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SOME GENERAL INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The assessment of the economic consequences of empires from the 
fifteenth century to the present raises a set of problems which should not 
be concealed, if we are to provide any meaningful answers to the questions 
implied in such a survey. First, it is useful to remember that these questions, 
as so many addressed by social scientists, are immersed in the interminable 
ideological debate about the development of nations. For example, it is 
not easy to avoid the judgement of empires as inherently good or bad, 
and to evade the prevailing notion that they are evil structures resting 
on some kind of violence, on which consequently it is not decent for any 
nation to have built its wealth. Anyway, even if we could easily do away 
with ideological controversies, and we cannot, we would still lack the 
appropriate statistical data, at least for most of the period under 
examination, which could support an accurate evaluation of the true 
economic consequences of empire. In fact, since we may never construct 
a plausible cost-benefit matrix or an acceptable estimate of the relative 
significance of imperial ventures ', controversy will always continué, not 
only about the interpretation of the effects of imperialism, but about the 
facts and figures themselves. 
There is of course much to gain from comparative analysis. The contrast 
between different empires should enable us to impxjse some general order, 
however loóse, onto the diversity of historical pattems, thus setting the 
standard to which each individual case can be compared. In this way, it 
may elucidate their specific characteristics as well. Since absolute 
conclusions are not at hand, then relative assertions, grounded on a 
comparative survey, will have to do. However, the variety of imperial 
P. K. 0'Brien(1991), p. 304. 
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ventures, which lends itself to that sort of inquiry, calis for a spccifically 
historical and cross-national scrutiny. Such a scrutiny must account for 
both the changing contexts in which successive or concurrent paths of 
empire building take place, and for the complexity of the relations between 
empires within the European state system and the world-cconomy (for 
instance in terms of competition, warfare, trade and investment). 
Furthcr difficulties arise from the fact that it is virtually impossible 
to sepárate the benefits from empires themselves (meaning some form 
of political or militar)' rule over territories, trading posts or commercial 
routes), from the profils generated by the operation oí purcly economic 
íorces, engaged, for instance, in the extensión of trade. In effect, it should 
be noted that, although the two undertakings are closely interrelated, to 
determine the economic consequences of empires and to estímate the 
contribution of the periphery to the economic growth of Western Europe 
are not one and the same thing, the former task being surely more difficult 
than the latter .^ In alerting my fellow researchers to the complexities of 
the Job facing them, it is not my purpose to discourage them from tackling 
the issue. Big questions are hard to answer, but this does not mean they 
should not be asked, for they are unquestionably the most fascinating. 
There is no reason why social scientists should not be bold when asking 
their questions, if they bear in mind the difficulties they will meet in their 
inquiry and as long as they are prepared to content themselves with more 
cautious answcrs than they would have contemplated at the beginning of 
the quest. 
THE PECULIARITIES OF PORTUGAL, PIONEER 
IN THE CONSTRUCnON OF EMPIRES 
In Portugal, a country which was the first to embark in the overseas 
expansión in the early-modem times, but was unable to follow the most 
progressive European countries in their way to modern economic growth, 
the controversy over empire displays peculiar features. With some 
variations, the debate, which finds its roots in some sixteenth-century 
concepts \ revolves around this altemative: did Portugal not develop 
- I. Wallcrstein (1974) and (1983); P. K. O'Bricn (1982) and (1991); II. Pohl (1990). 
' The notion decadcnce, one of the most compelling ways of represcnting Portuguese 
historv', originales in the sixteenth centur>' itself; see V. M. Godinho (1982), p. 13 and 
(1990), pp. 520-23. 
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because, in building the empire, the true bases on which national wealth 
could be built were disregarded, or rather because the vast resources 
generated by the empire were not put to proper use? The causes of 
economic backwardness undoubtedly constitute one of the most discussed 
historical issues in Portugal, and it is inevitable that the appraisal of the 
consequences of empire would be related to this issue. 
Along with the singularities of the controversy come the historical 
pecuÜarities themselves. The empires built by Western European states 
in the early modem period display striking similarities in their history and 
their structures. However, there are also some features which differentiate 
them from one another, and which may explain to some extent why some 
were more succcssful than others. In the first place, the singularity of 
Portugal comes from precedence. When Columbus set off on his voyage 
of discovery of America, Portuguese imperial endeavours already had an 
history of more than three-quarters of a century. These exploits had begun 
in 1415 by the seizure of Ceuta, a town in Morocco, just across from 
Gibraltar. The Portuguese proceeded with the discovery and peopling of 
the Atlantic islands of Madeira and the Azores, with the conquest of other 
towns in Morocco and with the exploration along the West Coast of África, 
until in 1487 they reached and turned the Cape of Good Hope, thus 
opening the way for the voyage of Vasco da Gama. In 1500, they discovered 
Brazil. By then, the scope of their economic ventures had been notably 
enlarged. In Morocco, they traded in Moorish textiles, corn and horses; 
they grew wheat in the Atlantic islands, and sugar-cane on Madeira; they 
captured Negro slaves along the West Coast of África, from Cape Branco 
(where a fort was built in the island of Arguin) and Guinea to Sierra Leone 
and beyond. Down the Grain Coast, further south in West África, they 
iraded in malagueta peppcr and slaves, and they finally reached the 
trans-Saharan lands where caravans took Sudanese gold and ivory, which 
were formerly and more expensively obtained in Morocco, to where it was 
carried across the desert. At the Portuguese trading posts and fortresses 
(the most important establishcd in Sao Jorge da Mina or Elmina) in the 
Gold Coast, gold was obtained in exchange for Moorish textiles, slaves 
and some European goods, an enterprise which formed a crown 
monopoly •*. In the second half of the fiftcenth centur>' Portugal held the 
' For the understanding of the workings of the Portuguese empire until the eighteenth 
centur>', the works of Vitorino Magalháes Godinho are absolutely indispensable. See, 
especially, Godinho (1962) and (1981-83). 
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undisputed command over this trade ' . In the prcxess, die Portuguese much 
extended the area for their físheries in North África and then in 
Newfoundland .^ 
Long before the voyage of Columbus, then, an empire overseas had 
been built by the Portuguese. An empire which already displayed a variety 
of structures and models of organisation later to be found in the other 
European empires: from the Moroccan strongholds to the settler colonies 
and plantations of the Atlantic islands; and, down the West Coast of África, 
from plunder to slave trade and from the commerce in luxuries (malagueta 
pepper and ivory) to the procurement of bullion. Moreover, some significant 
interconnections had already been established between the several parts 
of the empire. The Moorish textiles bartered for slaves and gold on the 
West Coast of África were acquired in the Moroccan fort-towns, which 
also served as bases to fend off the pirates who used to assail Portuguese 
vessels. Wheat of southern Morocco helped to feed the settlers in Madeira, 
where slaves from África were employed to grow sugar-cane. Slaves, ivory 
and malagueta pepper obtained in Guinea and the Grain Coast were 
exchanged for gold at Sao Jorge da Mina; and, of course, Portugal received 
the commodities procured in these various regions, to which it exported 
some of her own merchandise (mostly wine and olive oil), along with goods 
obtained from other European countries (mainly textiles and metáis) '. 
Most of this structure was to persist after Vasco da Gama's voyage, 
but the direct trade to India, which became a Portuguese monopoly until 
the late sixteenth century, soon overshadowed all other commercial and 
military endeavours. A new empire was built which was based upon the 
trade in luxuries (spices, drugs, jewels, silks and furniture). These 
commodities, which for the most part were paid for in bullion (silver) *, 
were brought to Lisbon and distributed across Europe through the 
Portuguese factory in Antwerp. To take part in the Indian trade, which 
they tried to control, the Portuguese sustained a long war against their 
rivals (mostly Muslim states and merchants), and so they found it necessary 
not only to keep a strong fleet in the Indian Ocean but also to establish 
forts and strongholds at strategic points ' . It was not just a matter of trade. 
' C. Rahn Philips (1990), p. 48. 
" Goclinho(1950), p. 33. 
' The works of Vitorino Magalháes Godinho are of paramount importancc for the 
understanding of the workings of the Portuguese empire until the eighteenth century. See, 
especially, Godinho (1962) and (1981-83). 
" Godinho (1978a) and (1981-83), i, 219-55 and ii, pp. 115-41. 
•* Godinho (1978b); M. N. Pearson (1987), ch. 2, 
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An imperial structure, the Estado da India, had been built, which extended 
from the East Coast of África to China. Portuguese policy in the East 
aimed at mastering and taxing the trade and navigation in the Indian Ocean. 
The Portuguese tried to impose the use of the trading posts under their 
control (where customs duties were coUected) and a rent was produced 
(both for the state and for crown officials, either through legal means or 
through corruption '") from selling protection to all ships cruising the Indian 
Ocean " . Furthermore, they also tried to reap the fruits of Asian carrying 
trade by organising commercial voyages along established routes (carreiras), 
for instance from Goa to Macao and Nagasaki '^. After the mid sixteenth 
century, the crown took a lesser part in intra-Asian trade. Reside the 
imperial organisation (the military-bureaucratic apparatus dominated by 
crown officials), Portuguese merchants and adventurers launched their own 
speculations, which became more independen! from state controls in the 
Far East. 
Despite all their efforts, the Portuguese could not completely cióse 
the Levant spice route. In the last third of the sixteenth century, the 
Mediterranean spice trade began to flow again and the Portuguese 
monopoly of the sea route to India came under attack from Dutch and 
English interlopers and privateers '^. Heavy losses at sea, increased 
transaction costs, which had always been high, and the competition from 
the more effícient and trade-oriented Dutch and English East India 
Companies all joined in reducing to less than a third the spice trade by 
the Cape route '"*. Private trade, both on the Cape route (mostly dealing 
in textiles and jewels) and in intra-Asian circuits, fared far better, but the 
decline of the Portuguese Eastern empire was under way " . 
Meanwhile, another empire was already under construction. It was 
meant to form a completely different model of imperial organisation: not 
'" N. Steensgaard (1973), pp. 81-95; Pearson (1976), p. 56. 
" Godinho (1978b). The conccpts of protection costs and protection rent developed 
by F. C. Lañe (1966) are particularly useful to analyse the economic system of the Portuguese 
empire in the East. See Lañe (1966), pp. 395-6; Steensgaard (1973); Wallerstein (1974), 
pp. 334-5; P. D. Curtin (1984), pp. 141-2 and Pearson (1991), p. 74. 
' ' Godinho (1978b) and (1981-83), iü, pp. 135-44; Subrahmanyam and Thomaz 
(1991), pp. 311-15. 
" Lañe (1966), pp. 31-33, 290-2; Godinho (1981-83), iü, pp. 81-94; Steensgaard 
(1973), pp. 168-9; C. H. Wake (1979), pp. 361-403; D. U c h (1994), pp. 127-31; Godinho 
(1978a), pp. 308-10. 
' ' Godinho (1978a), pp. 306-6; Steensgaard (1973), pp. 81-95. 
" A. R. Disney (1978). Othcr studies have emphasised the persistence of the Portuguese 
Eastern trade in the seventeenth century, against the more pessimistic views. See, for instance, 
Subrahmanyam (1985) and J. C. Boyajian (1993). See also Godinho (1990), pp. 345-50. 
97 
JüRíiE M PEDREIRA 
based on trading posts and the marketing of luxuries, but on territorial 
occupation, settlement, plantations and trade in groceries. For more than 
half a century after an early discovery, Brazil was a neglected colony, 
providing almost nothing except dyewood (brazil-wood). The cultivation 
of sugar-cane, which started around the mid-sixteenth century, spread after 
1570. Since the enslaving of Indians met with so many difficulties, the 
shortage of labour was solved by importing slaves from África. In 1570, 
there were two to thrce thousand Negroes in Brazil. Anticipating better 
conditions, planters from Sao Thomé moved to Brazil. Sugar plantations, 
later to be complemented by tobáceo and cattle raising, and slave trade 
soon provided the foundation of the new Portuguese Atlantic Empire, 
which united Brazil to Guinea and Angola '^. Through war and crisis (in 
the 1630's the Dutch seized a significant part of northern Brazil and the 
two Portuguese sources of African gold, Arguin and Mina), this empire 
Consolidated and expanded. However, the demand for tropical groceries 
on which the empire now rested proved to be somewhat unstable, and 
it produced sharp fluctuations, like the long recession from 1668 to 1690 " . 
In the very last years of the seventeenth century, the recovery of trade 
along previous lines was supplemented by the discovery of gold and 
diamond mines in Brazil. To be sure, Brazil never ceased to be a plantation 
economy (growing sugar, tobáceo, and later cotton and coffee), but during 
the first half of the eighteenth century gold became by far the most vital 
resource of the Portuguese empire. Brazilian gold, legally traded or 
smuggled into Europe, was certainly of paramount importance to the 
European (and especially to the British) supply of bullion in this period "*. 
However, the course of history was to change dramatically again for 
the Portuguese empire, when the consequences of diminishing gold and 
diamond resources started to be felt in the 1760's. After a period of crisis 
and uncertainty, the recuperation of the economy was partly based upon 
the growth of trade with Asia but fundamentally on the renewal of trade 
with Brazil. Portugal profited from a new expansión in the European 
demand for cotton and sugar '^. This expansión in tum stimulated exports 
of Portuguese products to the colonies. In order to obtain the tropical 
" F. Mauro (1956) and (1983); P. Verger (1970). 
" Godinho (1950a) and (1970). 
'" Godinho (1950a), pp. 192-3, V. N. Pinto (1979); Michcl Morineau has proposed 
a more modest evaluation of the economic effects of Brazilian gold remittances to Europe, 
Morineau (1985), pp. 190-7. 
" J. B. Macedo (1963), pp. 197-8; J. M. Pedreira (1994), pp. 263-70. 
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commodities, Portuguese merchants not only re-exported foreign 
manufactures and foodstuffs, but they also shipped national commodities, 
both industrial and agricultural. In the last years of the eighteenth century, 
the neutrality of Portugal in the French Wars proved to be particularly 
rewarding and created a period of prosperity for the Portuguese empire. 
Gaining from the crisis facing other colonial empires, Lisbon again became 
one of the most important trading ports for East Indian products. The 
demand for Brazilian commodities increased substantially and this in tum 
stimulated the growth of slave trade. Asian cotton textiles found their way 
to the expanding Brazilian market and to the African coasts, where they 
were exchanged for slaves. Brazilian, Asian and African trades were reunited 
in the process ^". However, this was to be a short-lived prosperity. The 
Portuguese colonial trade (thriving on neutrality) operated on a very delicate 
balance. Facing contradictory demands from France and England, Portugal 
was eventually invadcd and occupicd by French troops in 1807. During 
the next few years, struck first by the British blockade at sea and then 
by the calamities of war, the Portuguese-Brazilian empire collapsed. The 
royal family, having fled to Brazil, suspended the colonial system in 1808 
as a measure of necessity, but it was never reinstated. Under the new 
commercial structure, Portugal could no longer serve as the mandatory 
entrepót for the produce of Brazil, and although a brief and partial recover>' 
set in bctween 1814 and 1818, the alienation between Portugal and Brazil 
was then inevitable: the empire had come to an end ^'. 
Portugal was still to build another empire in África, but this is another, 
later, story. It nonetheless confirms the peculiarity of the Portuguese path: 
the role of pioneer generated a changing pattem for the empire or rather 
an ability to build new imperial structures without completely destroying 
the older ones. These part consecutive, part concurrent, structures worked 
in different geographical settings and ¡nstitutional contexts (from war and 
plunder, to settlement and plantations, from the organisation of luxury 
trades to the extraction of gold), and successive transitions certainly entailed 
múltiple adjustment costs. In the case of Portugal, then, the assessment 
of the long term consequences of empire must take into account that the 
economic implications of each of these historical experiences are rather 
different from one another. 
-"' V. Alexandre (1993), pp. 25-75; Pedreira (1994), pp. 261-78. 
'' Alexandre (1993), pp. 767-92; Pedreira (1993), pp. 232-40 and (1994), pp. 317-76. 
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THE OPENING OF NEW MARKETS AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
The succession of imperial structures, with different historical and 
geographical settings, had one major economic consequence: it extended 
the basis for economic integration. Portuguese voyages opened vast new 
markets and gave access to untapped sources of bullion, luxuries, tropical 
groceries, raw materials, and slave labour. As well as providing new outlets 
for Portuguese traditional exports (wine, salt, olive oil, dried fruit, fish) ^^ , 
the growth of market opportunities allowed for the development of the 
seabome trade (by means of the exchange of merchandise obtained or 
produced in one región for those acquired in another) and it established 
the foundation for a vast re-export traffic of overseas goods to the other 
European nations and of European products to the overseas. In this way, 
the procurement of colonial commodities amplifíed chances for the 
integration of Portugal within the Western European economic space. 
Portugal provided Western Europe with an array of non-European goods 
and in turn obtained European manufactures and foodstuffs both for home 
consumption and for the overseas trade. 
The benefits of this development of trade are obvious. The acquisition 
of merchandise at lower costs represented a net economy of resources, 
and the opening of new markets and opportunities for economic integration 
allowed for the development of the división of labour and specialisation. 
However, over the whole period under consideration, the promise of 
specialisation was largely left unfulfiUed. Although some merchandise and 
information flowed easily between cities, countries, and even continents, 
free trade took a long time to emerge, and circulation was subjected to 
political Controls and to the interference of the state and other powers. 
Institutional as well as structural factors combined to hinder specialisation. 
Such was the case of the shortage of business and technical skills and 
of the deficiency of transportation services. Such was especially the case 
of the host of restrictions imposed on the free use of land, on admissions 
to the industrial crafts and on economic enterprise in general. 
Administrative controls and economic interference from the state, which 
held monopolies of the more opulent trades (gold, spices, salt, tobáceo) 
for long periods of time, may have hindered specialisation and the growth 
of productivity. 
" C. Rahn Philips (1990), p. 57. 
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The direction of the state díid not preclude the interest of crown officials, 
aristocrats and sailors (besides merchants) in commercial undertakings and 
plundering expeditions in the capacity of both sponsors and direct 
participants. This amplified the weight of the military factor (both in the 
actual process of empire building and at the symbolic level), which in tum 
produced a new type of social character, the «merchant-knight» or the 
«nobleman-trader» ^\ The social differentiation of economic agents, 
incomplete as it was, did nothing to encourage puré merchant enterprise 
and may have even narrowed the scale to which the opportunities of 
specialisation were taken up ^'*. To be sure, many people were drawn to 
new endeavours, and merchants, which especially in the later period 
engrossed both the capital and the business skills, even became excessively 
specialised in the pursuits the empire most favoured (mostly colonial trade). 
Thus, they became very vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the imperial 
organisation. More than once, the merchant communities were stricken 
to the point of disintegration, when the sudden changes in the course 
of the history of the empire made adjustment costs almost unbearable ^'. 
Most of the time, however, social and economic agents lacked the 
information, the means or the chance to change their occupations for more 
rewarding ventures, and they of course could not benefít from hindsight 
and elect the correct path to follow. Accordingly, a large part of the 
population (exactíy how large it is impossible to determine) pursued their 
traditional and unproductive activities in agriculture and the handicrafts 
and they were only marginally affected by the construction of the empire. 
BUILDING AND SUPPORTING THE STATE 
The whole population could not help to be somehow affected by 
state-building, and the empire played a decisive role in this process. It 
may even be said that, at least after the Restoration of independence in 
1640, it was the empire that largely secured the survival of Portugal as 
an independent state ^^ . At any rate, in the early-modem period the 
construction of the state and the rise of the seabome trade were closely 
" Godinho (1981-83), i, pp. 51-62 and (1978c), p. 268. 
" This idea was originaUy suggested in 1873 by the Portuguese historian Oliveira 
Martins. On the question of the imp)erfect social differentiation of merchants see Pedreira 
(1995), pp. 11-20; see also Cuitin (1984), pp. 138-9. 
" J. GentÜ da Silva (1956), Boyajian (1983), Pedreira (1995), pp. 14-5, 140-2. 
'" C. R. Boxer(1961), p. 90. 
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intertwined. After the earlier stages (when the house of Prince Henry, 
the so-called Navigator, played a leading role), the state became the driving 
forcé behind the overseas territorial and commercial expansión. The miütary 
and bureaucratic apparatus set up and accomplished this expansión, which 
in tum supplied the means to strengthen the political centre. This is 
particularly apparent in the structure of public finance. Under the 
government of John II, in 1490-96, the state revenue collected in 
metropolitan Portugal totalled some 170 thousand cruzados, the receipts 
from African gold reached some 120 thousand and the crown obtained 
additional funds from the trade in spices and slaves in Guinea (since 1445) 
and sugar from Madeira (since 1460). Later, in 1506 and 1518-1519, 
maritime trade generated about t\vo-thirds of state resources ^^ . To be sure, 
part of this income did not derive, directly or indirectly, from the empire 
(coming from European and coastal trade), but Asian spices and African 
gold nevertheless accounted for more than half the crown's receipts. The 
general structure of Portuguese public finance remained virtually 
unchanged for almost a century, but the share of the Eastern Empire 
increased to more than 40 per cent *^*. However, in the 1620's, a severe 
crisis seriously reduced receipts, in particular those coming from trade with 
the dominions and the foreign nations. Despite attempts at the procurement 
of new sources of income, a necessity the War of Restoration made 
imperative after 1640, the receipts collected in the kingdom were still a 
lesser fraction of public revenue, although their share may have increased 
(in particular after the institution of a new direct tax especially levied to 
fund the war effort). 
From the second half of the seventeenth century onwards, Brazil 
became the major source of income for the Portuguese monarchy, and 
then came the Golden Age of Brazil, in the first half of the eighteenth 
century. Despite the plague of smuggling, gold and diamond remittances 
supplied the crown with ampie fresh new resources until the 1760's. In 
1716 the tax on gold accounted for some 10 per cent of the public revenue, 
and just before the gold and diamond mines started to drain, they provided 
a fifth of state receipts '^^ . It has been estimated that at the time of Pombal, 
the intercourse with Brazil supplied in one way or another almost 40 per 
cent of state exactions. As a result of the crisis of the 1760's and 1770's 
" Godinho (1978), pp. 56-7. 
" Godinho (1978), p. 56 and (1962a). On the structure of public finance, the work 
of Godinho is again invaluable. 
-'" Godinho {1978), pp. 71-2 and Tomaz (1988), p. 362. 
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this share may have marginally decreased, but this did not transform the 
fiscal structure. The critical importance of the colonies and the overseas 
trade in supporting the state persisted until the end of the 
Portuguese-Brazilian empire. 
This enduring financial organisation supplied the means for the rise 
of a strong political centre, which concentrated power without being drawn 
into extensive bargaining or heading for a clash with its more prominent 
subjects and powerful institutions. As a result, the political system had 
comparat ively few representa t ive ins t i tu t ions and secondary 
organisations '". In the fifteenth century, while other European countries 
were plagued with domestic strife, Portugal enjoyed a fairly peaceful 
period^'. The relative internal stability allowed the state to improve its 
distributive functions and enhance its entrepreneurial capacity, and to put 
some order into the host of rules, statuses and laws and reform the provisión 
of justice as well '^. The development of the state and the part it played 
in the commercial endeavours also favoured the introduction of new means 
of administration, which required calculation, and the spread of mercantile 
attitudes into broader circles of the Portuguese society. 
If the construction of the modern state is to be regarded as a positive 
factor for the long run development of an economy, the empire, by 
sustaining the state, certainly helped the modernisation of both the economy 
and the political structure. Yet, in Portugal, the government did not perform 
this role to perfection. It did restrain prívate violence and established the 
foundations of a legal and judicial system (which must have helped the 
enforcement of prívate contracts ^'). It also set up some basic infrastructure 
(shipyards, ports, storehouses, manufactories) and introduced a certain 
predictability into economic agency, inasmuch as it instilled trust in the 
'" C.TiUy(1992),p. 62. 
" C. Verlinden (1953) and Boxer (1961), p. 6. In 1438-48 there was however a bittcr 
conflict between houses of the royal family, which led to the death of formcr regent, Prince 
Pedro, in the battle of Alfarrobeira (1448). King Afonso V also tried to secure the regency 
of Castile and interfered in Castilian affairs until his prctensions were permanently thwarted 
after the battle of Toro (in 1476). 
'"' The first eomprehensive collection of laws was prepared in the mid-fiftecnth century 
(under the regency of Prince Pedro). Under the goverrunent of king Manuel new coUections 
Were arranged (one of them regarding expressiy the empire) and the royal courts were also 
reformed, thus forming a judicial, administrative and political structure which established 
the basis for the system of government in Portugal during the Anden Regime: see J. Subtil, 
(1993). p, 79; A. M. Hespanha (1991). 
" On the economic significance of the enforcement of legal contracts, see North and 
Thomas(1973), pp. 126-7. 
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economy by sticking to its engagements (contrasting with Spain, in Portugal 
the State never really went bankrupt in the sixteenth century, it merely 
determined the conversión of the floating debt in 1560 ^•'). Nonetheless 
it did not or could not restrain the interference of the Inquisition, which 
persecuted merchants from Jewish extraction and often seized their assets, 
forcing many more to emigrate. The Portuguese govemment also failed 
to clear away impediments to private enterprise, a design to which it was 
never really committed. For instance, the lav/s against usury were reiterated 
in 1570. Moreover, the fact that the state itself worked as an entrepreneur 
and monopolised some of the more profitable trades in no way promoted 
the spread of independent merchant ventures. 
The scale and consequences of govemment control over the imperial 
economy are open to discussion. It has been widely assumed that the 
organisation of crown monopolies seriously hampered private merchant 
enterprise", that, to put it in Weberian terms, bureaucracy killed 
capitalism. However, management and operation of such monopolies were 
not entirely left to royal officials, who (as even contemporary commentators 
pointed out) lacked the necessary skills to run them. Merchants, both 
foreign (Italian and Germán) and national, took part in the funding and 
organisation of these ventures. They shared in the marketing of the producís 
under royal monopoly and engaged in various contracts with the crown 
(including the chartering of the monopolies). They obviously collected large 
benefíts from this participation. The Portuguese «merchant-state» or 
«monarchical capitalism» did not engross the imperial endeavour to the 
exclusión of all others, although it did expressly exelude some, and its 
influence even started to wane after the second half of the sixteenth 
century '*. 
Anyway, the involvement of the crown, crown officials and the 
aristocracy certainly enhanced the role of conquest and plunder in empire 
building " . Conquest and trade were not always easy to reconcile, and 
it might even be said that, at least in the Eastern empire, too much was 
put into the building of a vast military-bureaucratic system but, bearing 
in mind the hostile circumstances under which that empire was built, it 
is difficult to imagine that the military factor could have been of only 
" Godinho (1962a), p. 114. 
" Diffie and Winius (1977), p. 312; A. K. Smith (1991), p. 87. 
" Godinho (1981-83), iii, pp. 77-69, 190-214; Lach (1994), pp. 109-12, 121-6, 
" Lañe (1966), pp. 401-2, 426-7. 
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secondary importance **. In fact, after the more precocious pioneering 
ventures, the state, and only the state, could organise the construction 
and the defence of the empire. Accordingly, pattems of public expenditure 
revea! the requirements of the armadas, the army and the colonial 
administration. 
There were however other less benefícial overtones to the structure 
and the financial arrangements of the Portuguese state. This is not so much 
the fact (as has been suggested) that the availability of commercial revenues 
precluded any push for institutional and structural reform, for it must not 
be taken for granted that such reforms would actually take place had those 
revenues not been available. It is just as plausible to imagine that a strong 
and effícient political centre would simply fail to develop. In fact, the more 
detrimental aspects of the financial structure rested on the very character 
of the Portuguese early-modem state, which made it unsuitable to perform 
the distributive role in a way conductive to economic growth. Portugal 
certainly developed a solid institutional centre, capable of organising the 
imperial enterprise, but in a sense it was a capstone govemment, not so 
much because it enjoyed arbitrary domination (which it did not), but 
because it lacked in infrastructural power and could not fully penétrate 
the society (although it did not meet with strong opposition from the 
peripheries)''. This circumscribed the possible positive effects of fiscalism, 
that is of the crown's undertakings to raise funds. Moreover, by placing 
the fiscal burden on the more dynamic ventures, the govemment could 
restrain their development. 
The structure of national budgets brings to light the underlying political 
models ^. Thus, the complex nature of the Portuguese «merchant state» 
showed in the way in which the imperial revenue was allocated, namely 
in the importance of extravagant expenses, such as the building of convents 
and churches, royal marriages, pensions and grants to the aristocracy, which 
had obviously nothing to do with maintaining the empire or fostering 
economic improvement. Therefore, the financial structure supported by 
" The contention of Michael Pearson to the contrary, as far as the Eastem empire 
is concemed, is not at all convincing. See M. N. Pearson (1976), p. 78. Although Asian 
trade used to be peaceful before the arrival of the Portuguese, they found almost immediately 
a hostile environment, and the fierce competition from Muslim merchants soon tumed into 
warfare. Furthermore, the comparative advantage the Portuguese enjoyed rested not so much 
on shipping itself but on firepower at sea. 
" On the notions of capstone state or govemment and infrastructural power see J. A. 
Hall (1988), pp. 33-34 and (1994), pp. 1-26, M. Mann (1986), pp. 477-83. 
* A. M. Hespanha (1991), p. 123; Godinho (1978). 
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the empire had ambivalent consequences as far as long term economic 
growth is concemed. But the question is: in the historical context of a 
pioneering empire and mercantilist competition, could it have been 
othenvise? 
POPULATION GROWTH, MIGRATION AND URBANISATION 
One of the most puzzling questions in the history of European overseas 
empires is how a small country with just a fraction over one million people 
in the early fifteenth century could launch the voyages of discovery and 
build an empire which encompassed every known continent, with domains 
in Morocco, the Atlantic islands, both coasts of África, South America, 
India and the Far East. In 1527-1531, at the height of her power, Portugal 
had still no more than 1.4 million people, numbers similar to those of 
the mid fourteenth century, before the Black Death •". During the fifteenth 
century, the empire was not too demanding as far as demography was 
concemed. Colonising the Atlantic islands (Madeira, the Azores, and then 
Cape Verde and Sao Thomé) and supplying the garrisons and officials 
of the forts and factories of Morocco and the West Coast of África did 
not require very significant demographic outflows. No more than 50,000 
people left Portugal for places overseas before the voyage of Vasco da 
Gama (an average of some 500 every year), and many did of course 
return '*^ . 
In the sixteenth century migration increased. In 1540, the fort-towns 
of Morocco contained some 25,000 to 30,000 people (5,000 of which were 
soldiers). By then, there were some 17,000 Portuguese nationals in Madeira 
and another 10,000 in the other Atlantic islands. In the East, the Portuguese 
population did not reach this number, more than half (5,000 to 6,000) 
lived in the city of Goa and the rest were scattered over countless towns, 
from Abissinia to Japan. In Brazil white people still numbered only 2,000. 
Every year, from 1500 to 1580, 3,000 to 5,000 Portuguese quit the country 
for its overseas territories (in the thirty years after the Cape route had 
been discovered, the lavishness of the Eastem empire alone enticed about 
2,000 emigrants annually). It has been estimated that during that period 
280,000 people departed, the equivalent to a yearly average of 3,500. Over 
the next sixty years, these numbers increased to 300,000 to 350,000 and 
" A. H. Oliveira Marques (1987), pp. 291-307; T. Rodrigues (1993), p. 211. 
" On emigration see Godinho (1978d) and Rodrigues (1993), pp. 236-41. 
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5,000 to 6,000, respectively. Brazil, which counted 20,000 Portuguese in 
the 1580's and 50,000 in 1610 (beside 120,000 Negro and Indian slaves), 
already attracted the largest part of the migration flow, while the Spanish 
possessions (Rio de la Plata and Perú) also tempted many Portuguese. 
After Portugal regained indepcndence in 1640, emigration slowed: until 
the end of the century some 120,000 people (or 2,000 annually) set sail, 
bound primarily for Brazil. The Brazilian gold rush raised this number 
to 600,000 over the next sixty years. Migration must have eased off in 
the 1760's and 1770's, but, at the turn of the century, commercial prosperity 
spurred it again. The retreat of the royal family and the court to Rio de 
Janeiro in 1807 formed a further encouragement. But then war became 
an obstacle to mobility. Emigration to Brazil was not inhibited by the 
collapse of the oíd colonial system and not even by the secession of political 
lies. After the indepcndence in 1822, some 4,000 to 5,000 Portuguese 
departed every year to the former dominión, a stream which more than 
doubled in the last quartcr of the nineteenth century. 
AJthough the Portuguese did not build their empire alone, and found 
support, from the very beginning of their overseas expansión, from Italians, 
Flemish, Germans and CastiÜans, migration certainly affected population 
growth in Portugal, but not to the point of generating a peculiar pattem 
of demographic development. There is no evidence to support the more 
pessimistic assumptions. Even in the peak years, emigration did not exceed 
0.5 per cent of the population •". Furthermore, many of those who left 
would later return. It has been estimated that only about a third of the 
Portuguese who arrived in Asia until the end of the sixteenth century did 
not come back to the motherland '^*. At that time, expatríate Portuguese 
numbered 100 to 150 thousand, that is 7 to 10 per cent of the metropolitan 
population'". 
As it was, Portuguese population grew at virtually the same rate of 
the French population and faster than the Spanish (to be sure, not the 
more demographically dynamic European countries) from the sixteenth and 
•" For instancc, A. K. Smith suggests that Portugal started to loóse population in the 
sixteenth century, bcfore the other European countries, which only suffered losses in the 
following century; Smith (1991), p. 88. This cannot at all be confirmed. Until the end 
of the sixteenth century, the gross rate of emigration has been estimated at 1,5 to 3,5 "/,„. 
In the seventeenth century the available estimate puts it at between 3 and 3,5 7«> (see 
Rodrigues, 1993, pp. 236-7). From a demographic perspective, the damages inflicted by 
the War of Restoration after 1640 and the crises of the seventeenth century were far greater. 
" Subrahmanyam and Thomaz (1991), p. 319. 
" Godinho(1978d), pp. 8-9. 
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the early nineteenth century. This may in part be explained by the fact 
that, from the second half of the fifteenth century onwards, departures 
were partially compensated for by the import of slaves. In that period, 
slaves arriving in Portuguese seaports numbered around 700 each year, 
and it has been calculated that over the next century this figure went up 
to between 2,000 and 3,000, totalling some 250,000 ''*. Although present 
in most áreas of the country at the end of the sixteenth century, slaves 
only formed a sizeable portion of the population in certain towns and 
regions (up to 10 per cent in Lisbon and the Algarve). These ratios 
subsequently declined. Slave labour was primarily employed in the domestic 
services, but also in transportation and urban crafts, and even, on a smaller 
scale, in agriculture (particularly in Southern regions). The benefits from 
its use were mostly indirect. Slaves counterbalanced the loss of population 
and they allowed for the Portuguese to take up more skilled and productive 
activities. Most of all, they secured the manpower for the construction 
of the empire. In Madeira, Sao Thomé and Brazil, and still in other parts 
of the empire, in the plantations and in the mines, slaves discharged the 
heavier services and became the backbone of the primary sectors of the 
economy. From the mid sixteenth century onwards, slave trade formed 
an essential component of the Portuguese empire, but it was more and 
more a matter of supplying labour to the overseas possessions (and to 
Spanish America as well), rather than meeting the needs of metropolitan 
Portugal. 
In general, emigration may have deprived the country of manpower, 
skills and entrepreneurship, because emigrants, as a rule, were young males, 
more literate and ambitious than the whole population, and some of them 
had even leamt some trade. On the other hand, emigration made possible 
the colonisation of new territories, opening new markets and providing 
luxuries and tropical groceries at lower costs. Migration eased economic 
conditions in the more densely populated áreas, especially in the Northwest. 
In the eighteenth century, Brazil became something of a frontier (a role 
the Eastern empire had had more difficulty in performing). A lengthy 
sojourn in the colony secured one of the easiest means to climb up the 
social ladder. Many of those who crossed the Atlantic in search of fortune 
failed. Others never retumed, but some did succeed and came back with 
their wealth, acquired in business (mirúng, plantations, commerce) and 
in the civil service. The Portuguese economy certainly benefited from this 
'" Godinho (1981-83), IV, p. 168. 
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movement, to an extent which is impossible to determine. This pattem 
of emigration, although it changed over the years (poor peasants and 
workers replacing litera te ambitious people), persisted throughout the 
nineteenth century, and the inflow of remittances, of profíts and assets 
from the colonies certainly helped the Portuguese economy. It might be 
said that the availability of such resources postponed structural change, 
but then again, it is far from certain that such a change would have occurred 
anyway. 
Perhaps still more important than the consequences of emigration, were 
the changes introduced to the pattems of settlement within Portugal. Before 
the seaborne expansión started, the Northwest was already the more densely 
populated región, but the towns (with more than 500 people) concentrated 
in the inner parts of the country. Even in 1527, after one century of overseas 
expansión, the coast Une, except for the Northwest and for some especially 
favoured locations (along rivers), was underpopulated ''^ . Nevertheless, 
Lisbon which had become the centre of administration and the chief port 
of the African and Asían trades, was already a very large city, with some 
70,000 residents. At that time, it was one of the largest cities in Europe, 
outnumbered only by París, Naples, Milán and Verdee (and on a par with 
Granada and Prague). Since it kept growing steadily (100,000 inhabitants 
in mid century, 120,000 in 1590, 165,000 in 1620, and 180,000 in 1700 
when no other city in Portugal reached 25,000), it is not surprísing that 
it figured among the top ten cities of Europe until the early nineteenth 
century •**. As a matter of fact, the empire set in motion two mechanisms 
which were to shape the distribution of the population in the centuries 
to come: demographic growth now converged in the seashore (north of 
the Tagus and in the Algarve) and the urban population concentrated in 
Lisbon to an exceptional degree. 
The empire stimulated urbanisation predominantly in the growth of 
the capital. Only in the eighteenth century did Oporto exceed 20,000 
inhabitants (when Lisbon approached 200,000), and just before the loss 
of the Brazilian empire, no other town yet topped that mark. In fact, apart 
from Lisbon and Oporto, there were no other true cities: medium-sized 
urban centres (with more than 20,000 people) were lacking altogether. 
Low agricultural productivity restrained the growth of provincial towns, 
which never reached the scale required to promote functional specialisation. 
'' T. Rodrigues (1993), pp. 2ü7-8, 230-3. 
" P. Bairoch, J. Batou. F. Chévre (1988), pp. 276-80. 
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Strong regional centres were virtually non-existent, with the important 
exception of Oporto (which in the eighteenth century became the capital 
of an economic región not particuiarly dependent on the colonies) •*'. The 
highly asymmetrical urban structure was not particuiarly helpful for 
economic development. Urbanisation, then, meant the expansión of Lisbon, 
and was largely precipitated by the construction of the empire. But, for 
all its growth and urban supremacy, Lisbon, which vitally depended on 
maritime trade, did not build an integrated national market on the strength 
of its consumption needs and distributive capacity, unlike other European 
cities, such as London and Amsterdam, which also enjoyed primacy in 
the respective national urban systems. In fact, the primacy of Lisbon is 
both modern and pre-modem in character'". On the one hand, it 
accumulated urban functions and the respective infrastructure, as a 
commercial and administrative centre; but, on the other hand, its growth 
was disproportionate to the functions it actually performed in the national 
economy {naturally this disparity is in part explained by the position it 
held in the imperial system). So, in the long run, the concentration of 
wealth and population in only one city, which played the roles of political 
capital and chief port-town at the same time, appears to have been more 
harmful than propitious for the economic development of Portugal. 
AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY AND INDUSTRIALISATION 
Portuguese urban structure may suggest that except for Lisbon and 
Oporto, the country was left untouched by the overseas expansión. This 
is not however the case. To be sure, the more inner regions did not take 
an active part in the development of the empire and their economies were 
certainly not affected in the same way as that of these larger port-towns. 
Apart from some indirect consequences which have already been mentioned 
(for instance those deriving from the structure of public finance), the new 
opportunities for economic integration had nonetheless some effects on 
the more traditional occupations. 
In Portugal, com imports, coming both from the Mediterranean and 
northem Europe, originated in the Middle Ages. Early in the overseas 
expansión, new sources of supply were found in the Atlantic islands (where 
'" Pedreira(1994),pp. 391-5. 
"' On modem and pre-modem primacy in urban systems, sce C. Smith (1982), 
pp. 79-96 and J. de Vries (1984), pp. 89-90. 
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initially wheat was cultivated) and in the plains dominated by the fort-towns 
of southem Morocco". Furthermore, the colonial trade provided the 
means to increase importation from foreign nations, which became all the 
more necessary to support the growing population of Lisbon. Easier imports 
of wheat from the more productive regions of Europe certainly did not 
favour national production, but Portuguese agriculture was not too 
distressed, because of the protection accorded by the state and the local 
authorities and of the narrow scope of domestic markets '^. However, these 
developments were not entirely determined by the expansión of the imperial 
economy, because integration into European trade also relied on such 
Portuguese commodities as salt and wine, and had similar economic 
consequences (thus, in exchange for the salt they took from Portugal, the 
Dutch brought com, textiles and timber, along with silver). In the long 
run, foodstuffs (grain, fish, butter, cheese) formed the largest part of 
Portuguese imports, and this exposed the deficiencies of national food 
production " . At the same time, Portuguese wine and olive oil found new 
outlets in the overseas markets, but increased demand (although it 
encouraged the extensión of production) did not bring about vast structural 
changes. In fact, one of the most significant innovations, the extensión 
of vineyards in the Douro valley, took place much later, in the second 
half of the seventeenth century, as a result of a straight connection with 
a European country (England), and owed nothing to the empire, which 
until the nineteenth century had a very small share in the Port-wine market. 
On the other hand, there are links relating the empire to the major 
structural change to Portuguese agriculture in the sixteenth century, namely 
the introduction of maize in the Northwest, where it benefited from 
propitious natural conditions. Contrary to the widely accepted notion that 
the introduction of maize in Europe did not initiate economic 
innovations''', in north-westem Portugal it has been called a revolution, 
because it allowed for more fruitful cultivation cycles and for a swift increase 
in basic food production, sustaining higher levéis of population density 
in the región and then feeding emigration''. This pattem survived until 
the twentieth century. The new crop undoubtedly came from the overseas. 
U /f 
" Gcxlinho (1981-83), m, pp. 217-67. 
'" The idea, advanced for instance by A. K. Smilh (1991), p. 88, that some productive 
soils finds no support whatsoever in the existing evidence. 
" D. Justino (1988-89), II, p. 60; Alexandre (1993), p. 74; Pcdreira (1994), pp. 389-90. 
"' P. Hohcnberg (1977); W. Reinhard (1990), p. 33. 
" O. Ribeiro (1985), pp. 294-8; Godinho (1981-83), IV, pp. 23-38. 
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Maize may have been brought directly from África by the Portuguese 
explorers and merchants, but it may as well have come from Spanish 
America. Therefore the connection with the empire is not at all certain, 
and even if it could be ascertained, it is perfectly plausible to imagine 
that, had Portugal not embarked in the overseas expansión, maize could 
still have been introduced from Spain. Apart from the introduction of maize, 
Portuguese agriculture was not much changed by the new setting created 
by the overseas expansión, into which it was only pardy integrated. Easier 
imports of com, a modérate extensión of cash-crops (wine, olive oil and 
fruit), and the marginal employment of slave labour could not really recast 
the most traditional of occupations. 
The effects of empires on industry lie at the core of the controversy 
about their role in the long term economic development of Europe '^. 
Since industrialisation is regarded as the lever of modem economic growth, 
this is scarcely surprising. Although Portugal did not develop a fully 
industrialised economy until well into the twentieth century, industry was 
certaiíJy more affected than agriculture by colonial trade. From the very 
early stages, some industrial activities provided indispensable equipment 
for overseas expansión. For example, the system of plunder, conquest, 
and trade was built, to a large extent, using guns and sails. Most of the 
larger manufacturing units were connected to the imperial endeavour. In 
the royal storehouses, workshops were established to make the gtms and 
other weapons which secured the military pre-eminence of the Portuguese, 
and shipbuilding, supplying the celebrated caravels, was no less important 
than the artillery. Although shipyards existed in several ports, the royal 
workshops of the Ribeira das Naus, in Lisbon became the most important, 
particularly after the inauguration of the Cape route to India, because they 
made the larger ships required by the trade to the East. Shipbuilding 
promoted the growth of ancillary industries, such as hemp spinning and 
sail weaving, which developed in different parts of the country. Finally, 
large fumaces were erected to provide biscuits which used to feed the 
crews and the soldiers while on board. All these manufacturing enterprises, 
were either initiated or animated by the expansión of the empire. Innovation 
was nevertheless restricted to the kinds of products they supplied (for 
instance some varieties of ships and textiles), although the large royal 
manufactures may have promoted the development of more centralised 
modes of production and the advancement of certain skills (especially in 
" O'Brien (1982) (1990) and (1991) and Wallerstein (1974-89) and (1983) 
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shipbuilding). A few prívate businessmen benefited from the orders placed 
by the royal shipyards and the arsenal and worked as contractors for them ' ' . 
However, this did not enhance the country's industrial potential very much. 
Part of the raw materials and semi-manufactured inputs were imported 
(iron, timber for ship-poles, pitch, hemp, textiles), and improvements in 
production techniques were kept to a few large units, state-owned or 
strongly protected by the state, and did not spread to the rest of the 
industrial sector, in which basic skills were lacking. 
Thus, for a very long time, the benefits the industrial activities derived 
from the overseas expansión were restricted to the firms and sectors which 
provided some of the basic inputs for the very construction of the empire. 
The opening of new markets and the fresh opportunities for economic 
integration had a very limited impact on the manufacturing sector. 
Traditional sectors, such as salt production, benefited from the integration 
into larger markets. Exports grew because the Dutch demand for salt was 
matched by the Portuguese demand for silver, on which the trade to Asia 
so vitally depended. However, until the Portuguese-Brazilian commercial 
system had been Consolidated, domestic manufactured goods formed a 
small part of the cargoes of the Portuguese ships taking part in the long 
distance trade. Cloth, weapons and metalwork, paper and powder in small 
quantities, made up the commodities exchanged for the exotic goods from 
the colonies. National industrial articles had a smaller share in the overseas 
markets than the foreign manufactures re-exported from Portugal. Retums 
from the empire, particularly those coming from the transhipping of colonial 
goods to European entrepóts, provided the means for the Portuguese 
economy to import these manufactures both for home consumption and 
for marketing in the empire. It has even been suggested that in early-modem 
Portugal industry and trade operated in countercycles, and industrial spurts 
occurred only during commercial crises and downswings, when imports 
became much more diffícult to procure, for, as a rule, the profits from 
trade in tropical groceries and bullion made industrial policy superfluous '*. 
In fact, major government-driven attempts at industrial development, in 
the late seventeen century and again in the 1770's, under Pombal, took 
place when the imperial economy was in distress " . However, these were 
" On the royal manufactures which supplied cquipment to the imperial ventures, and 
especially on shipbuilding and the shipping undustry, see L. F. Costa (1993) (1996) and 
(1997). 
" Godinho (1950a). 
" Godinho (1970) and (1955); Macedo (1989), ch. 5. 
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mercantilist state-driven efforts, the impact of which is difficult to assess 
and, in any event, this is not a general pattern. In the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries commercial prosperity and industrial 
progress go hand in hand ^ . 
What part did the empire play in this industrial dcvelopment? Industrial 
exports werc almost entirely scnt to the colonies and only very small portions 
of lincn cloth and leather goods were sold to Spain and Italy. In the closing 
stages of the colonial system, Brazil took 94 per cent of the exports of 
Portuguese manufactured goods. The significance of colonial demand 
varied from one particular industry to another. Most important among 
manufacture exp<5rts were printed calicóes and linen cloth (a little under 
60 per cent of the total). In the early nineteenth century, cotton-printing, 
a new industry concentrated in a few faetones and large workshops around 
Lisbon, exported a substantial share of its output (60 or 70 per cent), 
while the linen and lace manufacture, a purely domestic industry, which 
employed a large part of the population of the north-westem districts and 
used both local and imported raw-material, shipped to Brazil the equivalent 
to 15 to 30 per cent of its production. At this time, colonial markets were 
also important to some other industrial branchcs: silk, woollens, hat-making 
and workshops producing nails and agricultural tools from iron. Both in 
the scattered looms, workshops and factories in the north-eastem districts, 
and in Lisbon and Oporto, silk manufacturing was a very important 
industrial sector, and colonial markets played a significant role in its 
development. A role which was not so important for the vast wooUen 
proto-industrial áreas, for these only exported a small share of their output, 
which was basically sold at home. On the other hand, hat-making sold 
a sizeable part of its production to Brazil, both the coarser articles to be 
worn by slaves and workers (provided by the town and cottage workshops 
in the Northwest) and the finer hats, produced in Lisbon. For other 
important industrial branches, however, such as leather-making, ceramics 
and glass-making, the colonies were only marginal markets ^'. 
There can be no doubt that colonial prosperity, generated by a new 
expansión in the European demand for cotton and sugar and profiting 
from the crisis that beset the other colonial empires, was a major driving 
forcé for the development of the manufacturing sector. The export of 
industrial goods then became one of the more dynamic branches of 
"' Pedreira (1988) and (1994), ch. 1. 
" Pedreira (1993), pp. 228-32 and (1994), pp. 278-306. 
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Portuguese foreign trade, growing at a higher rate than gross exports and 
increasing its share in the commodities sent to Brazil to 35 per cent. This 
spurt, in the closing stages of the eighteenth century, had some structural 
consequences. New industrial units were founded. The geographical 
location of industrial activities changed and the coast was henee preferred 
as a site for the manufacturing enterprises. Domestic industry as welJ as 
small workshops developed. Some technical innovations were introduced 
and a new industrial Business (cotton-printing) emerged. Alas industrial 
growth soon ran into obstacles not only within the Portuguese economy, 
but in the system of trade itself. The true lever of the prosperity that 
the Portuguese merchant economy enjoyed was its position as an entrepót 
between the foreign nations and Brazil. At the end of the Atlantic empire, 
between 1796 and 1806, national manufactures and foodstuffs accounted 
for only 48 per cent of all shipments to Brazil, meaning that re-exports 
accounted for more than half the traffic. Exports to the foreign nations 
consisted of 27 per cent of Portuguese and 62,7 per cent of Brazilian 
goods. Marketing of Brazilian sugar, cotton, hides and tobáceo formed 
the most important branch of this system of trade, and foreign merchandise 
(foodstuffs, raw materials and industrial commodities) had to be accepted 
in exchange. In this way, although they made some progress, Portuguese 
manufactures never displaced large imports of textiles from Europe and 
Asia, which supplied more than half the shipments of cloth to Brazil. It 
must be emphasised that the development of Portuguese industry in the 
later stages of the oíd colonial system did not bring Portugal to the verge 
of modern industrialisation. Therefore, the breakdown of that system, 
serious as it was, cannot be blamed for the country's failure to join the 
first comers to industrialisation ^^. 
LIMITATIONS AND SPILLOVERS 
The empire most certainly changed Portuguese economy and society. 
Changes did not affect the entire country in the same way. Some parts 
had virtually no direct relations with the empire and were almost left 
untouched by the overseas expansión. For the rest, however, economic 
life became transfigured. In the long run, the empire determined some 
very momentous transformations: for instance, the levéis of public and 
Pedreira (1993), pp. 251-2 and (1994), pp. 365-75. 
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family consumption surely increased; a more centralised state was built 
(a development which was not free from economic reverberations); the 
commercialisation of the economy spread; new pattems of population 
settlement appeared; Lisbon grew into a very large city (even by European 
standards); and some industries developed. 
In its final stages, the colonial system fulfiUed six main functions for 
the Portuguese economy: (a) it supplied the mainland with foodstuffs 
(sugar, coffee and rice) and raw-materials (mainly hides, cotton, dyewood 
and tobáceo); (b) it provided privileged access to markets for mainland 
production (manufactures, wine, etc.); (c) it stimulated sectors of trade 
between the domains themselves, especially through slave trade; (d) it 
established the basis for a vast re-export trade of colonial goods to the 
foreign nations and of foreign commodities to the overseas; (e) it allowed 
for the transfer of private income and assets from the colonies to the 
mainland; and finally (O it generated most of the state revenues (through 
the transfer of taxes from the dominions, customs tariffs and trade 
monopolies). These were by all means pivotal functions and the breakdown 
of this system meant a very serious setback for the economy. Then Portugal 
suffered severe losses (greater than Spain's) and lost the solé external outlet 
for the more dynamic parts of the manufacturing sector^'. In the 
International división of labour Portugal was thereafter confined to the 
role of supplier of foodstuffs and raw-materials, for which International 
demand lagged behind the growth of world tr^de. No opportunities for 
specialisation within the more dynamic industrial sector were to be found 
for a very long time. In turn, the economic pattem fostered by the imperial 
monopoly can only be explicitly represented as harmful because the empire 
crumbled. Had it persisted, it might have proven to be benefícial. This 
does not mean that the empire had brought the Portuguese economy to 
edge of industrialisation and that this prospect was suddenly shattered by 
the coUapse of the colonial system. It merely says that this collapse put 
Portugal in a much worse position to initiate modern economic 
development. 
In any case, the empire displayed severe limitations as an engine of 
growth. A significant part of the receipts generated by colonial exploration 
and long-distance trade was consumed in maintaining the empire itself. 
Military and administrative expenses were always very high, both in the 
" Pedreira (1993), pp. 248-9 and (1994), pp. )65-66; L. Prados de La Escosura (1988), 
p. 85. 
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fortresses and trading posts of the Eastem empire (although, contrary to 
more pessimistic views, the Estado da India ordinarily yielded a net 
surplus " ) , and in the territorial control of Brazil. The pattems of public 
expenditure (and to some extent of private expenditure as well) certainly 
restricted the potential extemalities from the imperial venturas. The ways 
in which government and households spent their income were nevertheless 
dictated by specific structural and cultural attributes of the Portuguese 
society, which may only in part be imputed to its imperial character. And 
the counterfactual notion that resources would have been allocated 
differently and more efficiently if the empire had not been out there is 
impossible to substantiate. 
Moreover, a large share of the revenues produced by the Portuguese 
colonial empire never reached Portugal or accrued to other European 
nations. The increasing importance of the Creóle element and of 
inter-colonial exchange must not be overlooked. For instance, the East 
African trading posts fell into the orbit of the Indian commercial network. 
As Asian carrying trade achieved increasing significance as compared with 
trade on the Cape route, in which private business played an ever growing 
part, the Estado da India, with its centre in Goa, gained considerable 
autonomy ^'. In the Atlantic, Portuguese merchants gradually lost control 
of the slave trade to Brazilian and Luso-african slavers, who enjoyed more 
favourable economic conditions (namely the access to the by-products of 
sugar and tobáceo cultivation which bought slaves in West África) **. 
International relations of competition and co-operation not only 
affected the magnitude of retums from the empire but could even 
determine the general course of its history. Warfare undoubtedly played 
a role in rising transaction costs for the Portuguese imperial economy, but 
sometimes it really changed its fortune. In the early sixteenth century, 
French privateers regulariy attacked Portuguese vessels on the route 
between from Lisbon and Antwerp. Later on, the onslaught of the British 
and the Dutch precipitated the break of the Portuguese monopoly of 
navigation on the Cape route and the eventual demise of the Eastem empire 
and it seriously restricted the significance of Portuguese trade in West 
África as well. On the other hand, co-operative relations could peacefuUy 
transfer the extemalities from the Portuguese empire to other European 
" Godinho (1982b), p. 346, A. T. Matos (1985); Subrahmanyam and Thomaz (1991), 
p. 317. 
" Godinho (1978b), WaUerstcin (1974), p. 343, Cunin (1984), pp. 142-3. 
•* J. C. Millcr (1988), pp. 207-313, 445-81; Verger (1970). 
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countries. From the earlier tentative steps, merchants and sailors from Italy, 
Flanders and Castile took part in the Portuguese undertakings, and 
although some were assimilated into Portuguese society others were not. 
The navigation and trade on the Cape route immediately invited the interest 
of the great merchant houses of the day. ItaÜan and Germán syndicates 
were prominent in the outfitting of the fleets, the ñnancial arrangements 
for the expeditions and the marketing of spices in Anfwerp. As far as 
the manufacturing sector was concerned, tropical groceries and raw 
materials coming from the Portuguese dominions generally found their way 
into the faetones and workshops of northern Europe. In the sixteenth 
century, sugar from Sao Thomé was shipped to the refineries of Antwerp 
and Amsterdam'". In the late eighteenth century, Brazilian cotton was 
feeding the ever growing European, and particularly British, industr)', much 
more than the Portuguese, which failed to take off. At that time, Portuguese 
merchants and ships, engrossed as they were in the overseas trade, in which 
they enjoyed the protection that the colonial system accorded them, played 
only a minor role in the conunercial intercourse with Europe ^ **. 
Therefore, in a way or another, foreigners from various origins benefited 
from the Portuguese imperial endeavour. They may have taken away profits 
and resources, but in turn they supplied capital, skills and commodities 
which Portugal was lacking, and which proved essential to the construction 
of the empire. Could it really have been otherwise? Was this not a basic 
condition for the very construction and persistence of the empire? That 
a small country, with very restricted means, could build an empire which 
encompassed the world may weli only be explained by its ability to captivate 
and mobilise the energy of others. This is the inherent contradiction of 
empires, for they are meant to fend off foreign competition, but, with 
the odd exception, their very subsistence makes spillovers unavoidable. 
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THE AMERICAN EMPIRE AND THE SPANISH 
ECONOMY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
BARTOLOMÉ YUN-CASALILLA 
(University of Valladolid) 
The Spanish Empire in America —so envied by other countries— has 
never been regarded by economic historians as an unmixed blessing. For 
Hamilton, the precious metáis from the Americas caused a parallel rise 
in prices and wages, reducing industrial investment and thus aborting the 
development of capitalism. For Vilar, a critic of that view, the Empire, 
as «the supreme phase of feudalism», led to a primitive accumulation of 
capital responsible for freezing structures inhibiting to capitalism. 
Wallerstein recognised that America was essential for the conversión of 
Spain into a semi-periphery of the world market ' . To that can be added 
other less general but equally negative approaches concerning the effects 
of emigration or of American treasure, seen by many as contributing to 
an absolutism powerful enough to impose a foreign policy alien to the 
interests of the country and highly damaging to the Spanish economy, and 
to that of Castile in particular. 
The resulting picture, in large measure sustained by an emphasis on 
supposed defects in the economy, society and government of 16th-century 
Spain, which America merely accentuated, has not, however, cohered into 
a general overview which would permit a more balanced assessment of 
the economic consequences of empire. ITie aim of these pages is to set 
out such an overview and to present a revisión of certain more specific 
issues in the light of recent research. 
1. A CRUDE BUT NECESSARY APPROXIMATION: AMERICA 
AND THE KEY STATISTICS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
Despite the one-sided emphasis on the powerful distorting effect of 
America on the Spanish economy, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
Vilar (1956") (1956b), Wallerstein (1974). 
123 
BARTOLOMÉ YUNCASAULLA 
in global, macro-economic terms the impact of America on the Spanish 
economy was slight. 
Faced with the estimates of Momer ,^ for example, what is stressed 
now is both the limited scale of emigration —500,000 emigrants between 
1500 and 1800— and the fact that far from having a determining effect 
on demographic development, and specifically on depopulation, it simply 
reflected the greater or lesser vitality of the population of the metrópolis '. 
From the fiscal point of view American treasure was never the panacea 
it was thought to be. Receipts for the Crown [Graph 1] rose in Une with 
buUion retums throughout the period. In effect, it was pardy due to them 
that Philip II was able to maintain the rising real valué of his revenues 
until the early years of the I7th century, [Graph 1 ] whereas other monarchs, 
as in England, saw a real decline in their revenues after 1550''. 
Nevertheless, the Graph also shows that the rise in the Crown's revenues 
began before the 1530s, when American treasure was only just beginning 
to be important. Not until the last quarter of the century, did it reach 
significant proportions. [Table I] Moreover, this inflow was always very 
variable, irregular and unpredictable, thus making it necessary for the 
Crown to resort to extremely costly fínancial expedients. The colonies 
produced income, but they also imposed costs, and, although we do not 
know what proportion was spent strictly on the defence of the Americas, 
it is to be noted that in the 18th century total defence costs exceeded 
by some way silver retums and, at times of greatest activity, around the 
1790s, the combined total of silver imports and tobáceo duties, a revenue 
closely tied in with the Atlantic trade '. 
With regard to the price revolution, it now seems reasonable to believe 
that we are not faced with a phenomenon solely monetary in origin. If 
bullion had its part, it is no less true that the price rise can also be 
understood in terms of Castilian demographic fluctuations .^ Furthermore, 
theories such as those of J. Goldstone ,^ relating inilation to urbanisation 
' Mómer(1975). 
' According to Martínez Shaw (1993), emigration was high until 1580, not until 1625 as 
has bcen claimed; it coincided with the period of demographic expansión which reached its peak 
around the former date, and then, in the wake of the demographic crisis of the 17th century, 
fell back to a leve! of some 100,000 emigrants in each of the two succeeding centuries. 
•• O'Brien and Hunt (1993), pp. 152-4. 
' Income into the Depositaría de Indias was in cxcess of 600 million reales in 1760-69, 
nearly 660 in 1770-79, and rather more than 420 in 1780-89 [Barbier, 1980]. In those same 
decades naval expenditure was 870, 1140 and 1780 respectively. 
'' Nadal (1959). 
' Goldstone (1984) (1991). 
124 
TliE AMERICAN EMPIRE AND THE SPANISH ECONONIY 
§ 
s 
^ 
s 
^ 
X -i 
Ü 
. i b 
^ 
j 
j 
^ Jt 
\ 
• 
• 
• 
• 
> 
1 
s 
3 
5 "S 
O —1 ^-. 1 - Z 
Z |_ Z to < 
•TT w < < Q-y < £ o o> OC o C/5 ~ ^ ^—' 
^ ^ — LU l U 
CO UJ LU S S 
< 5 2 o o y o o o o 
E O O z z 
z z ~ ~ 
Z — — Q Q 
< —1 —J LU LU 
o < < -^ (-
= z z c/} co S i 1 ? § 
2 o o d tí < z z < <
IHH 
— 
I _ — 
• 
• 
• 
1 
l^' 
0 
» 
0 
h 
• 
• 
_ 
• 
• 
• 
1 
% 
0 
« 
« 
« 
• 
o 
96¿l 
98¿l 
VUl 
£9¿l 
29¿l 
IPli 
oezi 
6Ul 
80¿l 
¿691 
989L 
9¿9l 
W9l 
£991 
ZWl 
IC91 
0Z91 
6091 
8691 
/891 
9¿9l 
9991 
W9l 
ewi 
Z£9l 
LZ91 
019L 
88tl 
¿¿Pl 
99^1 
99*1 
eett 
ootí 
I 
sateai 
125 
BARTOLOMÉ W N CASALILLA 
I 
\—i 
rSá 
•o 
"a C 
.» 
5? S 
g 
. V j 
-Si 
5! 
ft. 
^ 
5 
- ' C 
W a 
- > S 
§ ^ 
^ 
'^ ^ 
.55 
S S 
^ 
•¿2 
«3 
& 
ü O 
K 
S 
.?> 
<3 
S: 
Vi 
s: 
x; 
•-1 
^ 1 
Í S 
í; 
> 
•^ i ; 
.o 
S 
w 
-* íl 
-3 § 
-^ ^ •3 
o 
^"S 
-jí 
— s 
r 
« 
^ 
oo 
'—< s^_ 
,<=^ 
>-n 
"3 
cS 
-S 2 
« Vi 
"O 
f v f^ • * 
00 
o 
-i (N 
c 5 -<• 
tN 
O rf\ ir\ 
^ fN (N 
00 (N sD 
<N 1/^ O 
*"* 
c 
B 
V5 
- O 
« U 
0 
0.2 
"O 3 >, 
u rl 
.5 u 
o ^ 
- 3 C 
r ^ f ^ i/> 
o 
o - H 0 0 0 0 
o r^ sO ^¿ 
lA © a^ 
O ~ 00 (N (N <N 
«O Os 0^ ^^ 
— fS "^ »^ 
I^ r^ f^ lA 
fNI ^ t ^ 00 
Tf Ov vO • 
r^ rsi ro 00 
•<r vo 00 
— ^ rrs ir\ 
(N - ^ <N (N 
O r^ O O 
t ^ - H ON r'-
» ^ <N rrs r ^ 
« f u r r i o (N-^OO-^ rA<NfN 
o 00 U-\ lA lA lA <N r^ 
oótX'^S 
o o '^• 
•-^  rsj O^ 
o 
o 
lA o lA lA 
Al lA r^ -H 
'-< \0 -^ sO 
o <N lA r^ 
^ TT T -T 
lA O lA vO 
(N lA 1^ -< 
— \¿ -^  s¿ 
o (N lA r^ 
lA lA lA lA 
O 
o 
lA o »A t^ 
<N lA r- —• 
-^  v¿ ó ó 
o <N lA r^ 
sD vO o \0 
O 
O 
lA O lA 00 
A) lA r^ —' 
-1. ^ ¿ ^  sD 
O <N lA h~ 
r~ r^ r^ r^ 
O 
H 
V o 
u 
-5 
'Z, 
00 (Jv 
O 
c 
c» 2 
rr\ 
<> 
E 
K 
00 0^ 
c 
o 
^ 
- o 
c 
« 
u 
O 
E . 
c 
. 0 
« 
c 
O 
> 
S Cn 
UJ 
0 
v^ 
oc 
u 
I N 
> 
8 
ti; 
3 
«a C 
"5-. 
R 
C .>2 
'«) "^  
o 5 
" ^ 
I B 
a> a> 
§•£ 0 . 
O ¡y « 
« ,* ^ C ™ « 
t í wí"—r 
!> 2 
•£ (fl « 3 3 
e '-' s? 
O *- o 
•-s'-é-c 
0 t; fc 1 - C8 > 
V « u 
3 c ^ t^ O.H 
_c t« 3 
•5 j j - o 
U — 2 3 
ft- C 3 y 
2 " 0 - ü 0 
y ir> 5; = 
S S E <-> 
í( « . • 
irt Ct 
c - o 
u 
J26 
rHK AMERICAN HMPIRE AND THE SPANISH ECÜNOMY 
and the división of labour, are strengthened by the coincidence of both 
processes, which were particularly intense in the period 1520-1570, with 
the years when inflation was steepest **. On the other hand, the fact that 
Castile not only minted money, but also exported it in such great quantities 
—particularly after the 1550s when price levéis were at their highest— 
means that purely monetarist explanations have to be modified ' . Though 
American silver was a factor in inflation, it does not seem sensible to accord 
it the solé responsibility for the movement of prices in Castile. 
Despite all the statistical problems involved, especially the fact that 
we are dealing with official figures which, because of smuggling, tend to 
be understatements, an examination of the valué of the American trade 
in terms of GDP suggests similar conclusions '". According to the figures 
in Prados de la Escosura ' ' , legal exports from Spain to America averaged 
some 404 million reales in 1786-95, of which 207 millions were reexports. 
Even on the lowest GDP estimates, derived from Arthur Young, namely 
5,685 million reales for the whole of Spain, total exports to America 
amounted to 7% of GDP, but, more importantly, exports of Spanish 
products scarcely carne to 3.5%, and in the light of other calculations and 
considerations that figure could be even less [Table U] '^. That contrasts 
with estimates for goods sent from England to her colonies of between 
" Martin (1993), p. 367. Wc are nol concerned here to arbítrate on the debate about the 
causes of the price revolution. X^^ a^t is of more inlcrest for us are its consequences. For that 
reason, I have discussed only sludies which balance the monetarist view by an emphasis on the 
significance of the real economy (population, urbanisation, etc.) in the process. 
'' Pieper(1985), p. 135. 
'" Elsewhcre, I have expresscd my doubts about the valué of this kind of exercise, Yun 
(1994b). 
" Prados de la Escosura (1993), lables 1 & 2. 
'•' The figures for GDP at the end of the 18th cenlury are presented here mcrely as 
approximations and because they seem to give clear support to the case for the small scale of 
the colonial trade in macroeconomic tcmis, which goes against the argumenl I am making tor 
the decisive impact of America on the Spanish economy. In support of that case onc should 
consider that, according to other calculations, GDP was in excess of 8,000 million reales 
[Prados,1993], and I myself have proposed a Castilian GDP of 5.6 million reales around 1795 
[Yun 1994c], and that would bring Spanish national income up to rather more than 7 million. 
Ñor should it be forgotten that Prados, whom I follow on this point, uses expon figures for 
Spanish goods taken from Hisher who includcd foreign goods finished in Spain or illegally registered 
as Spanish, as Fisher himself pointed out [1981, p. 31]. As a result, the 3.5% referred to in 
the text should also be reduced on that account. In the same way, the 2.9% of Table II should 
be modified, as I indícate in note 9 of that Table. On the other hand, those reductions could 
be offset by the inclusión of the profits of reexports, carrying sen'ices to other countries, and 
even those from contraband. For my part, I do not want to give precise figures here, mcrely 
to put forward data that leaves the issue open to question. 1 do that, moreover, in the belief. 
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n i E AMERICAN EMPIRE AND THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
9.4% and 14.6% of GDP " . Furthermore, for most of this period Spanish 
exports to other countries were twice as great as those to America '•*, 
reflecting the important but secondary character of the American market, 
when considered solely from this one point of view. 
Was this the case for the whole of the period under review? Despite 
considerable doubts, I have decided to include Table H, which refers solely 
to Castile, 70% of the country, as a point of departure for the discussion " . 
On the most favourable estimate, the total of legal exports, both goods 
registered as Spanish and foreign goods despatched from Cádiz or Seville, 
barely reached 9.4% of Castilian GDP during the period (See the most 
optimistic estimate of 1750-60 in Table II) '^. What is also apparent is 
the primacy of foreign reexports over those registered as Spanish, which 
scarcely came to 10% of annual exports until the 1750s, and which were, 
moreover, predominantly agricultural products ' ' . 
In fact, the colonies were more significant for the valué of their exports, 
4% of GDP at the end of the 18th century, and, especially, for their exports 
of silver, 9% [Table II]. 
In the light of these facts, the obvious question is: was America really 
so decisive for the Spanish economy? To answer that question we need 
not only a fuller consideration of its relative importance in macroeconomic 
terms, but also an examination of the initial conditions of the Castilian 
economy. 
that will be developed in this paper. that the macrostatistical pei^pective can be misleading insofar 
as it reflects only one part of the reality of the rclations between metixjpolis and colonies. 
" Crafts(1985), p. l i l . 
" Prados (1993), table?. 
" If prudence is needed for the calculations for 1795, figures for earlier periods need to 
be treated with the utmost caution. These GDP estimates are derived, with soine corrections 
and interpolations, from an unpublished study which includes a more detailed theoretical and 
documentary critique throwing doubt on their representativeness. lYun 1994cJ In the same way 
as for the late 18th century estimates, they are included here because, even admitting a widc 
margin of error in the calculation of GDP, the results are extremely indicative of the small 
importance of the export of Spanish manufactures and of the make-up of the trade, and the 
share of precious metáis, throughout the period. 
"• That peak of 9.4% would apply to 1750, on the assumptions indicated in the figure, 
which, as can be scen, are the most optimistic possible (the lowcst possible —if not impossible— 
figure for GDP, the peso taken at 10 reales, etc). In reality, other lower figures presented in 
the table would be much more acceptable, but, as always, I take as a point of reference that 
which is leasl favourable for the case for commerce making a light contribution to national wealth 
in macroeconomic terms. 
" 10% is in line with Fontana's estimate (1987), p. 9. 
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2. AMERICA AND THE TRAJECTORY OF THE CASTILIAN 
ECONOMY 1492-1600 
That 15th and 16th-century Spain can no longer be considered simply 
as an export economy, dominated by the Mesta, is now a commonplace 
among Spanish historians. Castile, and indeed Spain as a whole, was a 
country experiencing demographic, agradan and urban growth, in which, 
despite the importance of the export of primary products, the economy 
did not depend on external stimuli '*. By 1500 only Italy and the Low 
Countries were more urbanised than Spain '^. Urban networks had already 
been established by 1550 °^ and industry manifested a not inconsiderable 
dynamism. What Van der Wee refers to as «polynuclear» economic growth 
within European trade networks ^' was particularly important for Spanish 
inland regions, and that does not accord with the idea of a semipheripheral 
economy dominated by an over-inflated export sector. In the Duero Valley, 
the urban network, though composed of small centres, was extremely dense, 
with a manufacturing population exceeding 50% in places of merely 2,000 
inhabitants. Further south, the cities were of a more agrarian character, 
but they were larger, and centres such as Córdoba and Seville possessed 
great commercial and industrial dynamism ^^ . 
Contradicting the idea of Castile as a rigidly feudal and aristocratic 
society, lacking pressure for change, strong merchant groups emerged at 
the same time that a combination of conspicuous consumption and the 
inelasticity of seigneurial incomes worsened the financial situation for part 
of the aristocracy ^^ . Social tensions destabilised the political system. The 
usurpation of public lands and royal revenues was the traditional way for 
the great nobles to overeóme their financial problems. That not only 
reduced the Crown's fiscal resources, it also inflamed the cities which had 
to pay higher taxes. It thus created a tensión between the cities, the Crown, 
the nobility and the Church, of which the revolt of the Comunidades 
(1520-21) was to some extent the non decisive. By 1540, noble 
indebtedness was on the rise and aristocratic income beginning to fall in 
real terms. 
'* Yun(1994'). 
" DeVries(1987), p. 58. 
* Reher(1990). 
" Van der Wee (1988). 
" Vela (nd) (1983). 
" Yun(1987). 
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At the same time, during the 16th century a central govemment 
bureaucracy took shape, with the characteristics typical of the age, but 
of increasing weight and effectiveness. Its extensión into America made 
possible the establishment of complex linkages capable of intensifying the 
exploitation of the colonies ^'*. 
It is within this context of the economic development of increasingly 
interconnected regional economies, and structural tensions, heightened by 
the costs of servicing the dynastic empire of the Habsburgs in Europe, 
that the impact of the colonial economy has to be situated. 
From a commercial perspective it is possible to detect some potentially 
positive stimuli for the Spanish economy, though these did not derive from 
the size of the American market, which in volume terms was quite small 
—in 1570 there were barely 150,000 creóles, a mere 2.2% of the population 
in Spain— and which had limited capacity for growth in the 16th century ^'. 
As for silver exports, historians have been over preoccupied with testing 
the quantity theory of money and the impact of bullion on pnces. But 
increases in the money supply must have stimulated transactions and 
became a key factor in the increasing specialisation of labour that is 
apparent in the urban expansión of the 16th century. Silver, coming into 
a growing economy and spreading into the centre of the Peninsula thanks 
to the flow of interregional trade and the Crown's disbursements ^^ , vitalised 
commercial circuits such as those which linked Castile with Portugal, or 
with Catalonia, a región with connections with the fairs of the Duero Valley 
which benefited from a flow of bullion and public expenditure helpful 
for its industries ^'. 
As for industry, Hamilton's view *^ that wages did not lag behind pnces 
for the whole of the 16th century and that real wages fell less than in 
other countries is not correct except in the period between 1515-30, as 
Graph 2 shows. Contradicting the picture of an immobile and out of date 
'•' Elliott(1990),pp. 34-40. 
" Around 1590 outward cargoes to the Lidies amounted to 2 million reales (Phillips (1990), 
p. 82J, a substantia!, but not extraordinar>' figure. The atuiuai valué of trade in a city like Córdoba 
in 1579-84 reached a similar level, and sales of silk and woollen textiles there alone carne to 
600,000 IFortea (1981), p. 265], one-quarter of the total for manufactured goods exponed to 
America, 60% of which may have been textiles [García-Baquero (1992), p. 207]. The collapse 
of the indigenous population and the difficulty of increasing the consumption of Spanish products 
over there restricted demand for goods from the metrópolis. 
^^  Da Silva (1967), pp. 65-102. 
" Vilar (1962) I, pp. 544-52; Bennassar (1983), p. 327; Portea (1981), pp. 394-407; Vilar 
(1962), I, pp. 561-5. 
'" Hamilton (1975), p. 295. 
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GRAPH 2 
Real Wages o/a Building Craftsman in Spain 
and England (1501-1600) 
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SouRCES: My own elaboration from Reher and Ballesteros (1993) Appendix 1, Nadal, J. 
(1959) Appendix. Feliu, G. (1991), II, p. 88-95, Phelps Brown, E. H. and Hopkins, S. V. 
(1962), Appendix B). 
manufacturing sector, the textile industry tried to adapt to the demand 
for high quality cloths stimulated in part by the American market but, 
above all, by the rising income of better off groups and the effect of prices 
on the redistribution of wealth. Other industries, such as silk, displayed 
a notable vigour that continued until well into the 17th century ^ .^ The 
arrival of primary products, such as hides and dyestuffs '", contributed to 
the development of certain industries, and spices widened new fields of 
consumption, with consequential effects on the profitability and expansión 
of trade. Mining, in particular mercury mining, expanded its activities and 
witnessed important technical changes " . 
America, also contributed to the faster development of the financial 
sector and to the accumulation of profits, even áreas, such as the slave 
" Iradiel(1974), Portea (1981), García (1987), Momemayor (1996), pp. 223-8. 
" Lorenzo (1979), I, pp. 545-626; Between pp. 1571-72, when cochineal imports began 
to grow in volume, and 1590-93, its price barely rose in nominal terms, which meant a clear 
real decline. 
" Sánchez (1989). 
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trade to the Caribbean and Central America '^. The flourishing banking 
houses of Seville and the success of families like the Espinosa, are proof 
of that, as is the development of the fairs of central Castile, where the 
bulk of the Crown's disbursements, fed by American treasure, were 
handled. Neither were the profits of banking or the advances in insurance 
on the Indies route ^^  and in the techniques of commerce unconnected 
with colonial expansión. Though we do not know what the naval 
expenditure of the Crown would have been without America, it must have 
accounted for a substantial part of those costs, which rose from 3-400,000 
ducats a year in the 1570s to between 600,000 and 1,000,000 ducats a 
year in 1580-1600, that is nearly one-third of the demand generated by 
the colonies ^'*. 
However, America made its most decisive impact on the institutional 
and social side, though not by providing funds for a king who had solé 
control over the making of policy, ñor by virtue of the unprecedented 
financial resources it made available. In a patrimonial and «composite» 
unión " , public revenues from the Indies were important not because of 
their quantity, but because they constituted readily available resources and 
an indispensable source of credit. Furthermore, American bullion overéame 
the institutional impediments to the transfer of revenues across regional 
and constitutional boundaries, which was one of the main reasons for 
confüct between the king and his parliaments, a particular problem in the 
case of such a multi-national empire '^. Even so, what mattered was not 
the treasure from America, but the fact that, thanks to agreements with 
the Cortes, the revenues of the kingdom served to underwrite the 
consolidation of the debt. Because of that, though it did not do away 
with the need to have recourse to the bankers, it was possible to overeóme 
the biggest problem of the retums from America, their uncertain and erratic 
nature. The system never functioned entirely satisfactorily, but its outcome 
was that Castile became the backbone of an imperial system which in 
a short space of time extended from Flanders to the Philippines and from 
Italy to México. 
The empire, even in America where the king was legally all-powerful, 
was constructed on the basis of compacts with the local authorities. In 
" Lorenzo (1975), I, pp. 530-42. 
" Bemal(1993), pp. 182-20). 
" Thompson (1981), p. 356; (1982), pp. 12-13. 
" Elliott(1992). 
"* Rodríguez-Salgado (1988). 
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Castile, the mutual support of king, cities, nobility and Church, though 
not without conflict, was decisive. Far from being crushed, the cities, in 
effect corporate lordships, retained, and even strengthened, their 
jurisdictional autonomy and their role in tax administration. However, as 
grandees and patricians resident in the cities were the main purchasers 
of revenues and jurisdictions sold by the Crown, that reinforced and 
expanded the seigneurial regime. Moreover, many found in the empire, 
and especially in the government of the Indies, an arena for political 
advancement which facilitated their rise through the remarkably stable 
social structure. Although the king established his own royal bureaucracy, 
access to positions within it was often in the gift of viceroys or aristocrats, 
or was acquired through, or at least had begun within, the continuing bonds 
of aristocratic clientage. The Church, which absorbed the intemal tensions 
of the noble lineages via the younger sons it recruited, found in the Indies 
space for economic growth which did not detract from the expansión of 
its spiritual power ' ' . 
The aristocracy, threatened by crisis, were enabled to overeóme their 
diffículties. Although inflation eroded their income, the growth in the 
circulation of money and the willingness of the Crown to permit them 
to mortgage their entails, allowed them access to long-term credit with 
low rates of interest. Such loans, taken out to fund political duties for 
the king, or for their own prívate needs, made possible the incorporation 
of the nobility into the government of the empire in Europe and Ameríca, 
and served both to overeóme the danger of their failure as a ciass and 
to acquire the means for the expansión of scigneurialism through the 
purchase of jurisdictions and revenues from the Crown ^^. In effect, the 
exercise of positions of authority in Europe and America provided the 
aristocracy with a copious source of both wealth and patronage, which, 
together with the reinforcement of the mayorazgo as an institution, despite 
its encumbrances, for social and political reasons, enabled them to meet 
their fínancial problems without resorting to substantial investment in their 
" Céspedes (1988), pp. 240-5. 
'" Jago (1973), Yun (1987). 
The latter was helped in its tum by the alienation and sale of revenues and jurisdictions 
by the Crown, a process made necessary by the disjunction between the needs of the Crown 
and the capacity of the financia! system, which hinged on the flow between American treasure 
and Castilian taxes. 
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estates or a restructuring of the social order '^^ . In this context, political 
advancement, social prestige, strategic and costly marriage alliances, 
clientage networks and lineage soiidarities, all of them essential for the 
acquisition of political influence, became key elements in the management 
of aristocratic patrimonies ^". Though not resolved, the structural tensión 
between rising costs and inelastic seigneurial revenues was in part overeóme. 
Castile was thus converted into the most important power in 
Christendom without undertaking the institutional and financial changes 
(or the financial revolution, if you like) that at first sight seem to have 
been called for by the military revolution that was then taking place'". 
A remarkable effort was required, but the way it was effected defused 
the tensions which in other countries led to civil and religious conflict 
(France), or to economic change (England). The consequences for the 
system of production, both in the short and in the long term, were decisive. 
In that context the flow of bullion could stimulate not investment but 
conspicuous consumption and political advancement. That was in part a 
consequence of the polarisation of wealth and of changes in demand 
provoked by the arrival of the precious metáis ^^ but also of the sclerosis 
of an institutional system in which innovative investment, as something 
not essential to the preservation of status and power, was very limited 
and in which sumptuary expenditure, the acquiring of influence and life 
at Court were ways to increasing prestige and political power'". 
Agradan reform was almost imperceptible, even in Andalusia, where 
a sort of agrarian capitalism did not lead to wholesale investment or to 
significant improvements in productivity. That was not helpful for the 
development of the economy as a whole, as evidenced by the more rapid 
increase of agricultural as compared with industrial prices, but neither was 
it for manufacturing and commerce, though not for the reasons Hamilton 
proposed. Industrial profits were not the result of a gap between prices 
and wages. In many industries where the unit of production consisted of 
domestic workshops, profit depended mainly on household costs which 
moved in line with the cost of living. Given the unfavourable terms of 
" Although the royal service involved them in costs, at the end of the 16th century houses 
like that of Infamado were receiving nearly 30% of their incomes by virtue of the viceregai offices 
they held, and the Counts of Benavente got just about as much as viceroys in Italy as they 
did from their estates in Castile. Yun (1990) y (1994d). 
*' Yun (1990). 
" Thompson (1995). 
•" Forsyth & Nicholas (1983). 
" Yun (1998). 
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trade between primary and industrial producís, artisan's workshops had 
to opérate in an increasingly difficult situation. Moreover, the key role 
of the cities in tax collection resulted, at the end of the century, in a 
transfer of the fiscal burden from trade to consumption, which further 
worsened the situation of the small craft workshops, even though taxes, 
it has been claimed"''', carne to 9% of GDP. The autonomy of the cities 
and the sale of jurisdictions fragmented the fiscal map even more, hindering 
the integration of the market and resulting in a differential regional 
incidence of taxation and arbitrariness in its administration. 
The imperial system had its effects on financial developments. The 
need of the Monarchy for credit strengthened the Genoese banks, which 
alone were capable of effecting the transfer of funds to the theatres of 
conflict in Europe. The situation was made that much more difficult insofar 
as the arrival of American treasure, which was predominantly silver from 
the 1550s, implied a devaluation in terms of gold that was greater in Spain 
than in Northern Europe, where the troops had to be paid in gold. That 
made the Genoese indispensable for the Monarchy, strengthened their 
position in Seville and tightened their control over the Spanish banking 
system •". The issuing of «juros» (rights to revenues), often by compulsory 
allocations on the merchant body as a whole or the Indies traders in 
particular, contributed to the spread of a rentier economy, as did the 
diversión of savings into mortgage lending against entails and municipal 
properties. The high degree of insecurity inherent in the American trade 
was aggravated by the Crown's sequestration of bullion at moments of 
difficulty, which raised transaction costs and encouraged safe investment 
in rents or in political advancement. 
The multinational nature of the Monarchy hindered the formulation 
of mercantilist policies with respect to the other Habsburg territories, such 
as Flanders and Italy, whose products entered the Spanish and American 
markets in parallel with the growing number of merchants from those áreas 
in Seville. The Monarchy's borrowing requirements led to an overvalued 
exchange rate for specie that drew in imports. A good part of spending 
was directed to other regions whose industries developed on the back of 
it, such as arms manufacturing in Milán, and a proportion of the provisions 
bought in Spain for the armies was procured by compulsory purchase, 
or at fixed prices disadvantageous to the vendors ^^. In addition, the positive 
Thompson (1992). 
Ruiz Martin (1968). 
Thompson (1992). 
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effects of the growing supply of silver coins on transactions and 
specialisation of labour must have been limited, since an important part 
of trade, mainly at the local and rural levéis, was carried out using copper 
coins. 
Spanish manufacturers were unable to resist such pressures. Moreover, 
within this context, emigration to America, whatever its extent, had negative 
effects since it reached its peak at the moment of greatest diffículty for 
the cities, which were the source of the emigrants •*', and for which the 
loss of people of reproductive age accelerated the demographic downtum 
after 1580 *^ and the urban crisis of the Castilian interior. 
In short and despite some positive aspects, America contributed to 
the maintenance of an institutional and social system which, with its 
ramifícations in the fiscal sphere, was to lead directly to crisis. 
3. CRISIS AND ECONOMIC CHANCE 1600-1700 
The crisis —in some áreas, recession— that Spain experienced in the 
17th century was not triggered by the contraction of the Atlantic economy. 
On the one hand, the existence of a recession either in mining or in the 
colonial economy as a whole has been disputed'". But, more important, 
after 1580 —that is decades before the Atlantic trade cycle which began 
in 1560 reached its peak '"— the inflexibility of the system of production 
in Castile led to a profound urban crisis that was most acute in the more 
dynamic áreas of the interior, and to a stagnation of agricultural production. 
There were also changes and readjustments. The oíd pattem of 
expansión, based on a dynamic interior, would be gradually replaced by 
one with its dynamic in the peripheries. At the same time, the American 
economy witnessed the rise of economic circuits more independent of the 
metrópolis " . Upon a mineral wealth, steadily less important as silver fell 
in valué '^, was superimposed an increasingly developed plantation economy 
that was in a certain sense autonomous of the Península, and which was 
to transform the composition of the Adantic trade. The ruling creóle groups 
" Martínez (1994). 
••" Nadal(1984),pp. 58-62. 
" See TePaske and Mein (1981)(1982) and Kamen and Israel (1982). 
"' Chaunu (1959), VUl 2, 1, pp. 22-3. 
" Sempat (1988). 
" Hynn(1982). 
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were gaining in independence from the metrópolis and from the middle 
of the century were acquiring a powerful position in government '^. The 
strengthening of ties with the Philippines and the unión with Portugal 
accentuated the centrifugality of the empire. That coincided with the 
radicalisation of the struggle for the world market which was posited on 
the emergence in England and Holland, and later in France, of economies 
which, in institutional and productive terms, were more adaptable. How 
did the Spanish economy respond to these changes? 
Despite the qualifícations which the concept of crisis has undergone, 
it is hard to see what positive effects America had on the Castilian economy. 
Even those, such as Morineau, who have modified the figures of Hamilton 
and Chaunu on the import of precious metáis or on the traffic across 
the Atlantic in an upward direction, believe that Spanish products lost 
ground in the total of exports, as they were replaced by foreign 
manufactures. 
Positive figures exist. Although some products, such as cochineal, Índigo 
and hides became less importan! in the official import figures '"*, the 
plantation economy remitted to the Peninsula increasing quantities of other 
goods, like cocoa and tobáceo " , the rising consumption of which brought 
notable profits to the merchants of the Carrera and to those reexporting 
them to Flanders and Italy. If recent interpretations are to be believed '^, 
these lines of consumption should have activated new patterns of demand 
and reinforced commercial relations with the New World. Products brought 
from America, such as maize, were essential to overeóme the Malthusian 
checks in certain regions, such as Galicia, and later Asturias, where 
population continued to rise throughout the 17th century. Though clearly 
America was not the only cause, the extensión of English and Dutch 
commercial networks to Seville and from there to the southern part of 
the Peninsula then stimulated the trade in Ibizan salt, Andalusian oil and 
wines, Malagan raisins and wine, etc. ''. That generated a fvirther 
considerable spin-off as demand promoted the development of coastal 
transport networks in the Mediterranean. The contribution of American 
" Burkholder & Chandier (1977), pp. 39-52. 
" Phillips (1990), p. 88, 
" Figures for cocoa imports collected by Phillips [(1990), pp. 92-5] rcveal a rise in official 
imports from 1.756 arrobas a year in 1651-55, to more than 20,000 in 1681-85. Tobacco 
consumption rose from practically nothing at the beginning of the century to 3 million Ibs in 
1740. Archivo General de Simancas, Dirección General de Rentas, 2 ' remesa, leg. 4636. 
"• Shammas(1990). 
" Pulido (1993), p. 145; Quintana (1987). 
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treasure to the income of the Crown fell to less than 10% [Table I]. 
Nevertheless, and without reaching the level of 1576-1600, that figure does 
not tell the whole story, since to the treasure it has to be added new 
taxes generated by the Atlantic trade, such as that on tobáceo, or occasional 
though sometimes substantial revenues, such as donativos from the 
Consulado de Indias, concemed always to retain their monopoly, or income 
from the sale of offices '**. The calculations of TePaske and Klein '"^  for 
New Spain show in addition that the fall in bullion retums did not imply 
a parallel decline in the income of the Crown, which was in reality being 
spent in America, or the Philippines. Although to a lesser degree, the returns 
from America continued to be decisive. 
Already in the 17th century, America had become one of the most 
important levers of cconomic and social advance for an aristocracy and 
for urban oligarchies which could thus overeóme their difficulties in the 
Peninsula without that involving institutional change or changes in the 
system of production ^ . The penetration of aristocratic clientage into the 
imperial administration and the sale of offices increased corruption and 
fraud, progressively more important economically and excused by a very 
flexible ethic of royal service '''. The institutional balance in favour of the 
aristocracy and the autonomy of the cities in fiscal administration was 
preserved to the detriment of the attempt of mercantilists to reform the 
system and to increase the resources of the state *^ . Castilian absolutism, 
even more so than the French, the nature of which has undergone a 
profound revisión''', was articulated upon a complex and disaggregated 
system of powers and loyalties which were not always directed to the king ^ . 
It is likely that in terms of income and expenditure, America gave the 
Crown more than it cost, but the question should be put in different terms. 
Within the costs of the protection and preservation of the American Empire 
should be included also the funds accumulated by functionaries and ruling 
élites, at the expense of the Crown, which made the system possible. In 
'" On the «donativos» from the Consulado, see A. M. Bemal (1993), pp. 218-23. On the 
sale of offices, TePaske and Klein (1981), p. 131 and Burkholder and Chandier (1977). 
" (1981) 131-4. 
*" Yun (1990). Although those revenues carne from the empire as a whole, already in the 
16th century, the viceroyalties, the «encomiendas de Indios», and other sinecures and privileges 
associated with the administration in America were nourishing the economies of the grandees 
and their relatives and clients. See Domínguez (1985), pp. 112-4. 
"' Pietschman (1989), Yun (1993). 
" Elliott(1986). 
" Beik(1985). 
" Thompson (1990). 
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a system with a high degree of comiption, bureaucratic and military 
expenditures were not invested totally in protection services. The outcome 
was both inadequate defence and a good deal of uncertainty resulting from 
an adniinistrative arbitrariness which did not help to reduce transaction 
costs. 
The application of a mercantilist policy of a protectionist hue and the 
system of monopoly now clashed both with the need to facilítate the access 
of other subjects of the king to the American market and with the 
impossibiÜty of securing their markets against the Dutch, the French and 
the English ^'. Though many of the problems alluded to applied also in 
other countries, it was on that footing that the king of Spain aimed to 
exploit the most extensive, dispersed and institutionally fragmented empire 
ever known. All that was attempted within the context of a financial crisis 
which made necessary a «devolution of functions» to local powers and 
prívate individuáis in the two pillars of the Empire, the army and the 
bureaucracy ^. 
Expensive for the Crown, profitable for the ruling groups, and 
economically inefficient for the country, the imperial system contributed 
nonetheless to the maintenance of Castile's social and economic structures. 
For that reason the weak positive stimuli it generated could not easily 
revivify the economy. An industry of increasingly inflexible forms of 
production could not meet the changing demands of the colonies for high 
quality manufactures. Luxury goods imported from Asia via Manila mopped 
up the most refined segments of the demand of ciiies such as Lima and 
México with a growing sumptuary market ^'. Manufactures, legally or illicitly 
imported from HoUand, England, France, Italy or Flanders, took the lion's 
share of the cargoes from Seville. At the end of the 17th century, less 
than 4.5% of the total valué of legitímate cargoes were Spanísh goods, 
among which agricultural products predomínated *^. The extensión of the 
commercial networks to Seville also served to open the peninsular market 
to the New Draperies and other northern products ^', in successful 
competition with once vibrant local industries, such as that of Córdoba '**. 
In Malaga, the obverse of the export of wine was the massive entry of 
Wallerstein(1980). 
Thompson (1981). 
TePaske(1983), p. 433. 
Everaen (1973), pp. 277-82, Morineau (1985), pp. 262-9; Fernández de Pinedo (1986). 
Everaert(1973),pp. 287-96. 
Portea (1994). 
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foreign textiles with which the fragüe local industry could not compete " . 
That also implied a greater participation of foreign capital in the still 
plentiful remittances of silver —with consequential diffículties for domestic 
monetary circulation, which became increasingly copper based— and in 
the profits of the goods imponed and their redistribution to Europe '^. 
And all that leaving aside the expansión of the direct trade with America, 
by-passing Andalusia's monopoly. 
A good part of the profits was gathered into the hands of the Indies 
merchants, who dealt in a speculative commerce between the American 
fairs and Seville which was not dependent on direct investments. Another 
part was focused on the aristocracy of Seville whose sumptuary expenditure 
fed the same circuits of foreign trade which did little good for domestic 
industry. The concentration of capital contributed to the concentration of 
agrarian wealth and to the market orientation of neighbouring regions, 
and perhaps also to improvements in productivity, though these were very 
restricted and reached their limits around 1750 ^'. At the end of the century, 
the influence of Seville, through its Mediterranean links, began to be felt 
on the levantine coast, and even the brandy of Catalonia or the iron of 
Vizcaya benefited from it '^'. But in such a fragmented and regionalized 
economy, the concentration of profits in the región of Seville and its satellite 
ports percolated much more weakly through to the Spanish interior as 
a whole. The decomposition of the urban network and the disarticulation 
of the inland markets aggravated this situation, and the reallocation of 
productive resources in Une with American demand on any great scale 
was unthinkable. In a context of recession such as this, emigration took 
on particular importance. Though on all estimates very restricted, it 
nevertheless was a drain on a country in which labour was in short supply. 
On the side of consumption and demand, the stimulus was very limited. 
Naval expenditure fell, not only because of the decline in the income of 
the Crown, but also because of the diversión of funds to America and 
the Philippines ^'. The complexity and territorial dispersión of the Empire, 
based on so many local agreements, worked against the Spanish economy. 
Even the stimulation of domestic consumption by the arrival of new 
products was very limited. In an economy and social system that facilitated 
' ' Quintana (1987). pp. 89-92. 
'' Morineau (1985). 
" Bemal(1988). 
'^  Maninez (1981), pp. 200-5; Fernández de Pinedo (1974). 
" TePaske & Klein (1981). p. 133. 
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the polarisation of income in the hands of the aristocracy and the clergy 
and in which the rigidity of the society of orders inhibited the spread of 
more homogeneous patterns of consumption, changes would have to be 
slow '^. 
The Empire had lost its focus and its capacity to defend itself, and 
it had nourished an institutional framework that was not greatly helpful 
for economic growth. It was not easy for it to act as a motor for a new 
phase of expansión and even less for economic change. In addition to 
being a century of crisis, the 17th century in Spain was a time of 
readjustment, but those readjustments varied according to área and were 
slow overall on account of the regionalization of the economy. America 
was not in a position to speed up those changes to any significant degree, 
ñor to prevent the long-term crisis from tuming into recession in some 
áreas, and into stagnation in others. 
4. REFORM, EXPANSIÓN, BLOCKAGES (1700-1800) 
The 18th century in Spain was a period of growth. As in the rest of 
Europe, that growth was a prelude to industrialisation, and, as also for 
Europe, the role of the colonial economy in that process is an issue. 
It is important to remember that growth now took place in a world 
economy in which the role of the American colonies as suppliers of raw 
materials and as markets for Europe had been fully defined, at the same 
time that the centre of the world economy had shifted towards England 
and Northern Europe''''. The multiplication of transactions generated a 
growing need for silver in the Oíd World, which moreover continued to 
suffer an adverse balance of trade with Asia *^, at a time when the mines 
of America supplied nearly 90% of world output ^^ . That made trade with 
Spain and America doubly necessary. This was taking place in a context 
of International tensión, with increasing military and governmental 
expenditures that would put to the test both the fiscal systems and the 
social structures of the Ancien Regime. 
If the peace of Utrecht (1713) meant for Spain the loss of territory 
in Europe, it also meant a reduction in expenditures in Europe and in 
"• For a revealing counter-example, McKendrick (1982). 
" WaUerstein(1980),pp. 245-89. 
'" Attman(1986). 
" Barret(199ü), p. 225. 
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the centrifugality and complexity of the Spanish empire. The policy of 
the Bourbons was directed towards increasing public revenues both in the 
Península and in America, and that implied a reconsideration of relations 
with the oligarchies in America and Spain as well as various schemes for 
reform of the finances and of colonial trade. It is doubtful whether these 
reforms were the cause *", but legal trade with America increased up to 
1800, most particulariy in the second half of the century*'. In this way 
Spain captured a growing proportion of goods, such as hides, cochineal, 
cocoa, tobáceo, sugar, and others, for which there was a rising demand 
in Europe *^ . In 1796 imports from America exceeded 300 million reales ^' 
and were indispensable in the balancing of the trade déficit with countries 
such as England and France *'^ . That balance was made up with the more 
than 27 million silver rix-doUars a year (1791-95), up from around 13 million 
in the first decades of the century **', which paid for a great deal of the 
imported merchandise consumed intemally or reexported to America *^ . 
The importance of manufactured goods in Spain's exports increased. Even 
without accepting Fisher's estimates, which by including legal and illegal 
reexports give a máximum of 61.4% in 1794** ,^ it is clear that Spanish 
manufactures exceeded 8-16% of the total of exports reached in 1757 **". 
Silver returns for the Crown also rose *^ , though it is true that their 
valué in real terms continued to fall. More important, however, there was 
an increase in the valué of taxes on tobáceo —of 85% on that from 
Cuba "**•— and in the «Rentas Generales», mainly customs duties closely 
related, directly or indirectly, to the American trade (Table 11). That, as 
is sometimes forgotten, indicates a decisive change in the composition of 
revenues. The most important element was no longer the silver remissions, 
ñor traditional levies, such as alcabalas, cientos, and millones, which fell 
"" There is an extensive debate about the ends and the effccts of the Bourbon reforms 
inte which there is no space to enter here. It is sufficient to say that the growth of colonial 
trade and the increase in returns antedated the reign of Carlos III (1759-88), who is generally 
regarded as the reforming monarch par excellence. Barbier (1980). 
" García Baquero (1976), Fisher (1992). 
"' Phillips (1990). 
"' Cuenca(1981), p. 409. 
" Cuenca (1991). 
" Attman(1986), p. 25. 
"^  Prados (1993). 
"' Fisher(1981), p. 27. 
*' This is the figure that seems to me reasonable to deduce from Garcia-Baquero's estimates 
(1976), pp. 329-30, who gives a máximum of 15% in 1757. 
"^  Attman (1986), p. 14. 
•" McNeill(1985), p. 161, 
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for the most part on the consumption of basic necessities, but taxes on 
trade, customs duties, and on the consumption of nonssentials from the 
colonies. At the end of the century, when, despite the increase in treasure, 
that proportion was even more marked, as a result of higher customs 
retums, the situation was very like that in England' ' . That implied, 
furthermore, a redistribution of the fiscal burden, a decisive shift from 
the relatively peor regions of the interior, which were nonetheless crucial 
for the formation of the domestic market, to the more dynamic coastal 
áreas '^. Finally, the increase in revenues deriving from the empire was 
accompanied by an increase in what was also raised and spent in the 
Indies ^\ 
Spain, thus, strengthened her ability to benefit from the colonies in 
the 18th century. The flow of metáis, associated with a reduction in foreign 
expenditure with the outflow of silver and the fínancial costs they had 
involved, improved conditions for the circulation of money in the interior '''. 
America contributed to the formation of commercial profits, and greater 
links between Cádiz and other subsidiary ports multiplied its positive 
effects ' ' . The formation of privileged companies, some of them specialising 
in boom producís, such as the Guipuzcoana de Caracas, devoted to the 
cocoa trade with Venezuela, also helped. The impact of that trade was 
concentrated in the coastal áreas, which now saw increasing levéis of 
urbanisation'^, and from there commercial links with the interior were 
formed ' ' . If America had not created, it reinforced, after 1750, the kind 
of expansión emerging between 1600 and 1750. Its trade boosted Basque 
iron '*, Catalonia's brandy and other manufactures ^ , Valencia's silk and 
" Tedde(1989), p. 171, 
" Piepcr(1992), 140-3. 
" Pieper(1992), pp. 155-6. 
'•* Despite the rise in the premium on silver, which was constant from the monetary reforms 
of Carlos II to the end of the 18th century [Hamilton (1988), pp. 63, 82, 108], monetary instability, 
normal in the 17th century, was low until the 1780s. Hamilton (1988), pp. 65-118, 260-1. 
" Even in 1778-96 more than 70% of exports were concentrated in Cádiz [Fisher (1981), 
p. 42], though a good part of them did not come from Andalusia, but from áreas preferring 
not to engage in the direct trade. 
* Pérez &Reher( 1997). 
" Ringrose (1996). 
'" Fernández de Pinedo (1974). 
" The argument, based on the studies of P. Vilar on the wine trade [(1962) II, pp. 324-31], 
has been confirmed by that in brandy [Torras (1976)1 though qualifíed by the cotton industry 
[Delgado (1988)]. The result is a debate which remains unresolved. See Delgado (1993) and 
García-Baquero (1991). 
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paper '"", Andalusia's agriculture, Cantabria's ports, like Santander, where 
industrial activity was being stimulated '*", and until 1778 the export of 
Galicia's linens '"^. In some cases, Valencian silk and paper, for example, 
the importance of America did not lie so much in the size of the trade 
as in its capacity to genérate, or to revive, sectors related to new necessities 
or consumption pattems, which subsequently were reorientated towards 
the, sometimes larger, domestic market, as a form of market diversification, 
or as an escape from difficult situations, such as those created by the wars 
at the end of the 18th century. 
Though not great in macroeconomic terms, this trade, together with 
its side-effects and its connections with Europe, created a tensión in many 
regional economies. In some áreas, it contributed to increase the monetary 
circulation and the market orientation of peasant economies at a time of 
growing population pressure and rising land rents. That promoted the 
utilisation of idle resources and stimulated secondary activities, such as 
transportation into the interior, and so contributed to larger and more 
regular peasant incomes, and in some cases to their more even distribution. 
New producís, like tobáceo, cocoa, and, increasingly, manufactured goods, 
were distributed through commercial networks, inducing changes in 
consumption pattems '*". These commercial links had side-effects; they 
stimulated invisibles, such as Insurance, and Consolidated a merchant 
bourgeoisie that, by 1800, was beginning to define its own style of Ufe 
and political programme. Even accepting that such changes would have 
occurred without colonial trade, it is clear that the American connection 
played an important part in that process. 
The fact that emigration was not great —some 100,000 individuáis '"''— 
and was fed from the overpopulated rural áreas of the North, meant that 
it did not impact adversely on the supply of labour. 
At the same time, it promoted shipbuilding and its associated activities, 
such as the iron, timber, cordage and canvas industries. Increased 
expenditure on the army and navy contributed to that as well. At the end 
of the 16th century, at times of greatest military conflict, the defence budget 
in Castile carne to 28% of ordinary expenditure ""; it now reached 60% ^'^, 
"" Franch(1994). 
"" Miguel(1992),pp. 249-56. 
"" Alonso(1986), p. 255. 
"" García &Yun (1997). 
"" Martínez (1994), pp, 173-5. 
"" Thompson(1981), p. 355. 
"*• Barbier& Mein (1985!. 
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a proportion similar to that in England "". That manifested itself in an 
increase in expenditure on iron-works, such as those at Liérganes and La 
Cavada, where as a result output was expanded '*'**, and in the exploitation 
of forests, often in áreas some way from the sea. The shift of the fiscal 
burden from basic necessities to inessentials from the colonies and to trade 
also had a positive effect on domestic demand. 
Moreover, in the 18th century, the role of the Empire as a subsidiary 
source of income for the nobility declined markedly, a process to which 
the battle against corruption and a different notion of service to the Crown 
contributed '"'. That development, along with others, drove some 
aristocratic houses toward the more innovative management of their great 
estates ''". 
Nevertheless, taken overall the changes in the economy of the Península 
generated by America were less than might have been imagined. Colonial 
demand could not grow rapidly, given the low levéis of emigration and 
the difficulties in the way of the diffusion of new patterns of 
consumption ' " . It is not surprising that in many sectors domestic demand 
was more important for economic growth "^, especially in view of the 
competition that had to be overeóme in the American market. Local 
research into sectors such as Catalán cottons or Galician linens " ' shows 
that after 1778 the Reglamento de Libre Comercio contributed to the 
introduction into the Indies trade of foreign goods finished in Spain. 
Though this may not have been deleterious in itself, and even less should 
the benefit to other sectors in those same regions be forgotten, it does 
make it necessary to qualify the signifícance of the American trade for 
the industrial take-off of some regions "''. That America was the great 
world provider of silver sharpened the desire of foreign merchants and 
gave added incentive for the penetration of European manufactured goods 
in pursuit of the precious metal. That generated new patterns of 
consumption and new sources of demand, which in tum contributed in 
the médium term to import substitution that is apparent by the end of 
the century. In the short term, however, imports of foreign manufactures 
'"' Brewer(1990), p. 40. 
'™ Alcalá Zamora (1974), pp. 238-40. 
"" Burkholder&Chancller(1984), pp. 119-91. 
"" Yun(1998). 
' " Garavaglia(1991). 
'" Delgado (1995). 
' " Delgado (1988), Alonso (1986). 
' " Delgado(1995), p. 27. 
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were a severe challenge for native industries, prisoners in some cases of 
obsolescent structures. 
Despite changas in methods of collection, the fiscal system had not 
undergone any fundamental reform. America, and the revenues it 
generated, continued to nourish institutions and a social order that hindered 
the development of production. The morass of local taxes, which varied 
from city to city, and the arbitrary way in which local authorities coUected 
them, continued to be a source of confusión in the domestic market, 
increasing transaction costs and impeding the extensión of trading 
networks ' " , the ability to penétrate into the interior was thus much 
reduced. The stimulus to which America contributed, concentrated in 
specific localities, extended only weakly across the nation as a whole. Cause, 
consequence, and evidence of this is the atrophy of the cities of the regions 
of the interior, where even in 1787 levéis of urbanisation were lower than 
in 1591 " ^ 
Furthermore, it was a society that had experienced few structural 
changes. The commercialisation of the land was restricted by the extensión 
of the entail and of ecclesiastical properties in mortmain. The reallocation 
of resources that could have been generated by colonial-related commerce 
was not great. Industrial sectors like flour-milling, for export to Cuba, would 
not revive until the abolition of the entail and mortmain in the 19th century 
facilitated the acquisition of agrarian installations by merchant capital. Both 
the clergy and the nobility improved their management techniques and 
introduced productive innovations. But neither their management goals 
ñor the oíd forms of land tenure allowed much scope for such changes. 
AIl that helped to preserve a retrograde agronomy, in spite of the 
advances made, and entrenched a very unequal distribution of returns, 
which constrained consumption in rural society. Domestic demand 
continued to be very weak and fragmentad, and the development of new 
patterns of consumption for durables and semi-durables was either very 
limited "^, or was met by foreign imports '^*. 
America generated incentives that failed to break through the shell 
of a society of orders, which, despite changes, was still inflexible. Those 
incentives were in many cases just not strong enough. Public expenditure 
Yun(1997). 
Pérez &Reher (1997). 
Garda &Yun (1997). 
Stein(1989). 
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did not rise in real terms ' '^  and the silver cargoes continued to have their 
ups and downs [Table II], imposing financial costs on a system that even 
at the end of the century had not undergone a financial revolution, like 
those in HoUand in the 16th century or England in the 17th '^ '*. That 
deficiency would be perceived most of all in the wars at the end of the 
century, and would lead to a fiscal crisis that coincided with the uprising 
of the creóle minorities in America, chafing at their subjection under 
Enlightened Despotism, and with the break-down of the political and social 
system. The colonial empire and the society of orders were collapsing in 
unisón. That, indeed, is no surprise; the two phenomena were inextricably 
linked, and the fiscal system was the principal bond between them. 
5. TOWARDS A GENERAL AND COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 
In macroeconomic terms America had little weight in the great cycles 
of the Spanish economy. Nonetheless, America's role was decisive. Without 
it, it would not be possible to imagine a capacity for survival in merchant 
feudalism. That is not to say that the CastiÜan economy in the 16th century 
was either static or inward-looking, ñor that the wealth from the Indies 
served to strengthen a monarchical authority that was uncontested and 
that sustained an archaic social order lacking forces for change. Spain's 
colonies were just one piece in a complex of fragmented and disjointed 
powers. Castilian absolutism, along with the French, in fiscal terms the 
most powerful in Europe, was the delicate outcome of a compactualism 
that involved a high degree of political decentralization. No financial or 
administrative revolution had taken place, despite the attempt to establish 
a solid bureaucratic base in the 16th century. Ñor was Spain very different 
from other countries in Europe. It was precisely in such a context that 
the extraction of precious metáis became the principal goal and the empire 
contributed to the survival of a social system that rapidly reached the limits 
of its productive capacity. The result was an inefficient system geared to 
defence and an economy incapable of resfKjnding to the challenges of 
mercantilism and the struggle for the world market in the 17th century. 
Without America the history of Castile would have been very different. 
But more useful than an impossible counterfactualism, is a simple 
Barhier& Klein (1987). 
Tracy (1985), Brewerl 1990). 
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comparison. After 1640 England ran her colonies within the framework 
of a «powerful fiscal-military state» '^'. From 1688 a financial revolution 
was taking place based on the joint responsibility of king, lords and 
Parliament and on a «new» and professional administration, in which the 
sale of office, or office regarded as property, had no place and which 
constituted a guarantee that taxes would be collected and the interest on 
the long-term debt paid. That system permitted the effective mobilisation 
of prívate savings for military purposes at low cost, and involved a «limited 
extensión of venality», «a substantial and regular income», and heavy 
taxation, but on a «national and uniform» basis, «paid by all subjects, 
regardless of rank» '^ ^. 
In contrast with the centrifugalism of the Spanish empire, in the English 
nation-state the exploitation of the colonies was funded from the 
metrópolis, where expenditure was also concentrated, in sectors central 
for economic growth. As in 16th-century Castile, the economy was 
expanding, but its dynamic was different. It was developing towards an 
agrarian capitalism that, whether through the efforts of yeomen or great 
landowners, was generating increasing rates of productivity and feeding 
a rapid and widespread process of urbanisation [Wrigley, 1987]. Whether 
or not the colonies were responsible for growth in England, their effects 
were felt in a very different way from those in 16th-century Castile. The 
reallocation of the factors of production generated by colonial trade was 
easier, more fluid and more widespread. The diffusion of new pattems 
of consumption to link the economy of the household with that of the 
market was quicker. 
As was the case in Castile, the British Empire may have helped to 
sustain the existing social system, but it was one much more favourable 
for economic growth. Furthermore, the changes that took place in Spain 
in the 18th century were an important step towards arrangements similar 
to what was then in existence in England. However, the differences 
'" Brewer (1990), p. 250. An interesting comparison with what has becn set out above, 
into which it has not bcen possible to go more fully, can be pursued more widely in Brewer's 
work(1990). 
"- Brewer (1990), pp. 70, 89, 22, 251. Although it would present a more positive view 
not only of the lóth-century Castilian fiscal system, in which forms of debt consolidation and 
a certain degree of co-responsibility betwcen king and Cortes were developed, but also of the 
bureaucracy, which was a model for its time, such a distant comparison between England and 
Castile would take us too far. As far as the fiscal system is concemed, it is sufficient to say 
that, in contrast with England, joint responsibility between Crown and parliament ne\'er resulted 
in effective control by the latter. With respect to the bureaucracy, the decline from 1580 onwards 
is apparent, particularly in the Indies bureaucracy. 
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continued to be crucial. In the British colonies population grew rapidly, 
whereas in the Spanish growth was very slow '^ ^. That, together with a 
relative military and administrative weakness, which meant it was impossible 
to prevent either the contraband trade or the successful competition of 
third countries, held back the expansión of the colonial market. Spain's 
very urban structure, with the slow growth of the cities of the interior, 
blocked the creation of commercial networks such as could have had an 
impact on a country as extensive as Spain. 
If one compares the make-up of the income and expenditure of the 
two countries, it needs to be remembered that the Spanish fiscal reforms 
did not mean the end of the oíd system. The oíd taxes on the consumption 
of basic necessities, the fragmented fiscal geography and the group 
inequalities persisted. The political and constitutional framework for a 
financial revolution was lacking, and only in 1782 was a bank, the Bank 
of San Carlos, established with the aim of servicing the funding of the 
public debt. Until then advances on the floating debt were carried out 
privately, by the Cinco Gremios de Madrid for example, in return for high 
rates of interest and economic privileges. Though Spain collected a 
proportion similar to England from customs duties and spent a comparable 
amount on defence, she did it retaining a fiscal system and a complex 
of institutions which held down the development of the country's 
productive forces. When all is said and done, that was the best way, certainly 
better than market monopoly, of profiting from the Empire. 
America generated some incentives favourable to growth. They were 
not great, but they were there. Moreover, despite the difficulties described, 
economic growth after 1814 rested on merchant capital, commercial 
networks, a bourgeoisie, and also a capital stock and a change in 
consumption pattems to which the American trade, linked inextricably with 
trade with Europe, had contributed from 1750. Though the Indies were 
not important in macroeconomic terms, they were a vital cog in an 
institutional and economic system that shaped interregional relationships 
in the period of the formation of a national economy. The effects of 
American independence, though outside the scope of this study, should 
perhaps be analysed from that perspective. 
' ' ' Engerman, Haber & Sokoloff, (nxl), p. 7. 
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THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE DUTCH 
EXPANSIÓN OVERSEAS, 1570-1870 
PIETER C. EMMER 
Department of History, University of Leiden 
INTRODUCTION 
How much did die Dutch economy benefit from its expansión beyond 
the borders of Europe? The simple answer is provided by the Dutch 
spectators at international soccer games, when they start to encourage their 
team by singing about the great achievements of Piet Heyn, who as an 
admiral of the Dutch fleet captured the Spanish flota off the Cuban coast 
in 1628. This song implies that the Dutch economy was greatly stimulated 
by a one-time injection of «Spanish coins» and oranges. No doubt, both 
were vety welcome indeed, but they did not seem to have constituted 
the economic ímpetus that made a difference to the Dutch economy at 
the time. 
However, in the long run the popular notion regarding the importance 
of non-European sources of development proved to be exaggerated in case 
of the Netherlands. In spite of the fact that the contribution of the 
non-European world to the economies of Europe as a whoie has been 
calculated as relatively small, an exception has been made for those cases 
in which the colonial empires were large and the economy of the metropole 
small. Leaving the port-city states such as Hamburg, Goa or Gibraltar aside 
only two countries qualify in the category «small nation, large empires»: 
Portugal and the Netherlands. For these two countries Patrick O'Brien 
conjectured that the contribution of the periphery to the GNP of the 
metropole to have been larger than 10 per cent . 
Unfortunately, there exists no comprehensive study of the economic 
impact of Dutch overseas expansión. Worse still, to date there exists no 
table of estimated GNP figures for the period under discussion 
(1570-1870). These two lacunae make it virtually impossible to arrive at 
any reasonable answer to the question, which does justice to changes over 
time. However, several economic aspects of the Dutch exploits outside 
Europe have been studied to some detail and therefore we can offer a 
0'Brien(1982), p. 4. 
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summary of research of the economic impact on the Dutch economy of 
i) the Dutch East India Company (VOC) between 1600 and 1795; ii) the 
Dutch slave trade and of the plantation sector in the Atlantic between 
the foundation of the Dutch West India Company in 1621 and the slave 
emancipation in the Dutch West Indies in 1863; üi) the Dutch trade in 
the Atlantic between 1600 and 1870 and —last but not least— iv) the 
«cultivation system» in Java between 1830 and 1870 .^ 
These four major episodes and sectors of Dutch expansión do not, 
however, cover all the ground. An important omission is Dutch trade to 
the non-European shores of the Mediterranean, the so-called Levant trade. 
Every year after 1600 between 60 and 100 Dutch ships participated in 
this trade. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the majority of 
these ships sailed to Spanish and Italian ports and not to the non-Westem 
ports of the Mediterranean .^ 
A second omission is made up by the Dutch trade to North America. 
However, its volume could not have been very large as the Navigation 
Laws made this trade virtually impossible. After the U.S. had gained its 
independence, the trade with North America passed from the colonial into 
the non-colonial sector and therefore falls beyond the scope of this 
contribution. 
A third omission concems the trade and production of goods, imported 
and exported to and from neighbouring countries in Europe, coming from 
or going to the non-European world. It is well-known that during the early 
phase of the slave trade British and French slave ships first sailed to a 
Dutch port in order to buy textiles, cowries and assorted other items used 
as barter on the African coast. There is no way in which the volume of 
these exports can be calculated. However, it should be stressed that once 
the slave trade had been developed most French and British slavers were 
loaded in their own ports with products mainly produced in their own 
country "*. 
Similarly, between 1650 and 1800 large quantities of sugar from the 
French Antilles were imported from France and refined in and distributed 
via the Netherlands. The economic impact of this indirect colonial link 
^ On the Dutch East India Company sce Gaastra (1982a). The Dutch West India 
Company is discussed in Heyer (1994), Emmer (1981) and Goslinga (1971). The slave 
trade and plantation slavery in Surinarae is discussed in Stipríaan (1993) and Voort (1973). 
The colonial exploitation of Java is featured in Niel (1992) en Fasseur (1975). 
' Israel (1989), pp. 149-156 and Israel (1990), pp. 133-162. 
' Rawley(1981),pp. 79-92. 
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seems to have been limited. The import of unrefined sugar form France 
will have caused a marginal increase in the Netherlands in the number 
of refineries and in the amount of commercial and shipping services '. 
THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY AND THE DUTCH 
ECONOMY, 1602-1795 
Anyone studying the impact of the non-European world on the 
economies of Western Europe would have to discuss the economic role 
of the Dutch East India Company or Vereenigde Oosí Indische Compagnie 
(VOC) during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was the largest 
company at the time, employing more than 40,000 personnel during the 
most expansive years of its existence. The VOC accounted for 25% of 
Dutch shipping and for 13% of the valué of all Dutch foreign trade. The 
Company's offices and wharfs could be found in six Dutch cities and as 
such it was the largest single employer of artisans, clerks and seamen in 
the country. In addition, the VOC's capital was put up by shareholders 
and thus the Company constituted one of the few opportunities for 
investment at the time .^ Yet in spite of the size of its operation, its 
employees and its capital, the economic impact of the VOC on the economy 
of the Netherlands had few innovative spin-offs. 
First of all, it should be stressed that the VOC made most of its profits 
in Asia. Sometimes the trade between the Netherlands and Asia could 
only be operated at a loss. A largc share of the Asian profits did not accrue 
to shareholders, but to the members of its personnel. 
There is no doubt that each year the high-ranking expatríate staff of 
the VOC sent home much more money than the possible savings on their 
salaríes could have allowed for ^. 
Secondly, while the activities of the VOC in Asia might have been 
unique, at home the activities of the Company were similar to those of 
the other shipping companies, albeit on a larger scale. Thus, there were 
more sailors, soldiers, bookkeepers and ship building personnel employed 
than would have been the case without the VOC but the Company did 
not créate any unique economic activities. Its main impact can be situated 
on the Dutch labour market, but the VOC's demand for labour could 
' Voort(1973),pp. 134-152, 
" Vrics and van der Woude (1995), pp. 452-453. 
' Gaastra(1982b),pp. 79-83. 
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not have been met if there had not been a sizeable additional supply of 
foreign immigrant workers. Yet, the impact of the VOC on the Dutch 
labour market remained substantial because the bulk of the Company's 
employees, i.e. its soldiers and sailors, had a very high turnover. The 
constant need to hire additional men can be explained by the fact that 
most low-paid jobs in the Company were not suited for middle-aged men. 
In addition, mortality en route to and in Asia was extremely high, particularly 
among the soldiers who had to remain there for some time. In sum, the 
Company «used up» thousands of young, mobile boys and men, who 
otherwise would have been available for the labour market at home or 
as emigrants willing to go to the colonies of settlement in the New World 
and South África .^ 
A third observation, in favour of the argument that the economic impact 
of the VOC in the Netherlands was rather limited can be found in the 
financial demands of the Company. When founded the VOC absorbed 
a large share of the investment capital available at the time. Shares were 
sold to small investors (artisans, even employees and house maids), who 
were looking for an opportunity to invest their savings, as well as to 
merchants. Over time, however, the majority of the shares came into the 
hands of a small group of investors and remained there. Most of the 
additional capital needed by the Company was financed by ploughing back 
part of the profits. During the 18th century the declining profits and 
increasing overhead costs forced the VOC to obtain loans and these reduced 
the opportunities of merchants to obtain credit for innovative change. The 
VOC absorbed substantial amounts of money in order to continué its 
increasingly uncompetitive activities. Without the Company, more 
investment capital would have been available for small entrepreneurs 
operating in the intra-European trade and —last but not least— for those, 
who produced goods and services for the Dutch and European markets. 
As well as for investments in the public debt of foreign countries, notably 
that of the U.K.''. 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE DUTCH SLAVE TRADE 
—CUM— PLANTATION SECTOR 
To what extend did the Dutch economy during the period of the Anden 
Régime profit from the slave trade and from slavery itself? In the case 
" Bruijn (1976), pp. 218-248 and Bruijn and Lucassen (1980). 
' Vries and van der Woude (1995), pp. 144-179. 
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of Britain the answer to this question is usually derived from calculations 
of profits for the slave trade as well as from estímales of the financial 
profits and other spin-offs from the various plantation economies in British 
America. In this discussion many historians remain adamant that there 
is no direct link between the profits from the slave trade and the beginnings 
of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, but there is no doubt that the rapidly 
growing West Indian economies provided an indirect stimulus. However, 
the debate about a possiblc link between the slavery —cum— plantation 
sector and the growth of the British economy of the later 18th century 
seems to be of little valué in solving a similar question regarding the Dutch 
economy. Furthermore, the Industrial Revolutions in Portugal, Spain, the 
Netherlands, and even France seemed to have owed little to their slave 
economies in the Americas. 
In the Dutch case, the economic impact of their slave trade and West 
Indian plantations might well have been a negative one. First, for Dutch 
expansión the Atlantic was secondary. Asia carne first. It has always been 
assumed that the total turnover of Dutch exports and imports to and from 
Asia was substantially larger than for Atlantic trades. Recent calculations 
seem, however, to indícate that the two were not dramatically different 
because the volume and the valué of the production and trade in goods 
in the Atlantic have always been undervalued. Yet, during the 18th century, 
the Dutch economy was never faced by an explosive increase in the 
production of its West Indian plantations as had happened in the case 
of the U.K., France —and to a lesser extent— for Spain and Portugal. 
Secondly, the Dutch might have been instrumental in increasing the 
Atlantic slave trade and in laying the foundations of capitalist plantation 
economies in the Caribbean, but Dutch primacy was only of major 
importance during the first half of the seventeenth century when the volume 
both of the slave trade and of the plantation output were still very limited. 
After 1660 when these volumes started to increase, the share of the Dutch 
in the Atlantic trade declined rapidly. There is moreover good reason to 
assume that the respective shares in the slave trade of the U.K., France, 
the Netherlands and Portugal can serve as proxies for their ranking as 
producers of plantation cash crops. The Dutch slave trade constituted about 
5 per cent of the total slave trade and this percentage can ipso fado be 
applied to the production of cash crops. Towards the end of the 18th 
century the Dutch share decreased rapidly indicating a decline in the 
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position of the Dutch Caribbean relative to other áreas both as recipient 
of slaves from África and as exponer of plantation produce '". 
Third, the Dutch investments in plantation agriculture yielded retums 
which were not nearly as positive as those of other nations. The origin 
of this difference emerges beginning of the 17th century. During the early 
decades of the 17th century, the Dutch tried to seize Northeastem Brazil 
which already had been developed by Portugal as a sugar producing región 
rather than conquering and setting islands in the Caribbean and starting 
from scratch as France and England opted to do. The struggle for mastery 
in Brazil was more fierce than the Dutch had expected and as a consequence 
the Dutch West India Company went bankrupt. In 1645 the export of 
sugar from Dutch Brazil virtually came to a standstill and the Dutch had 
no altemative but to induce planters in the British and French Caribbean 
to créate a «second Brazil». Only after the conquest of part of Guyana 
in 1667 did the Dutch start to develop some sugar producing colonies 
of their own " . 
Even then the development of the Dutch sugar colonies was quite 
different from that of the British and French islands. The Dutch only 
invested substantial amounts of capital into their plantation colonies when 
their position as distributors of sugar and coffee from the French Antilles 
in Europe was being threatened. After 1750 when the French started to 
distribute these products themselves, Dutch investors poured more than 
60 million guilders into the Caribbean, two thirds of this amount went 
to the largest Dutch plantation colony, Suriname, between 1753 and 1775. 
These investments should be seen as one of the many 18th century 
«bubbles» that were not based on sound business acumen. It soon became 
obvious that the size of these investments was far too large in relation 
to the increase in the productive capacities of Suriname's plantations. The 
result was that most of the planter-owners of that colony went bankrupt 
and that their plantations became the property of a multitude of 
metropolitan investment groups who had expected a quick retum on their 
investments rather than becoming the actual owners of plantations in a 
distant part of the world '^. 
In spite of heavy debts, the Suriname plantations were nevertheless 
able to take part in the «second plantation revolution» at the end of the 
18th and the beginning of the 19th century. However, Suriname's increase 
'" Postma (1990), p. 296 (table). 
" Boogaart(1992), pp. 156-166. 
' ' Voort (1973), pp. 197-213, and Stipriaan (1993), pp. 69-74. 
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in the production of sugar due to improvements in efficiency only amounted 
to half of that of some parts of the British Caribbean, notably Trinidad 
and Guiana. In fact, Guiana's output only started to grow once it had 
been transferred from Dutch to British ownership during the course of 
the Napoleonic Wars. This suggests that after 1775 the Dutch had become 
too reluctant to invest in the Caribbean, because their previous investments 
had turned into losses. Successive over- and underinvestment in the 
plantation sector prevented the Suriname's planters from gaining as much 
from the new opportunities offered by steam milis and new varieties of 
sugar cañe as did their competitors elsewhere '^. 
These various mishaps and miscalculations in the history of the Dutch 
Caribbean explain why the West Indian plantations never became the 
«jewels» of the Dutch colonial empire. The plantation market for consumer 
and investment goods certainly was of interest to the Dutch metropolitan 
economy, but its size was limited and did not increase consistently during 
the 18th century. In sum, the links between the plantations in the Caribbean 
and the Dutch economy at home were far weaker than those of Britain 
and France. The Sugar Duties Act forced the British consumers to subsidize 
their plantations, and in retum the West Indies offered the fastest growing 
outlet for British exports during the latter part of the 18th century. A 
similar observation can be made about France and the French Caribbean. 
During the same period the Dutch export to Suriname stagnated, because 
of the debt crisis and the lack of protection '''. 
During the first half of the 19th century economic links between 
Suriname and the Netherlands remained stable, but the colony's relative 
share in Dutch overseas trade declined because of the increase in trade 
with the Dutch East Indies. After 1848 the Suriname sugar producers were 
allowed to export wherever they wanted and soon they sold most of their 
sugar to the U.K. and the U.S. After the 1830s the sugar exports from 
the Dutch East Indies started to exceed those of Suriname in spite of 
the fact that the Atlantic colony used slave labour until 1863, when the 
slaves were finally emancipated. Again, its should be stressed that the 
«benefit» of continued slave labour in Suriname only prevented the decline 
of the cash crop production, while the continuation of slavery in Cuba, 
Brazil, and the U.S. helped to increase production ' ' . 
" Emmer(1996), pp. 11-18. 
" Cuenca Esteban (1994), Butel (1990). 
" Fogel (1989), pp. 60-72; Stipriaan (1995), p. 125. 
163 
PIETER C EMMER 
The growth of the agricultural production for export on Java explains 
why the Dutch govemment could pay the owners of slaves compensation 
without increasing the national debt as had been the case in Britain and 
France. The British slave emancipation was paid for by the taxpayers in 
Britain. In case of the Dutch, the costs of slave emancipation could easily 
be met because of windfall income derived from the sale of cash crops 
from Java. These cash crops were produced by forced labour and sold 
for the profit of the Dutch colonial govemment in Java. Paradoxically, 
one kind of forced labour paid for the abolition of another '^. 
Lastly, Dutch trade with Western África should be mentioned. This 
trade was dominated by the slave trade. Unlike the British, French and 
Portuguese/Brazilian slave trades, the Dutch slave trade peaked in the 
second and third quarters of the 18th century and declined sharply towards 
the end of the century. This sequence flowed from the investment crisis 
as outlined above which severely had curtailed the buying power of the 
planters in the Dutch Caribbean after 1775; and from the -illegal- supply 
of slaves by North American and British slavers reducing the demand for 
Dutch slavers and from the absence of protection for the Suriname sugar 
and coffee which would have made its plantations more profítable and 
provided their planters with more buying power " . 
As a result of the relatively modest size of the Dutch slave trade, there 
are no indications that branches of the manufacturing industry in the 
Netherlands, such as the textile industry were increasing in order to respond 
to the African and West Indian markets. In fact the major share of the 
textiles exported to West África on Dutch slave ships had been imported 
from Asia. No research has been done on the impact of the African and 
West Indian trades on the Dutch industries producing textiles, liquor, guns 
and powder, but it seems unlikely that these trades created anything but 
a relatively small and unstable supplementary demand. 
THE IMPACT OF THE ATLANTIC TRADE IN GOODS 
The Dutch expansión within the Atlantic economy differed from that 
of other nations in that the major share of the Dutch trade consisted of 
products not produced by Dutch colonies. At the end of the 16th century 
the Dutch expansión in the New World had been supported by other 
"• Emmer(1995), p. 215. 
" Postma (1990), p. 295 (table). 
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empires, notably the Portuguese and Spanish colonies and that tradition 
persisted. First, the Dutch penetrated into the sugar trade between Brazil 
and Portugal and over time they succeeded in transporting more than half 
the yeariy sugar production to Europe. After the aborted attempt to take 
over the sugar producing regions in Brazil between 1629 and 1651, the 
Dutch had been ousted from those trades. From the middle of the 17th 
century Brazilian export products were brought to Europe in ships owned 
by Portuguese, Brazilian and British merchants '*. 
As Brazil tumed out to be a dead loss, the Dutch traders moved to 
the Caribbean, where they stimulated the creation of a second sugar 
producing área between 1640 and 1670. In some of the literature the role 
of the Dutch has been praised for being instrumental in the transfer of 
relevant technology from Brazil to the West Indies. After 1640 Dutch 
merchants were supposed to have provided extensive credit facilities to 
the planters in the British and French Caribbean, in addition to the slaves 
as well as the machinety needed for the production of sugar. However, 
in the long run the second Dutch attempt at acting as middlemen for 
foreign sugar planters also failed. During the 1660s the Navigation Acts 
forced the Dutch traders to withdraw from the British islands and ten 
years later the mercantilist policies of Colbert had a similar effect on the 
then flourishing Dutch trade with the French Caribbean " . 
It would go beyond the scope of this paper to enumérate all the new 
findings regarding the creation of a «second Brazil» in the Caribbean, 
but the most important conclusions point to the fact that before the 1660s 
the role of the Dutch was far less vital than the literature wants us to 
believe. Local capital as well as British ships and traders played a much 
more substantial role during the 1640s and the 1650s than has been 
assumed previously. What should concern us here is the fact that even 
if the Dutch had occupied the position of the foremost trading nation 
in the Caribbean, it can only have been limited to a relatively short period 
when the production of plantation products was still in its infancy and 
consequently the export volumes were very small 
How then it is possible that between 1650 and 1800 the Dutch were 
able to continué a sizable trade in goods and slaves in excess of the demand 
for slaves generated by their own West Indian colonies? The present state 
of the research points to two major «leaks» in the mercantilist empires 
'" Jobson de Andrade Arruda (1991), pp. 380-397; Schwartz (1985), pp. 180-185. 
''' Boogaart (1992), pp. 156-166. 
'" Appleby(1996), 
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of the Atlantic trade before 1800: Spanish America and the French Antilles. 
In times of war, large quantities of French sugar were shipped to the 
Netherlands via the (neutral) Dutch island of St. Eustatius. In addition, 
directly or via Dutch Curasao, merchants were able to siphon off large 
quantities of cocoa, sugar, coffee, tobáceo, Índigo and hides from Spanish 
America, mainly from Venezuela ^'. 
Last, but not least, it should be repeated that the major activity of 
the Dutch in the Atlantic was trade and not production. Thus, the impact 
of the dynamic, capitalist and innovative plantations on the Dutch economy 
was far less important than the less dynamic impact of the long-distance 
trade. Yet, their own plantations kept the Dutch operating in the Atlantic 
after the Napoleonic Wars had brought all other activities to a virtual 
standstill. Although markets in Latin America were lost to the British, after 
1815 the Dutch were able to keep about 40-60 ships per year employed 
in the carrying trade with Suriname by excluding foreign carriers. Even 
this economic activity was threatened when the introduction of free trade 
after 1848 showed that the majority of the Suriname cash crops could 
be marketed more profitably in the U.K. and the U.S. than in the mother 
country. Since the introduction of the «cultivation system» in 1830 virtually 
all Dutch efforts at increasing their supply of tropical cash crops were 
directed towards Java, where this new system of forced cropping yielded 
results beyond the wildest expectations ^^ . 
THE CULTIVATION SYSTEM AND JAVA, 1830-1860 
After the Napoleonic Wars the Dutch colonial empire found itself in 
a State of crisis. In the West Indias, Essequibo, Demarara, and Berbice 
(later to become British Guiana) had not been handed back and the same 
applied to the Cape Colony and Ceylon. The West and East India 
companies had gone bankrupt and the state had been forced to assume 
responsibility for the administration and the defence of their possessions. 
After 1815, the colonial trade links had become more vulnerable as 
foreign competitors were ready to take over from Dutch shipping firms 
offering cheaper freight rates and cheaper products. In the Atlantic as well 
as in Asia the Dutch activities were increasingly directed towards the 
remaining colonies from where foreign competitors could be excluded. 
" Klooster(1995). 
" Fasseur(1975), pp. 114-128. 
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British and American merchants replaced the Dutch in intra-Asian trade, 
once the driving forcé behind the Dutch presence in Asia. Since the Dutch 
East and West Indian companies had gone bankrupt and had been taken 
over by the government, the Dutch taxpayer now had to pay for the 
govemment and the defence of these colonies. The Dutch government 
was not able to defray the expenses by increasing the taxation of colonial 
firms or of its colonial subjects. The budget déficit was considerable and 
the situation worsened when during the 1830s the Dutch King spent a 
considerable amount of state money on a military campaign against Belgium 
in an abortive attempt at preventing secession, as well as on suppressing 
a guerilla war on Java. 
The financial crisis was solved by the introduction of a colonial taxation 
scheme which yielded results far beyond the expectations of its architect, 
Johannes van den Bosch. From 1830 onwards, the production of cash 
crops was forced upon the Javanese villages in addition to the various 
taxes which already existed. The villages were ordered to use part of their 
arable land for the production of coffee, sugar and Índigo. It is truc that 
the villages were paid a fee for the cultivation of these crops, but the 
large differentiai between fees (and other expenses involved in operating 
the system) and the income from the sale of these products was pocketed 
by the colonial government in Batavia. After deducting expenses for 
goveming Java, Suriname and the Dutch Antilles the remainder flowed 
into the metropolitan treasury ^'. 
Time and again the cultivation system has been evaluated, In fact, there 
is a whole historical and literary tradition denouncing the more than 800 
million guilders which in this way were transferred to the Netherlands as 
a «debt of honour». There exists an extensive and conflicting body of 
literature conceming the question as to whether the introduction of the 
system has been detrimental to the economic well-being of the Javanese. 
To date this debate remains inconclusive as the relevant economic and 
demographic data showing the effects of the cultivation system are not 
available. 
What should concern us here, however, are not the effects of the system 
on Java, but on the Netherlands itself. On paper these results seem dramatic 
as well as unique. Dramatic, because the Dutch metropolitan treasury 
profited greatly from the transfer of the positive balance from Batavia to 
The Hague. This transfer was unique, because no other colonial power 
" Fasseur(1982), pp. 166-194. 
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ever sold coffee and sugar for its own benefit. All other colonial powers 
left this activity to the prívate sector. 
During the 1860s extra income derived from the cultivation system 
peaked to about one third of the income of the Dutch state. This extra 
income allowed the Dutch to increase their expenditure on the transport 
infrastructure at home. The 1850s and 1860s saw the rapid extensión of 
the railway network as well as improved access to the harbours of Rotterdam 
and Amsterdam. Also, the debt left after the unsuccessful campaign against 
Belgium could be paid off and the owners of the slaves in the West Indies 
compensated. The colonial profits also allowed the Dutch to postpone the 
introduction of an income tax. 
This financial windfall from the colonies seems to have made the Dutch 
economy more productive but not more competitive. The Dutch 
government had given the Dutch Trading Company [Nederlandsche 
Handelsmaatschappij or NHM) the exclusive right to transport sugar and 
coffee from Java to the Netherlands, where the NHM sold these products 
at public auctions. This monopoly position allowed the NHM to pay 
extremely high freight and insurance rates. In addition, the government 
also allowed the NHM to sell exclusively Dutch textiles in Java and to 
exelude foreign (i.e. British) competition. Secondly, the need to transport 
coffee and sugar and the demand for European goods on Java resulted 
in a boom in shipbuilding, textile production and commercial service sector. 
However, the boom was short-lived and did not créate industries which 
could face intemational competition. The effects of the boom were mainly 
felt between 1830 and 1840. After this decade the level of protection was 
reduced. 
No doubt the «cultivation system» was important for the Dutch 
economy as more than half of the valué of Dutch intemational trade 
consisted of tropical cash crops and about 60 per cent of the valué added 
in maritime shipping was dependent on the Dutch East Indies. The textile 
exports to the Dutch East Indies certainly reduced unemployment. This 
seems to suggest that the effects of the cultivation system on the 
metropolitan economy were beneficial when we consider the growth in 
volume, but negative when the quality of that growth is taken into 
consideration. In fact, there are reasons to assume that the cultivation 
system retarded the development of the Dutch economy towards 
competitiveness on the intemational markets, which were increasingly 
liberalized from the I840s onward. 
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The shipping and the sale of coffee and sugar produced by the 
cultivation system was handled by a semi-private trading Corporation which 
excluded competition. Similarly, the Indonesian markets, which were 
increasing in size due to monetization flowing from the payments involving 
the cultivation system, were only accessible to Dutch firms. The question 
remains whether around 1830 there would have been sufficient investment 
capital available in the Netherlands in order to constitute a viable altemative 
to the heavy-handed role of the govemment. However, it seems clear that 
outside the domain of govemment flnance the economic impact of the 
colonial links between the Netherlands and Java remained more limited 
than would have been the case had prívate entrepreneurs been allowed 
access to Java. The jealousy with which other colonial powers regarded 
the Dutch exploitation of Java was misplaced. The cultivation system 
retarded the introduction of a modem market economy in Java and it 
also retarded the adaptation of the Dutch economy to the competitive 
capitalism of the 19th century. As late as 1830 the «free labour cum prívate 
enterpríse» maxim had not yet been accepted by the Dutch political élite 
and this allowed the introduction of the cultivation system with its outdated 
forced-labour ideology. It was not abolished until 1860, when this maxim 
had fínally gained more adherents in the Dutch parliament. After a period 
of stagnation between 1780 and 1860, the modemisation of the Dutch 
economy started after the cultivation system had been abandoned and after 
the link between the colonial and metropolitan economies had been 
weakened ^^. 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE NON-EUROPEAN WORLD, 
ON THE DUTCH ECONOMY: ESTIMATES OF THE VOLUME 
OF TRADE AND OF THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE DUTCH 
NATIONAL INCOME 
There have been a few attempts at calculating the volume of the Dutch 
share in the trade between Europe and the non-European world. Niels 
Steensgaard suggest that the total volume of all foreign imports into the 
Netherlands around the middle of die eighteenth century amounted to 
150 million guilders of which 20 to 25 per cent was derived from 
non-European trade. No allowance had been made for the sale, re-export 
" Fasseur (1991), Elson (1994), Boomgaard (1987), Jong (1989), Reimsma (1955), 
Niel (1992). 
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and distribución from, to and via the Netherlands of colonial imports and 
exports from and to the neighbouring countries. For Britain around 1750, 
Steensgaard calculates the share of the non-European trade as a percentage 
of all trade at about 50%, twice as much as for the Netherlands ^'. 
A second difference between the Dutch and British trade pattems which 
Steengaard's statistics bring to light, is the fact that within British colonial 
trade the importance of America versus Asia can be set at 3:1, while that 
ratio is roughly 1:6 in the Dutch case. However, recently W.W. Klooster 
has pointed out that the volume of the Dutch trade in the Atlantic has 
always been undervalued. In the existing literature the export of cash crops 
from the Dutch plantations in the Caribbean suppxjsedly constituted the 
lion's share of all Dutch Atlantic trade. Klooster's revisión suggests a 500 
per cent increase in the gross turnover of the Dutch Atlantic trade, which 
brings it to about 10 million guilders. This means that the share of the 
total non-European trade to and from the Netherlands would come to 
30-35 per cent of the total trade and that the ratio between the American 
and Asian trades of the Netherlands can be set at 1 to 2 rather than 
at 1 to 6 '^'. 
De Vries and Van der Woude recently have re-calculated a 
contemporary estímate of the Dutch National Income around 1800. They 
estímate a National Income of around 300 million guilders and suggest 
that all foreign and colonial trades (inclusive of banking) brought in 50 
million guilders or about 18 per cent of the total (30 million from the 
trade within Europe and 20 million from the Asian and Atlantic trades). 
The combined figures of Steensgaard and Klooster suggest that the 
respective valúes of the European and non-European trades of the 
Netherlands had been 130 million guilders and 30 million guilders 
respectively (or roughly 4:1) ^'. 
These figures indícate that the Dutch economy of the Anden Régime 
was more dependent on foreign trade than virtually any other economy 
in Europe, perhaps with the exception of Portugal. The mercantile sector 
certainly was less important to the economy of Britain than it was for 
the Netherlands. Within the mercantile sector of Britain, however, the 
non-European trade, and especially the Adantic trade, was twice as 
important as is was within the mercantile sector of the Netherlands *^. 
" Steensgaard (1990). 
" Klooster (1995), pp. 169-199. 
" Vries and van der Woude (1995), pp. 806-818. 
" O'Brien and Engerman (1991), p. 186 (table). 
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During the 19th century there was little change in the nature of the 
Dutch econotny and in the relationship of that economy with the Dutch 
colonial world. In a recent analysis of the economic development of the 
Dutch service sector between 1800 and 1850 E. Horlings points out that 
the modernisation of the Dutch economy did not take place until after 
1850. During the first half of the 19th century the Dutch economy 
experienced growth but that growth was mainly concentrated in the 
intemational service and export sectors which had few feedbacks to the 
economy at large. Until 1860 real wage levéis stagnated as well as the 
consumption per head of population, while poverty increased because of 
a combination of slow economic growth, stagnating wages, and the 
increased taxation of low incomes. Horlings concludes by saying that the 
economic growth afier 1850 constituted the real rupture with the past ^'. 
CONCLUSIÓN: DUTCH ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND NON-EUROPEAN TRADE 
The impact of the colonial trade on the Dutch economy varied over 
time. During the three hundred years between 1570 and 1870 there are 
three phases of economic development during which the impact of ©verseas 
trade changed: i) the period of explosive growth between 1570 and 1670; 
ii) the period of relative stagnation between 1670 and 1800 and iii) the 
period of reorientation from 1810 to 1870. 
It could be argued that the impact of the non-European world on 
the Dutch economy had been most profitable during the earliest part of 
the first phase of Dutch expansión because it coincided with an increase 
in the Dutch trade in Europe as well as in the production at home. The 
factors of production could easily be switched from intra- to extra-European 
activities. In view of that situation it seems strange that the Dutch took 
such enormous risks by gambling on the profits to be gained from the 
conquest of Brazil. 
However, the overhead costs of the Dutch Atlantic possessions had 
to be paid for by one single institution: The Dutch West India Company. 
Because of the constant warfare against the Spanish, the Portuguese, and 
the British the Company had no way to balance its expenses and income. 
Had this venture been successful, the Dutch would have been as unique 
Horlings, pp. 309, 310. 
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in the Atlantic as they were to become in Asia. The Portuguese and the 
British, however, cut the Dutch West India Company down to size and 
both Brazil and New Netherlands in North America were lost while the 
Company went bankrupt. As a consequence, the Dutch could no longer 
invest in the conquest of another Atlantic settlement colony and they were 
rather late in obtaining a plantation colony of their own. The atomization 
of the Dutch Atlantic empire created several loóse ends; the various 
possessions and trade pattems no longer constituted a coherent entity. 
For example, the Dutch slave trade network in West África had become 
far too extensive in relation to the very modest demand for slaves in the 
Dutch Caribbean and for a short period the Dutch were able to become 
the largest suppliers of slaves to third parties such as to the British, French 
and the Spanish plantations. However, the rise of the various Atlantic 
empires was based on a mix between metropolitan business acumen, 
overseas settlement and plantation colonies and mercantilism and after 
the 1660's the Dutch in the Atlantic lacked several of these ingredients. 
The only way to redress this situation would have been a massive investment 
in naval power, but the Dutch Repubüc could not have financed such 
an increase in govemment expenditure. Around 1670 the Dutch in the 
Atlantic had only two avenues for economic growth left: illegal trade with 
Spanish America and plantation agriculture. 
After 1670 Dutch trade with the Adantic started to become more 
important to the Dutch economy, because the Dutch trading operations 
within Europe declined due to increased competition from British and 
French traders. The Dutch lost ground in the Atlantic trade when the 
British, French and even Portuguese slave trade-cum-plantation sectors 
became more dynamic than their Dutch equivalent. In Dutch economic 
history there is no corollary for the interesting fact that while the British 
trade with the Atlantic during the 18th century did not constitute the major 
part of British foreign trade in general, it was the most rapidly growing 
section. In case of the Dutch, the Adantic trade did not increase nearly 
to the same extent. 
In order to explain the relatively modest performance of the Dutch 
plantation colonies it should be pointed out that the Dutch West Indian 
cash crops did not enjoy any protection on the Dutch home market. In 
addition, Dutch investors and plantation owners were reluctant to invest 
in the new opportunities for growth after a dramatic decline in the valué 
of plantation loans on the Amsterdam stock exchange around 1775. The 
Dutch plantation colonies in the Guianas had ampie room to increase their 
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crash crop production by adopting new varieties of sugar cañe containing 
more sucrosa. However, there no longer was investment money available. 
Only after the take-over by the British did Demerara, Essequibo and 
Berbice start to grow, while Suriname could only attempt at keeping cash 
crops production at the same levéis as before. 
This leaves us with the Dutch mercantile triumphs in Asia. In Asia 
military power, and the number of available colonists were far less important 
than mercantile organisation. In the Atlantic the Dutch lacked a strong 
fleet as well as govemment money to invest in overseas settlement. These 
requirements were absent in Asia, where the Dutch could excel in trade. 
There is no doubt that during the first half of the 18th century the VOC 
became for the Dutch economy what the American plantations were for 
the British economy. The question is whether the trade with Asia had 
similar effects on the metropolitan economy as had the trade to and from 
American plantations. 
There seems to be sufficient evidence to prove that the trade to and 
from Asia created different —and less stimulating— demands on the Dutch 
economy than did the Atlantic trade. First of all, Dutch trade to Asia 
required little in the way of specialized production, meanwhile the imports 
from Asia did not induce the entrepreneurs in the Netherlands to invest 
in manufacturing. In the Adantic the demand for barter products on the 
African coast and the need to supply the plantations did créate inducements 
for the mechanisation of the manufacturing sector. 
Secondly, the Dutch East India Company needed large numbers of 
mobile, unmarried males in order to staff their growing number of entrepots 
in Asia. In the 18th century the numbers amounted to perhaps as many 
as 4,000 to 5,000 a year. Two thirds of these boys and men were sent 
to a certain death in Asia. Whereas 75 per cent of such men in the U.K. 
went to work overseas in the American colonies of settlement and only 
25 per cent went to the dangerous environment of the tropics. In case 
of the Dutch these percentages were exactly opposite. In spite of the large 
percentage of foreigners employed in the Dutch overseas ventures, the 
constant drain on mobile labour must have pushed wages up at home, 
thus reducing the competitiveness of Dutch mercantile shipping and 
manufacturing. As 20% of each cohort of young men bom in Holland 
died overseas in the employ of the Dutch East India Company, the Dutch 
expansión certainly kept the streets at home free from beggars and the 
unemployed. 
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In a dialectical way, the trade with Asia also had some positive 
consequences. Once the Dutch had become less competitive in Europe, 
dieir colonial trades reduced unemployment in the shipping industry, in 
banking, broking and ship handling. On the other hand the Dutch trade 
with Asia reduced the need for leading sectors in the Dutch economy 
to face up to competitive European and Atlantic markets. Attempts to 
imitate the economies of the U.K. and France by heavy investments in 
the Dutch plantation colonies failed because of over-investment. On the 
other hand, it should be pointed out that the consumers in France and 
the U.K. were forced to subsidize their West Indian plantations by having 
to pay higher prices for sugar (and coffee) than the world market would 
demand, while such protective policies were absent in the Netherlands. 
The Napoleonic Wars did not constitute a change in the relationship 
between the empire and the metropole. The proííts from the «cultivation 
system» allowed the Dutch to continué operating a non-competitive 
economy at home. During the first half of the 19th century the profits 
from the colonies were used to improve the infrastructure of the Dutch 
economy. The subsequent modernization during the second half of the 
19th century was in part based on that improved infrastructure. Yet, the 
metropolitan economy only started to grow once the flow of windfall profits 
from overseas had dried up. 
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EMPIRE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
THE CASE OF 18TH CENTURY FRANGE 
PAUL BUTEL 
FRANgOIS CROUZET 
1. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRST FRENCH 
COLONIAL EMPIRE 
Among the colonial powers of the early modem period, France was 
the last to emerge. Although, the French had not abstained from the 
exploration of fhe New World in the 16th century: G. de Verrazano 
discovered the site of New York (1524), during a voyage sponsored by 
King Francis I; Jacques Cartier sailed up the St. Lawrence to Quebec 
and Montreal (1535). From the early 16th century, many ships from ports 
such as Dieppe, St. Malo, La Rochelle, went on privateering and or trading 
expeditions to the Guinea coast, to Brazil, to the Caribbean, to the Spanish 
Main. Many French boats did fish off Newfoundland. Some traded in 
fiírs on the near-by Continent. Moreover, during the 16th century, sporadic 
attempts were made to establish French settlements in «Equinoctial 
France» (Brazil), in Florida, in modem Ganada, but they failed utterly. 
Undoubtedly, foreign wars against the Habsburgs, during the first half of 
the 16th and of the 17th centuries, civil «wars of religión» during the 
second half of the 16th century, political disorders like the blockade of 
La Rochelle or the Fronde during the first part of the 17th century, absorbed 
the attention and resources of French rulers, despite some ambitious 
projects, like those of Richelieu, for overseas trade. As for the port cities 
they tried to trade overseas but they were isolated and not strong enough 
(specially during the wars of religión) to créate «colonies». Some small 
companies, which had been started in 1601 and 1604, to trade with the 
East Indies, were very short-lived, and the French did not engage seriously 
in Asian trade before 1664. 
A French «colonial» empire only emerged during the 17th century and 
for long it was of modest size. Quebec was settled in 1608, but only had 
150 inhabitants in 1635. In the West Indies, some Frenchmen settled in 
St. Kitts in 1627. Possession of Martinique and Guadeloupe was taken 
in 1635. But the population of those colonies only increased slowly, and 
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much of their trade was in Dutch hands up to the 1670's. There was, 
however, a significant change in the late 17th and in the early 18th centuries, 
despite the long wars at the end of Louis XIV's reign. Sugar plantations 
expanded in the French islands (but in 1685, their production was under 
half that of the British West Indies) but a few French ports —first Nantes, 
and later Bordeaux— developed trade with these colonies. In 1697, the 
Western part of the large island of Santo Domingo was officially ceded 
by Spain to France. Groups of French buccaneers and tobacco-growers 
had already settled there and its production of sugar (also coffee) then 
grew at an amazing speed —from 7 000 tons in 1714 to 86 000 in 1789. 
As for North America, small groups of French explorers, soldiers, 
missionaries, fur traders, starting from their base in the St. Lawrence valley, 
built up, within a few decades, an immense «empire», which extended 
from the Great Lakes to the Ohio and Mississipi Valleys, down to the 
gulf of México (New Orleans was founded in 1718). 
This empire was, however, to be short-lived. As early as 1713, foUowing 
the war of Spanish succession, France lost Acadia (Nova Scotia), 
Newfoundland and the Hudson Bay área. Fifty years later, the French 
disasters during the Seven Years war resulted in the loss of all French 
territories in North America. Louisiana, West of the Mississipi, was ceded 
by France to Spain, as a compensation for the losses the latter had suffered 
in supporting the French cause. France also lost some minor West Indian 
islands and renounced all claims to territorial expansión in India, where 
she only retained five trading posts. 
This narrative of rise and decline over a relatively short span of time 
is significant for the role which the 18th century colonial empire played 
in the French economy. First, it is obvious that French colonial trade could 
only develop, in all its dimensions, much later than it was case for other 
colonial powers- i.e. not before the very end of the 17th century, or rather 
after the peace of 1713. Secondly, the French empire included a rich core 
of colonies which were retained despite the Seven Years War. It was made 
up of Martinique, Guadeloupe and Santo Domingo and the Isle de France 
(Mauritius), in the Indian Ocean, can be added. Its total área was small, 
but the rise in its production of colonial produce during the 18th century 
brought about a remarkable increase of French colonial trade. However, 
it had started from a low level in the late 17th century, at a time when 
Dutch and English traffic with non-European countries was already large. 
As it was basically a West Indian trade, its growth potential was also limited 
by the cultivable área available on French islands. 
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Moreover, the European population of both this core and of the 
shortlived periphery in North America was small and could not provide 
a large market for French manufactures (except for luxuries such as Lyons 
silks). Food exports were also important for rural áreas in Aquitaine, which 
sold flour to the West Indies. The contrast with British colonies was striking. 
For example, although France had about three times more inhabitants than 
Britain and had not escaped the Malthusian trap, Frenchmen, unlike 
Britons, were not prone to emigrate to the colonies. New France —which, 
admittedly, had a harsh natural environment and furs as its only export 
staple— did not receive, altogether, more than 10 to 12 000 immigrants, 
so that the very high marriage and birth rates it enjoyed gave it a rapidly 
rising yet not a large population. By 1763, European inhabitants in the 
lands which had been under French sovereignty did not exceed 85 000, 
of whom about 60 000 were in «Canadá» and 4 000 in Louisiana. The 
huge empire which France lost in North America had been almost empty 
(and therefore the commercial consequences of that loss were limited). 
In contrast the British Continental colonies, by 1763, had 1,6 Million 
inhabitants. Many of whom enjoyed relatively high incomes. As for the 
West Indies, they had attracted more Frenchmen than North America, 
but the rapid rise in their population —from less than 80 000 c. 1713 
to over 700 000 in the 1780's— resulted mainly from the slave trade. 
By 1789, Santo Domingo had half a million slaves, and only 30 000 whites. 
The century during which French colonial trade developed (1672-1789) 
was punctuated by six major wars during which it suffered, because of 
British ascendancy at sea after 1692. Convoys,escorted by warships, were 
used to maintain relations between France and its colonies during the wars 
of Austrian Succession and of American Independence; though during the 
former heavy losses of both merchantmen and naval vessels occured. Only 
during the Seven Years war was traffic almost completely interrupted. Even 
before war had been declared, French merchants and shipowners had also 
suffered heavily from the piratical capture of 300 merchant ships by Admiral 
Hawke's squadron. British sea-borne trade generally enjoyed security 
(except during the Nine Years War, when the loss of the Smyrna convoy 
in 1693 was spectacular). 
Yet, French colonial trade bounced back to new heights after each 
war, even after the Seven Years War, when the enourmous loss of territory 
at the peace of 1763 did not have disastrous consequences from a purely 
commercial and short-term point of view. Still, trade with New France 
had been growing on the eve of that War, when 60 ships sailed from 
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France to Canadá, on average per year. As for the French East India trade, 
after protracted diffículties, it had prosperad after 1730; the sales in France 
by the French East India Company grew faster than those of the EngÜsh 
Company in London and were about the same in valué in the years before 
the Seven Years War. After the latter, trade revived, but at a lower level, 
it prospered again in the 1780's, but a large share was with the French 
islands of Mauritius and Bourbon. 
Indeed, the «golden age» of French colonial trade had been fi-om 1735 
to 1755. It suffered greatly during the Seven Years War, but rebounded 
sharply after its end, and likewise after the War of American Independence 
(when levéis had been better maintained). Counterfactually French colonial 
trade could have grown more, but for the disasters of the Seven Years 
and interruptions of the American wars. 
2. COLONIAL TRADE AND FRENCH FOREIGN TRADE 
During the 18th century, imperial expansión in America (and also in 
Asia) might have made a significant and dynamic contribution to the growth 
of the French economy, inasmuch as colonial trade was connected with 
a large flow of reexports to Europe. Contemporaries were fully conscious 
of this connection. For example, in 1761, the directors of the Chamber 
of Commerce of Guyenne wrote about «a trade, which generates an 
enormous navigation, which spreads all over Europe and which gives to 
France a favourable balance of profits». It is, however, difficult to estímate 
with any precisión the importance of this role or the profitability of colonial 
trade. 
As table I shows, on the eve of the French Revolution, trade with 
French colonies held first rank in the total foreign trade of France, and 
its share of the latter had markedly increased since the beginning of the 
18th century. 
In 1787, France received from its colonies 227 millions livres of imports. 
They were its largest single source of supply, far ahead of the second 
supplier —Italy (Switzerland, Geneva and Savoy included) from which the 
economy purchased 82 millions worth of commodities, i.e. 13.5% of total 
French imports. Then came Germany with 64 m. It, 10.5% of total imports 
and Britain, 63 m., 10.4%. 
The situation had been completely different at the beginning of the 
18th century. In 1716, French imports from the colonies were only worth 
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TABLEI 
Imports from the colonies compared to total imports 
1716 1754 
— Imports £rom the colonies Millions of Itvres (It) 5.1 76.8 
— Total Frence imports Millions of// 38.5 227.1 
— Share of the colonies % 13.5 33.8 
Exports to the colonies and total exports 
— Exports to the colonies Millions of It 2.1 43.5 
— Total exports from France Millions of It 49.1 292.0 
— Share of the colonies % 4.3 14.9 
1772 
142.1 
300.2 
47.4 
38.3 
335.6 
11.5 
1787 
221.Q 
606.5 
37.4 
120.0 
544.2 
22.1 
5 millions, i.e. under 14% of total imports. They were far below imports 
from Spain (10.7 m., i.e. 28% of total imports). Furthermore imports from 
England (5.8 m., 15.2%) and Holland (5.7 m., 14.8%) were also slightly 
larger than those from the colonies. 
As early as the mid-18th century, imports from the colonies (East Indies 
not included) had risen cióse to 77 millions It, 34% of total French imports. 
They exceeded those from Italy (40.4 millions, 17.8% of total imports) 
and those from the Ottoman Empire and Barbary (28.7 m., 12.5%). Spain 
had lost much ground, with imports worth 23.5 m., i.e. 10.3% of total 
imports. 
As for French exports, in 1787, colonial markets received 120 millions, 
i.e. 22% of the grand total. In rank order they preceded «Germany» 
(including Austria and Poland), which bought 95.6 m. worth of goods 
(17.6% of total exports), «the North» (Hanseatic cities and Scandinavia; 
79.8 m., 14.7%) and Italy (78.3 m., 14.4%). Admittedly, colonies in America 
and África only bought for 93 millions (17.1% of total exports) and held 
second rank. 
Progress of exports to the colonies had indeed been spectacular. In 
1716, they had only been worth 2.1 millions, i.e. under 4% of total exports, 
far behind those to Holland (16.6 m., 33.9% of the grand total), Italy 
(9.3 m., 19%) and Spain (9.2 m., 18.8%). 
At mid-century, exports to the colonies had gained in importance, but 
less markedly than imports. Colonial markets received in 1754 43.5 millions 
of French goods (14.9% of total exports), but Spain remained France's 
best customer: 50.1 m., 17.2% of the grand total. 
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Fierre Léon concluded that the colonies represented a significant 
market for French industry. In 1787, exports of manufactures to the French 
West Indias were worth 42.1 millions, and those to África 12.8 m. They 
made up over 57% of total French exports to the West Indies and over 
75% of those to África. As the grand total of manufactured goods exports 
reached in 1787 the sum of 154.4 m., the French West Indies and the 
French African trading posts absorbed 35.5% of that total. On the other 
hand, exports of foodstuffs to the West Indies were only worth 26.8 millions 
and those to África 4.9 m. From 1716 to 1781, exports of manufactures 
to the West Indies had increased ten-fold —from 4.1 to 42. m. They 
consisted mainly of up-market textiles, such as fine linens and silks. Linens 
represented 56% of exports to the Guinea coast, 23% of textiles sent to 
the West Indies. Sizeable quantities of these goods were reexported from 
the French islands to the Spanish colonies. 
The importance and growth of colonial trade varied from port to port. 
Bordeaux's colonial trade (in valué) increased three-fold from 1750 
to 1787; Nantes had been far ahead in the early 18th century but later 
fell behind Le Havre. 
TABLEE 
Colonial Trade hy Major Parts 
(Millions It) 1750 1787 
Bordeaux 34 110 
Le Havre 21 53 
Nantes 26 45 
This expansión of French colonial trade was generated by the increase 
in the production of sugar in the colonies, from the 1720's to the 1740's, 
and after the Seven Years War, by the progress in coffee cultivation. As 
the French home market —unlike the English— could not absorb the 
increased output of its colonies, markets were found in a growing reexport 
trade to Europe. Thus, in the early 1770's, over three quarters of imports 
from the colonies were reexported. Reexports to Europe increased over 
eightfold from 1716 to 1787, while exports of French goods only rose 
threefold. 
Colonial demand also created large markets for French agricultural 
produce, such as fine flour from the Garoime valley. Bordeaux sent nearly 
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20 000 tons per year to Santo Domingo, where «ostentation at meáis» 
was a more significant sign of high social status than grand houses. Wines 
from Guyenne and Anjou, delicacies (such as truffled pies from Périgord) 
were also exported. As for textiles, the rise of proto-industriaÜzation in 
Western France (and elsewhere) was helped by colonial demand. Linens 
from Brittany and Saint-Quentin, lace from Le Puy and Valenciennes, 
woollen cloths from Languedoc, cotton fabrics from Normandy were sent 
to the West Indies, via large fairs, like the Fair of Bordeaux in spring 
aud autiamn. 
The colonies (mostly the West Indies —thus achieved a dominant 
position within French foreign trade, but this does not necessarily mean 
that they became a major engine of growth. 
There is no doubt that several port cities, which dominated colonial 
trade, gready benefited: one has only to consider the historical centre of 
Bordeaux (which is one of the most impressive examples in Europe of 
18th century European architecture, on a par with Bath and the New Town 
of Edinburgh, and only surpassed by St. Petersburg) to illustrate the 
connexion. Nantes suffered from Allied bombing during World War 11, 
but still contains many fine houses built by 18th century merchants. These 
local gains are obvious, but there is a broader and more diffícult problem: 
how to ascertain the role which the fast-growing (and profítable) colonial 
trade imparted to the progress of the French economy as a whole? 
A first step is to measure it relatively to national product. Figures for 
the latter are, of course, highly problematic; still we only need rough orders 
of magnitude. The total valué of French foreign trade in 1787 (1151 miUions 
livres) is equivalent to 19% of in the 1780's, according to J.-C. Toutain's 
most recent estímate of French Gross Domestic Product. It is 28% of 
the commodity output of 1785, as calculated by P. Mathias and P. O'Brien 
(c. 1715, the ratio would have been only 6%). If only French exports are 
considered, they were equivalent in 1787 to 9% of Toutain's G.D.P., and 
to 13% of commodity output (Mathias-O'Brien); in 1716, they would only 
have been 3% of the latter. However, colonial trade of 1787 is only 6% 
of Toutain's G.D.P. and 8-9% of French commodity output. Both G.D.P. 
and commodity output include agriculture and non-tradeable services. 
As for total exports of French manufactured goods in 1787 (154 
millions), they amount to only 7% of French industrial and handicrafts 
product (according to Toutain). That ratio falls to 2.5% if only exports 
of manufactures to the colonies {55 m.) are considered. In the early 18th 
century the ratio would have been even smaller- around 1%. However, 
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Toutain's figures include a good deal of non-tradeable goods and small-scale 
production for purely local needs. At the margin, exports to the colonies 
increased by a factor of 13 from 1716 to 1787 (from 4.2 to 55 milüons) 
and they were responsible for 45% of the increment in total exports of 
French manufactured goods over those 71 years. However, the growth 
of the latter was not particularly fast, and this ratio is lower than its 
equivalent for Britain, as calculated by P. O'Brien and S. Engerman. 
One must therefore accept that exports to the colonies were not a 
powerful factor for the growth of French industry as a whole. However, 
colonial markets were clearly important for some manufactures —^mosdy 
of linens— from some rural áreas and small towns, specially in Western 
France (Brittany, Normandy and Maine). The frequent statements, from 
1791 onwards, that many French centres of industry had gready suffered 
from the loss of colonial markets may have been excessive, but not untrue 
(even though the decline of the linen industry had already started in the 
1760's). 
On the other hand, feedbacks from colonial trade generated or 
stimulated a number of non-exporting industries, including sugar refining, 
shipbuilding and its ancillary activities, such as the making of cordage, 
sails, anchors, etc. Transport across the Atlantic, to and from the colonies, 
was entirely on French ships, but the large reexports of colonial produce 
to Northern Europe took place on foreign vessels —Dutch, Hanseatic, 
Scandinavian, so that profits on freight on those cargoes were lost to France. 
It can be thus suggested that the positive economic effects of the First 
French Empire were rather localized —in a few ports and a few industrial 
centres. They were certainly smaller than comparable effects on the British 
side, a difference which is not at all surprising. Because the British Empire 
—at least before the American Revolution— was bigger, more populated, 
more diversified and richer. 
Secondly, France had both a territory and a population which were 
much larger than Britain (not to mention Portugal and Holland) and a 
bigger economy. Though the valué of its aggregate foreign trade had risen, 
on the eve of the Revolution, to the same level as the valué of British 
trade, figures on a per capita basis were much lower in France than in 
England. Moreover, France had no national market, because of natural 
obstacles separating its regions, inadequate transport facilities (particularly 
in inland áreas), and suffered from intemal customs and toUs. Needless 
to add, agriculture remained the dominant sector of the French economy. 
Under such circumstances, the feedbacks and spinoffs from foreign —and 
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specially colonial— trade were bound to be weaker and more regionally 
concentrated than in Britain. Though trade connections widí other parts 
of France even distant ones —existed (e.g. gloves made in Grenoble were 
exponed from Bordeaux). The great portcities-Bordeaux, Nantes, 
Marseilles —^were in some ways enclaves, where the entrepot trade, of 
itnporting and reexporting, was dominant. The fact that the French 
consumption of colonial produce was Hmited, so that a large share of French 
imports from the colonies was reexported, also reduced the significance 
of colonial trade for the economy as a whole. 
One must also mention that large illegal imports from North America 
and some British islands also reduced the size of markets for French goods 
in the French West Indies. Illegal imports included slaves which thus had 
a negative impact upon the French slave trade, which was already markedly 
smaller than the British. Among illegal exports, molasses were prominent, 
because their distillation was prohibited in France in order to protect the 
spirits industry. On the other hand, France had an «informal» empire in 
the Spanish colonies, to which large quantities of French manufactures 
were reexported from Cádiz —^where the French colony of merchants was 
the largest. Still, in the second half of the 18th century, despite the cióse 
political alliance between the two Bourbon courts, French dominance of 
this trade was weakened by Spanish protectionism and English competition. 
3. INVESTMENTANDPROFITS 
In 1761, the Chamber of Commerce of Guyenne estimated that, in 
peace-time, about 60 ships cleared from France to Ganada each year. The 
cargoes of those ships, which were made up of wine, brandy, fine and 
coarse woollens, silks and other luxuries, involved a capital investment of 
10 millions and, according to the merchants of Bordeaux, yielded a profít 
of 2 millions. Page suggests that, in 1788, 783 ships sailed from France 
to the West Indies. Assuming that the average valué of cargoes came to 
about 166 000 It and that the rate of profits was the same for the West 
Indian and the Canadian trades, total investment in the former might have 
been cióse to 130 millions and profits 26 millions. The valúes of the ships 
involved must be included and the lowest possible estímate comes to 42 
000 It per ship, which implies an overall valué of over 32 millions. This 
brings the total investment by French merchants and shipowners in the 
West India trades to over 160 millions. This figure is not improbable. 
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because investment by Bordeaux merchants in the East India trade was 
valued by the Chamber of Commerce of Guyenne at 20 millions for 1785. 
Such a significant level of investment and profits achieved by merchants 
fluctuated and depended upon correctly predicted prices. Yet forecasting 
price movements was extremely difficult and risky, because of long delays 
in the transmission of information. A typical example of the risks involved 
is the trade in fine flour, which was much demanded by European settlers, 
who wanted to eat the same white bread as in France. In war time, scarcity 
caused sudden and sharp price hikes. For example, in 1757 —during the 
Seven Years War, a barrel of flour rose on West Indian markets from 
70-80 colonial livres to 170-210 1. Such an upswing could bring enormous 
profits, while, at the same time, prices of colonial produce were collapsing 
on the islands, because few ships were available to take produce to France. 
In peace time, during the early 1770's, competition by flour from the British 
Continental colonies resulted in falling prices, and some times it became 
impossible to sell French flour. Fluctuations in the prices of both goods 
imported from Europe and colonial produce led to contingent variations 
in profits —and losses. In French Atlantic ports, most of the demand for 
colonial produce came from markets in Northern Europe and from time 
to time wide gaps developed between prices which sugar refiners asked 
and those offered by commission merchants —according to the orders 
they had received from Hamburg or Amsterdam. For example, in september 
1763, the Chamber of Commerce of Guyenne observed that orders for 
the reexport of sugar had been suspended, because refiners were buying 
at 24-25 livres per hundredweight, while foreign commission merchants 
only offered 20-22 livres. Two decades later, a sharp rise in coffee prices 
in 1784 and early 1785 came to a sudden end in May 1785, when the 
«fleet» from Surinam arrived in Amsterdam and caused a fall in Bordeaux. 
Price data, however, are not as illuminating as a number of examples 
which provide direct evidence for profits. For example, in 1724, the 
Portuguese-Jewish shipowner Abraham Gradis made a nominal gross profít 
of 43% on the sale of a cargo, made up of European goods, sent on his 
ship Ange Mikaél to Léogane, in Santo Domingo. But he suffered losses 
on his retum cargo of sugar and Índigo, so that the overall profit on both 
legs of the voyage was cut in half. Moreover, if credit given to planters 
is taken into account, then the net profit on this voyage comes to only 
5% but on the next trip, it exceeded 10%. There was thus great variance 
in profit rates. For the four ships which belonged to Gradis, profits varied 
between 8% and 40% in 1726-27. 
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Furthermore, profits may have decreased in the course of the 18th 
centviry. In the 1780's, Bonnaffé, one of the leading shipowners of 
Bordeaux, made gross profits of 10 to 13% on the voyages made by his 
ship Le Magnifique and his yearly retum on capital was 5-6%. The profits 
of the house of Gradis carne to 12-13% for the years 1786-89, but they 
had been much higher in 1780-82, thanks to contracts with the French 
Royal Navy for hire of ships, on favourable terms, and again in 1784, 
when colonial produce prices rose sharply. On the other hand, Gradis 
suffered losses on his shipments during 1785. 
In that year, shipowners, affíliated to the Chamber of Commerce, 
complained of «the incertitude of the business with America». In 1786, 
an official report stressed that, since the peace of 1783, profits on sales 
in the West Indies, from retum cargoes in French ports and freight rates 
had all fallen. Such complaints may be taken with a pinch of salt, but 
the falling trend was unmistakeable. One cause was increasing competition 
from United States imports into the West Indies. According to Page, in 
1788, over 1 200 small American ships visited the Virgin islands, where 
they loaded sugar and molasses. To Europe, Britain reexported sugar, which 
competed with French produce. 
On the positive side, French merchants had for a long time taken part 
in smuggling from the French islands to the Spanish colonies, and this 
illicit trade brought in profits, some times very large, which were not 
mentioned in reports by Chambers of Commerce. Some merchants actually 
specialized in this traffic. For instance the Portuguese-Jewish house of Raba, 
which had been established in Bordeaux after the Seven Years War, had 
a subsidiary firm at Santo Domingo and it made over one fifth of its profits 
in the smuggling trade with Terra Firma. In 1783, its assets were over 
4.3 millions livres. 
Some merchants were bold enough to break the French Navigation 
Laws. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, in his Considérations sur l'état présent de la 
colonie frangaise de Saint Domingue, stated that since 1772 large quantities 
of flour, from Philadelphia and New York, were put into French barréis 
and shipped by Bordeaux merchants to Santo Domingo and the Windward 
islands. Such illegal practices were denounced again, some years later, in 
letters fi-om the Govemor and the Intendant of Santo Domingo to the 
Secretary of State for the Navy: one seacaptain of Le Havre had called 
at Plymouth (Massachusetts) to load some prohibited goods, which he 
carried to Santo Domingo. Profits from illegal trade —not only in 
foodstuffs, but also in slaves— ought therefore to be taken into account 
187 
PAUL BUTEL AND FRANgOIS CROUZET 
in the aggregation of gains made by merchants and might be set against 
the very pessimistic views expressed in 1785 by die Chamber of Commerce 
of Guyenne: «there are not in Bordeaux ten shipowners who have made 
profíts in their trade since the Peace, all the others have more or less 
suffered losses». 
Actually a number of Bordeaux shipowners, who had succeeded in 
gaining control of the sources of supplies for the West Indían islands, 
increased their profíts. The example of the fine flour {minots), produced 
in the Garonne valley, leads to stress the rise of some fortunes built up 
on vertical integration, from grain-milling at Moissac or Montauban, in 
order to make a flour of which the West Indian settlers were extremely 
fond, up to its transport and sale in the colonies. A good example is the 
Gouges family, who owned milis at Moissac, ships registered in Bordeaux, 
a subsidiary trading fírm in Santo Domingo. Jean Gouges was one of the 
largest mÜlers in Moissac and in his will (1746), he mentioned that within 
13 years he had made gains over 71 000 livres in grain-milling alone. In 
1764, the magistrates (consuls) of Moissac rejected a petition for tax relief, 
from Jacques Gouges, «who has given an expensive education to his 
children, erected splendid buildings, paid up large dowries, without his 
trade having suffered». Furthermore, shipowners who did not have similar 
connections with the production of goods sent to the colonies, were 
nonetheless able to obtain credit: in the late 1780's, Bordeaux shipowners 
could buy fine flour at Moissac on a 8 to 10 months credit. Bordeaux'credit 
system was efficient and extensive, so that its colonial transactions were 
made easier and profíts larger. 
The over-pessimistic statements by the merchant bodies in the 1780's 
cannot be taken at face valué. The same caution is necessary towards 
conclusions which were put forward in those years about the profítability 
of plantations. Detailed studies demónstrate that planters made profíts. 
For example, with the exception of difficult years during the Seven Years 
War or after the earthquake of 1770, financial results for the Fleuriau 
estáte, near Port-au-Prince, were good before the War of American 
independence and became still better afterwards. Its gross income tripled 
during the 1780's and net profíts exceeded 15%. This is cióse to the estimate 
given by Hilliard d'Auberteuil and which was much critícized by the 
«planters' party» at the end of the Oíd Regime. He suggested that a well 
managed sugar estáte yieided 15 % per year and repaid its capital in less 
than seven years. Absentee owners maintained that retums on capital did 
not exceed 5 to 7% per year. The West India interest rareiy acknowledged 
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the gains from illegal trade, through which a sizeable share of the colonies' 
sugar and molasses output was shipped to the United States. 
Yet there were risks: crops might be suddenly destroyed by hurricanes, 
or severely reduced by drought, and prices fluctuated. Moreover the price 
of slaves rose sharply after the American War. All these circumstances 
pressed heavily on planters' incomes and pushed many of them into debt. 
From a survey of cases and evidence of profíts generated by 
colonisation, historians can thus conclude that it was profitable for the 
majority of planters and merchants involved. But when we take account 
of govemment expenditures for the defence of the colonies, the overall 
benefits of colonial expansión are not so clear, despite the gains from trade 
which it brought to France. 
French colonial trade from the death of Louis XIV to the French 
Revolution may appear as a striking success story: its valué grew ten-fold 
between 1716/20 and 1784/86. Even sceptics (who suspect 
under-estimation early in the 18th century) cannot dismiss a three-fold 
increase from 1754 to 1787 (see table I). France had been far behind 
England in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, but caught up fast, 
despite losses of territory. In the 1740's, Santo Domingo alone exported 
as much sugar as all the British West Indies put together. Subsequendy, 
the latter regained some ground, but the French islands retained their 
dominant position on the International sugar market, and the production 
of coffee made striking progress in Santo Domingo, where it increased 
six-fold from the late 1760's to the late 1780's, while the British islands 
did not grow much coffee. 
This successful investment in colonies was destroyed by exogenous 
shocks. First the slave revolt in Santo Domingo (which started in August 
1791) and then the twenty-three years of war with Britain, during which 
French colonies were cut off from France and eventually all occupied by 
British forces. The plantations of Santo Domingo were destroyed, the 
French failed to reconquer the island, which became the independent 
republic of Haití. The large investment, which had been made in plantations 
and slaves in Santo Domingo, was almost a write-off, though some planters 
managed to transfer some money to Cuba or to the United States. 
Although the jeremiads about falling profits (which French planters, 
shipowners, merchants voiced loudly during the 1780's) must not be taken 
at face valué, nonetheless, difficulties existed. Planters' debt increased and 
hurt their creditors, at least the smaUer merchant houses. Furthermore, 
the «colonial system» [l'Exclusif) carne under pressure, after American 
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independence, when a royal order opened seven free ports in the French 
islands to American vessels. Though the kind of goods diey were allowed 
to import and export was limited, those restrictions were not well enforced, 
and a significant share of die colonies' trade was diverted towards the 
United States and lost to France, and to French merchants, who complained 
loudly. But the govemment did not daré to antagonize planters, who had 
not been unaffected by the American Revolution. In Santo Domingo, some 
of them had started to dream of independence and free trade. 
Actually, Santo Domingo had become responsible for three quarters 
of French colonial trade, while the concentration there of half a milHon 
slaves was dangerous —even though their revolt was a by-product of the 
French Revolution. So the counter-factual that, but for the Revolution, 
French colonial trade would have gone on prospering and growing cannot 
be accepted at face valué. 
4. THE COSTS OF EMPIRE 
The creation of the First French Empire was not expensive. No large 
scale expeditions were required to conquer colonies. Cavelier de la Salle 
fínanced from his own pocket the exploration down the Mississipi river, 
which led to the «annexion» of an immense territory in North America. 
The administration and defence of colonies in peace time did not cost 
that much. 
The trouble was the wars with Britain, which colonial conflicts helped 
to trigger. Those wars caused serious human losses, in batde of course, 
but also among French seamen kept as prisoners of war on British hulks. 
Occasionally the civilian populations also suffered. For example in 1741, 
a squadron which sailed back from Santo Domingo brought fever to Brest 
which killed many of its inhabitants. Wars, of course, cost money. 
One can assume that the wars of Louis XIV did not have colonial 
origins? Anyhow, the enormous debt they had generated was almost wiped 
out by the bankruptcy of 1720-21. Subsequendy, between 1744 and 1783, 
within 40 years, Britain and France fought three major wars. Their total 
cost for the French Treasury was about 3 billions livres (£ 120 millions). 
They were increasingly fínanced by borrowing (about 90% of revenue for 
the War of American independence) and were therefore the major factor 
in the growth of the public debt, which had reached an amoimt of 5 billions 
in 1789. The servicing and repayment of this royal debt absorbed a growing 
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share of govemment expenditure, which rose from 28% in 1751 to 49% 
in 1788. And the growing budget déficit eventuaUy brought down the Oíd 
Regime and started die French Revolution. 
However, neither the War of the Austrian Succession, ñor the Seven 
Years War were purely Anglo-French conflicts. In each, France had a major 
continental enemy —^Austria in the former, Prussia in the latter. Therefore 
a share of the expenditures and borrowing they caused was not related 
to the Empire. Moreover, as far as those two wars were «colonial», they 
were imposed upon France by British aggressiveness, by British resentment 
against French presence in North America and the progress of French 
colonial trade. Benjamin Frankiin proclaimed that the Thirteen colonies 
would not enjoy peace as long as France possessed Ganada. 
On the other hand, the War of American independence undoubtedly 
had «colonial» origins and France, who lent assistance to rebels against 
their legitímate sovereign, can be represented as an aggressor. Moreover, 
the American war is often seen, because of the heavy borrowing to finance 
it, as a direct cause of the French Revolution. Recently Eugene White 
has suggested that the financial crisis of the Oíd Regime could have been 
solved and that it became irreparable, not because of the loans contracted 
during the war, but because the borrowing which went on after the peace 
of 1783, and which was unprecedented. In 1783, British fínances were 
in as bad a condition as the French, but within a few years the Younger 
Pitt had restored them to a sound state. In contrast Louis XVI's ministers 
presided over a cumulative process of debt creation, which made the déficit 
worse every year. 
The First French Empire can be represented, as therefore one cause 
of the French Revolution. The latter in its tum triggered off a twenty three 
year long desperate struggle between Britain and France. One of its results 
was the final destruction of the French colonial empire. This was only 
one of the disasters which revolution and war brought to France, particularly 
to its economy. 
This leads to a last problem: the decline and fall of the First French 
Empire were largely caused by the inferiority of France at sea relatively 
to Britain, by an inadequate investment in sea-power. 
Indeed, French efforts to build and maintain a large and efficient navy 
were sporadic. Colbert and his son Seignelay built up an enormous fleet 
—^which, for a time, outnumbered the Royal Navy. But, after their deaths 
and during the Nine Years and Spanish succession wars, which demanded 
large land armies, the French Navy did not receive enough money, and 
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la guare d'escadres had to give way to la guerre de course, against enemy 
trade. Yet, by 1715, France still had a large fleet. Then carne a long period 
of lean years. For fínancial reasons and in order to appease England, few 
new ships were built, so that the French Navy had far fewer ships of 
the line than the Royal Navy, when the two wars of the mid-lSth century 
started. Furthermore, the Navy suffered heavy losses during the Seven 
Years War. However, from 1761 onwards, a serious effort to «rearm» began 
and an ambitious building programme went on right up to 1792. Still, 
French ministers knew that they could not win an armaments race with 
Britain. They did not aim at parity with the Royal Navy (France did not 
have enough seamen), but instead achieved a ratio of 2 to 3 —against 
1 to 2 or even 1 to 3, earlier in the century. Then the Navy was desorganized 
by the French Revolution and suffered a succession of crushing defeats. 
One factor behind those ups and downs of investment in sea-power 
was that «public opinión» and ruling circles did not understand its 
importance and did not realize the real stakes in the Second Hundred 
Years War with England, particularly the relationship between sea-power, 
empire and wealth. Voltaire's famous statement, that «France can be happy 
without Canadá», which was just «a few acres of snow», was far from 
atypical. 
On the other hand, France had both a continental and a maritime 
calling, and on many occasions, the Continent had priority. France was 
a late-comer to colonial expansión and therefore to colonial trade because 
its encirclement by the Habsburgs had to be broken and its land frontiers 
Consolidated. On several later occasions, the threat of invasión by powerful 
coalitions deprived the Navy of fínancial resources it badly needed. Still, 
during the War of American independence, England had no continental 
ally, France could concéntrate on war at sea —and was supported by Spain; 
yet she did not win a decisive victory. 
Actually, French inferiority was not only quantitative —in the number 
of ships, but also qualitative. The French are (as most Britons assume) 
possibly an inferior race. Anyway, British crews were better trained, British 
officers had more practical experience of the sea, of handling ships and 
of fighting, British admiráis were bolder and more skilfiíl. Tactics in battle, 
logistical support and the command structure were also better on the British 
side. So the French empire in North America was lost at Lagos and 
Quiberon Bay (1759). The French defeat at Les Saintes (1782) prevented 
a landing in Jamaica and the retention at the peace of some other islands 
which the French had occupied. 
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Altogether, during the early modem period and up to 1815, the French 
experience of empire was quite different from those of Portugal, Spain, 
the United Provinces and Britain. The conquest and loss of colonies seem 
central to the history of those countries. For France, they only were 
side-shows, relatively minor episodes, which have not left any imprint on 
the collective memory. 
On the other hand, the 18th century was the «Atlantic» phase of French 
economic history, the only period during which France played a major 
role in global trade —specially in traffic with the West and East Indies. 
Fernand Braudel was right to stress that the center of the world economic 
system was never located in France: it has wandered from Venice to 
Antwerp, to Amsterdam, to London, to New York, but has never been 
within the Hexagon. Even during the ISth century, French colonial trade 
was shared amongst several ports— for obvious geographical reasons, so 
that none of them (even Bordeaux) could approach the size and power 
of Amsterdam or London. Indeed, they depended upon those dominant 
places de commerce for financial and other services (including shipping). 
Nonetheless, one can wonder whether more continuity in naval and colonial 
policy would not have promoted a larger trade and more economic growth. 
This is one of the many opportimities which the French —a nation with 
suicidal tendencies— have missed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Writing on the eve of one of the major transformations in the British 
Empire, Adam Smith more or less repeated the remark made by the Abbé 
Raynal several years earlier that «the discovery of America, and that of 
passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest 
and most important events recorded in the history of mankind» ^ Both 
of these great events of the 1490's, Columbus's discovery of the Americas 
and the sailing to India, a few years later, by Vasco de Gama, had no 
immediate impact on the British economy, but the opening up of this 
wider world for colonization and trading would soon have profonnd impacts 
on Britain and the other nations of Western Europe. In the same decade 
Britain, however, did make its first claim to New World territory, when 
John Cabot landed on Newfoundland in 1497, but it was to be about 
a century before tide was clear and settlement begun. Not the fírst to 
establish an empire, the British rose to world-wide dominance over the 
course of the next three centuries. Since the regions of Western Europe, 
with few exceptions, did not become the colonies of other European 
nations, the ability to reach other continents became an essential aspect 
* Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. This essay draws upen 
work with Kenneth Sokoloff and Stephen Haber under National Science Foundation Grant 
SBR-9515222. For comments on an earlier draft I should like to thank the attendees at 
the Madrid Conference, particularly Patrick O'Brien, as well as Lance Davis, David Eltis, 
and Seymour Drescher. 
' Smith (1976), it might be noted, also commented that although the «whole extent 
of their consequences» are impossible to determine as yet, the commercial benefits to the 
Europeans had come at the expense of «dreadful misfortunes to those resident in the East 
and West Indies, the outcome of the superiority of forcé of the Europeans». Smith, p. 626. 
Others at that time also pointed to the less positive aspects of colonization. See, e.g., Pagden 
(1995), Ch. 6. 
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of their expansión .^ Settlements and trading relatíons occurred throughout 
the worid, not just in mainland North America and the Caribbean islands, 
but in South America, India, elsewhere in Asia, in Australia and New 
Zealand, and throughout much of África. 
If 1492 represents an obvious starting point for the study of Britain's 
overseas empire, the choice of 1849 as the end-date for this paper is one 
that reflects the final repeal of the English Navigation Acts, along with 
various controls over shipping and shipbuilding .^ That repeal carne after 
a series of revisions, particularly in the 1820's, that reduced their overall 
impact, and came only three years after the dramatic abolition of the Com 
Laws and marked the movement from mercantilist regulation to free trade "*. 
These changes meant that the controls over imports that had long been 
central to British trade policy were eliminated, and also that the components 
of the colonial empire would now be on an equal footing for trade with 
the rest of the world. Arguments for free trade were also advanced in 
an attempt to persuade foreign nations to do the same, thus helping British 
exporters of low-cost industrial producer goods at this time. 
That 1849 had a signifícant meaning for the nature of the empire and 
its relations with the metropolitan power did not, of course, mean that 
Britain had lost any of its interest in empire-building. On the contrary, 
the late nineteenth century witnessed a considerable expansión of Britain's 
empire, sustained by irmovations in medicine and public health practice, 
permitting the setdement in and the obtaining of power in África'. Some 
departures from the Empire occurred, most notably the thirteen North 
American colonies in 1783, but otherwise Httle of the British Empire was 
relinquished prior to the end of World War 11. Nevertheless the world 
of 1849 was quite different for the British from the world of the 1490's, 
marked political and economic changes had occurred, and the place of 
Britain in the world arena had shifted dramatically. The relation between 
^ The role of Ireland is difficult to fully categorize, although because of the nature 
of settlement and political control, some now regard it as England's first colony. See Canny 
(1988). Similar relatad problems arise in dealing with Scotland and Wales, at least among 
some nationals. 
' On the Navigation Acts, see Harper (1939). 
•• For a recent discussion of the politícal economy of the repeal of the Com Laws, 
see Irwin (1989). 
' Thus Hobson (1902), pp. 18-19, notes that «we find one-third of this empire, 
containing quite one-fourth of the total populatíon of the Empire, was acquired within 
the last thirty years of the nineteenth century». On the role of changes in practices toward 
health which made this expansión possible, see Curtin (1989). 
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these changes and the growth of the British Empire remains a continuing 
question for historical analysis .^ 
n . WHY EMPIRE? 
There has been a long debate conceming specific motivations for the 
expansión of Empire and for the imposition of mercantile regulations, 
although the extent to which such motivations can be successfully 
distinguished is not clear. The familiar, and overlapping, dyads of «power 
versus plenty» of «God and gold», and of «Christians and spices», seem 
to present altemative motivations, but, as Jacob Viner has pointed out, 
it was believed that power went with plenty (and vice versa), while spreading 
the word of God took the Spanish and Portuguese to those heavily 
populated áreas where the gold and silver mines happened to be located ^. 
Clearly the general pattem of mercantilist rules suggested that an economic 
motivation formed at least some part of the desire for trade and Empire. 
Furthermore, the differences that existed among the Western European 
nations in mercantilistic policías reflected the adjustments to differences 
in colonial resource endowments and population densities and variations 
in policies for growth rather than any significant differences in motivation. 
The competitive nature of Western European expansión also meant that 
the pursuit of power and profit also embodied aspects of defensive reactions 
to more aggressive leaders, and the desire to avoid the dangers of falling 
further behind. While religious aspects of expansión are now given only 
minor attention, except to be depicted as rationalizations of various colonial 
labor and racial policies, the sheer magnitude of the missionary efforts 
suggests the importance of these beliefs among the early colonizers. 
Nevertheless, attempts to establish distinct motives indícate that this 
is an extremely difficult, if not impossíble, task, but to díscuss these causes 
helps US frame certain key questions. If, for example, Empire did not appear 
to yield economic retums, but satisfíed national (or govemmental) desires 
for power and served to feed national pride, such reasons may, of course, 
be used to justífy a nation's interest in Empire. But this is a different 
' For usefiíl descriptions of the British empire in this period, see, in particular, Davies 
(1974), Bayly (1989), Cain and Hopkins (1993), Fieldhouse (1973), Marshall (1996), Martin 
(1967), Porter (1996), and O'Brien (1998). 
' See Viner (1948), and for a recent discussion of the distinctions in regard to motivation 
of the colonizing nations, see Pagden (1995). 
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question than that conceming the economic benefíts of empire, as usually 
defined. 
m . WHEN EUROPE EXPANDED 
Starting from the 1490's all áreas of Western Europe became involved 
in settiement and/or trading enclaves in both the Americas and the East 
Indies. For some, including Spain, Portugal, Britain, and France, as well 
as smaller participants in the race for Empire, such as Sweden, Denmark, 
and Russia, and, on a more temporary and considerably smaller scale, the 
Brandenburgers and Courlanders (from modem Latvia), the primary focus 
was on the Americas. Yet they also had an interest in setdement and trade 
with Asia. The empires in Asia were less for settiement than they were 
maritime empires for trade, requiring only naval bases and ports. The 
British, after the defeat of the French in the mid-eighteenth century, had 
larger empires in both parts of the world than did the French and the 
Portuguese, as well as a much larger Asian empire than did Spain. The 
Dutch were unusual in that the numbers setded in the East Indies gready 
exceeded the numbers in the Americas, particularly after their departure 
from Brazil in 1640 and the loss of their mainland North America colony 
(New Amsterdam) to the British in 1664 *. 
The British, as well as the French and the Dutch, moved into the 
Americas about one century after the Spanish and Portuguese. The Spanish 
settlements, particularly in México and Perú, were in áreas with the largest 
Native-American setdements, in terms of both population density and 
degrees of economic and political sophistication. The «follower» nations 
were thus forced into seemingly less profitable áreas with lower population 
densities. These were primarily on the islands of the Caribbean and on 
mainland North America (apart from México and Central America). These 
were regions with fewer Native-Americans, requiring more whites and 
others to provide for the labor forcé that in Spanish-America was provided 
by resident Indians '. 
The setdements of Asia were similar in timing but there was more 
geographical overlap than in the Americas. For example, rivalry soon 
* For a survey of Dutch colonial migration, see Lucassen (1991). For indications of 
the limited European population in Dutch Java, see Nitisastro (1970), Ch. 1-3. 
' For a discussion of these issues, see Engerman and Sokoloff (1997). See also the 
extensión of this paper with Stephen Haber (1997). 
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emerged between the British with the French, Dutch, and Portuguese, 
but in general European control was only exercised over port cities or 
enclaves held as trading centers, not over large territories or numbers of 
people ^°. The fact that Europeans (except for the Dutch) were generally 
restricted to trading ports meant that in Asia only limited numbers of whites 
were required to migrate and to settle there. Very large resident populations 
were already involved in production and there was little need for 
immigration from other continents. 
In 1500, the populations of the áreas of Asia reached by Europeans 
was probably greater than was the population of the Americas. This 
difference increased dramatically after the onset of European contact, 
because there was a very large decline in the Amerindian population in 
all parts of the New World, as there was to be later among the aboriginal 
population in Australia coinciding with the start of British settiement. The 
epidemiological impact on Asian and Afncan populations was relatively 
minor. Thus the Americas required a much larger inflow of whites from 
Europe and blacks from África to rebuild the population and labor forcé 
than did Asian nations, while the European demands from África were 
met by the population present. Whereas a substantial economic role in 
production was played by immigrants, (whites and blacks) in the Americas 
(and particularly outside of Spanish-America), the small number of whites 
who went to live in Asia were most frequently there for military or 
govemmental purposes, or operated as merchants and traders. The causes 
of these rather different demographic pattems is uncertain, but it is clear 
that, in regard to África and to Asia, the whites remained on the coast 
and worked with inland producers, whüe in the Americas the Europeans 
went inland for settiement and production and became more exposed to 
resident populations (and vice versa). Initial epidemiological conditions 
helped influence the pattems of settiement and the relative demands for 
labor in the different parts of the world ^^  
'° For an analysis of the economic rivalry of the Dutch and the British in the East 
India trade, see Inwin (1991). On this rival^, see also Steensgaard (1973, 1990), and 
Wallerstein (1980), Ch. 2, 6. 
" On the role of disease in the «Transoceanic Exchanges, 1500-1700», see McNeill 
(1976), Ch. 5, as weU as Crosby (1972). 
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IV. MERCANTILISM 
The opening up of the world to sailing vessels had involved most of 
the nations of Western Europe. There were some basic similarities in the 
nature of technology and organization employed, and each nation also 
followed a somewhat similar set of policies that have come to be represented 
as mercantilistic in their intention to benefit the home country at the 
expense of other nations, as well as benefíting the metrópolis at the expense 
of the newly-created colonies, even though the settlers of these colonies 
had often been fellow countrymen '^. 
The English Navigation Acts which regulated the colonies contained 
a set of policies similar to those implemented by the other European 
nations. The Navigation Acts, effectively recodifying some earlier trading 
regulations, date from 1651, were modified frequently thereafter, as 
political and economic circumstances varied. Their central purpose was 
to maintain control over International trade, including colonial trade, by 
trade policies established by the metrópolis. The goals were to promote 
exports from the home country to the colonies, proscribing the countries 
that could be direct recipients of the products exported from the colonies. 
The rules were designed to control shipping and shipbuilding, and to restrict 
the rights of other carriers, including third parties, to transport goods to 
various markets. Controls over trade pattems were also designed to 
encourage metropolitan producers and merchants, to influence flows of 
specie to the European nations and to encourage the growth of British 
naval power. Migration policies were also set by the metrópolis, although 
these ranged from the very open policy of the British regarding the numbers, 
composition, and nationalities of migrants into their colonies to the severe 
legal restrictions (however loosely enforced) of the Spanish conceming both 
who could depart from Spain and who could settle in Spanish colonies. 
Underlying these mercantilistic policies were national rivalries and, in 
the economic sphere, the belief that commerce was a zero-sum game, with 
the benefíts for any one nation coming only at the expense of others. 
The intensity of national rivalry is also exemplified by the frequency of 
warfare among European nations, on the European continent as well as 
elsewhere in the world, including Asia and the Americas. For more than 
'^  There could, however, be some gains to the colonists from being in the Empire, 
since in some cases the colonies were treated no differently than was the metrópolis. The 
specific legal and political relations of metrópolis and colony took many different forms, 
by nation and over time, and that issue cannot be gone into detall here. 
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half the years between 1500 and 1850 England was at war with other 
European nations, mainly its two major economic and political rivals, the 
Dutch and the French. Between 1701 and 1815 Britain and France were 
at war more than 50 percent of the time, and these wars spilled over 
from the European continent to mainland North America, the Caribbean 
Sea, and to India '^ . The age of Mercantilism saw more than just economic 
warfare, military warfare also being a central aspect of the empire-building 
being undertaken by European nations. 
Intra-European warfare and the creation of overseas empires occurred 
against a background process of nation-building and political consolidation 
in Western Europe, including Britain '^'. This has given rise to the perennial 
debate among historians as to whether one or the other carne first. For 
some historians, the gains from Empire are seen as a necessary source 
of fínance for nation-building. To others only a strong state could provide 
the resources and power required to establish an Empire. The complexity 
of this question is reflected in the fact that some strong nation-states 
emerged without extemal empires, as in the nineteenth-century United 
States ^'. On the other hand, some nations, e.g., Spain and Portugal, with 
extended empires did not develop a modem state and economy. England's 
empire grew before, during, and after the Industrial Revolution. 
Nineteenth-century additions to Empire occurred after Britain was already 
the world's economic leader, as well as a model of appropriate political 
structure. 
V. LABOR IN THE BRinSH EMPIRE 
The history of the British Empire is marked by important changes and 
discontinuities. First came the successful rebellion of the mainland North 
American colonies (except Canadá), which led to the formation of an 
iftdependent United States in 1783, the one major military defeat and 
" See Wright (1965), pp. 625-676, for a detailed listing of various wars, and Kennedy 
(1987), for a more general discussion of military conflict and empires. 
" For a discussion of nation-building in Britain at this time see, most recently, Brewer 
(1988). 
" The question here is whether the intemal empire of the United States —the westward 
movement— substituted for the desire for an extemal empire. Wvh the closing of the intemal 
frontier, it is argued, the need for extemal expansión finally emerged. The Indians of the 
United States havc been regarded as undergoing difficulties similar to the residents in áreas 
settled by Etiropeans, leading to a similar historical treatment of this form of imperialism. 
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loss of territory suffered by the British before the loss of Ireland in 1921. 
The loss of the thirteen colonies, even had it been by peaceful transition 
and not warfare, would have imposed some costs on die remainder of 
the Empire, since after 1783 the United States fell outside the scope 
afforded by British mercantilist rules ^^ . This had an inMnediate effect upon 
British West Indian trade, and, along with the adverse climatic conditíons 
of that decade, led to some shortages of food and other supplies on the 
Caribbean islands. Some scholars point to a change in the focus of the 
British Empire coming on stream after the American Revolution, with a 
perceived shift from the «Oíd Empire» centered on the Americas, primarily 
áreas of white and slave settiement, to a «New Empire» «tipped in favour 
of the East», based upon «trade and political responsibilities in Asia» ". 
While trade with Asia increased, it did not equal the trade with the British 
West Lidies and Canadá until after the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Furthermore, trade with the United States continued to grow, and exceeded 
pre-Revolutionary War levéis within twelve years of independence. At 
roughly the same time that a British movement against the transatlantic 
slave trade emerged, so too did the parliamentary concern with the 
govemance of India. Pitt's India Act of 1784 redefíned the relationship 
between the East India Company and gave considerable powers to the 
British govemment to control the activities of the Company. 
Equally dramatic were the various charges in the metrópolis against 
slavery. The govemment ended British involvement in the International 
slave trade in 1808, and then attempted, by diplomacy and by naval patrols, 
to end the slave trades of other nations. Legislation weakened the 
demographic and economic conditions of British colonies. Slave 
populations failed to experience natural rates of increase, and the closure 
of the slave trade meant that the slave populations of the West Indies 
declined. More important in its impact upon the Empire was the abolition 
of slavery by the British govemment in 1833. Slavery in the West Indies, 
Mauritius, and the Cape Colony carne to an end in 1834, and was followed 
by a four-to-six years of apprenticeship. Slavery in India and the smaller 
eastem colonies persisted legally until 1843 and 1844. Emancipation was 
" American independence did, however, indícate the continuing power of the 
mercantilistic ideas. The new legislation regarding ships, shipping, and trade resembled those 
of the British, except now presumably in the interests of the fonner colonies and not of 
the British metrópolis. 
" See Rose (1968), p. 12. Of particular importance in this transition were the «vast 
responsibilities in India» (p. 14). See also Marshall (1996), p. 10. 
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generally followed by large declines in output (particularly of sugar) and 
in the extemal trade of these colonies, losses due basically to failure to 
re-impose plantation systems seemingly essential for the efficient production 
of sugar. Within several years a new system of labor was introduced to 
replace plantation slavery, a system that had previously existed in the 
eighteenth century to facilítate the migration of population from Britain 
to its North American colonies. The nineteenth-century movement of 
indentured labor from India, and other low income countries, was generally 
highly regulated by the British, both in India and in the receiving countries. 
Mauritius was the first major recipient of Indian indentured labor, but 
it was only after 1850 that the movements of Indian indentured labor 
to the Caribbean became important. This form of migration lasted until 
the early twentieth century, but it had long been a debated issue of Empire 
policy. Indentured labor was of particvilar importance in the production 
of sugar, both in those áreas, such as Trinidad and British Guiana, where 
sugar had previously been grown by slaves, and in parts of the Empire 
such as Australia, Malaya, Fiji, and Natal, where there had been no previous 
sugar production or slave labor. 
Other legislation also influenced population flows within the Empire. 
Britain, like most other westem European nations, had used the colonies 
as dumping grounds for convict labor. A half-century of shipping convicts 
to North America carne to an end with the independence of the United 
States. There then followed an even larger outflow of convicts to Australia, 
which lasted for approximately three-quarters of a century, by which time 
the Australian states had legally ended this arrangement '*. 
VI. BRITISH SETTLEMENTS AROUND THE WORLD 
The British Empire began with a movement into the Atlantic Ocean '^. 
As with the other nations, some of the earliest settlements were little more 
than seasonal camps for fishermen, particularly those in Newfoundland 
" See Ekirch (1987) on the convict shipments to the thirteen colonies. For the shipments 
of convicts to Australia, see Shaw (1966). Shipment of convicts to overseas colonies was 
a practice also long-followed by other nations of Europe. 
" This discussion will include only what has been called the formal empire, under 
British political control. Prior to 1850 the informal empire, with extensive trading 
arrangements dominated by the British, was less important than it was to become. According 
to Cain and Hopkins (1993), Ch. 9-13, the pre-1850 informal empire would include 
Argentina, Brazil, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, and China. 
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in the early sixteenth century, or concessional ports in Asia, where first 
trading and then political control preceded (outside of Asia) larger-scale 
setdement. Schemes for colonization were presented in the latter part of 
the sixteenth century in the hope that a profitable trade with the «American 
aborigines» would be possible ^°. Nevertheiess, settlement by the Britísh 
people to produce foodstuffs and other goods for export back to England 
was soon seen as desirable. 
The initial British move towards Empire began in Virginia in the first 
decade of the seventeenth century, and the movement into Barbados and 
the Lesser Antilles followed in the 1620's. These islands had been left 
unsettled by the Spanish, with their focus on mainland Latin America. 
Britain was seldom the solé settler nation, either on the islands or on the 
mainland, and it often took a century before peaceful ownership was 
established ^^ The British East India Company was chartered in 1607, 
but few British setders went to India, and their share in the overall 
population under British control continued to be quite small, a dramatic 
difference fi-om most of the rest of the Empire ^^ . Initially, the British 
role in India was to trade, but dramatic changes occurred after 1784 with 
the imposition of govemment oversight over the Company and, eventually, 
the crown control after the 1857 Mutiny. India's economic role in the 
Empire included not only the trade in goods, but also the impact of the 
unbalanced trade in goods, described, altematively, as «invisible imports» 
or as the «drain», depending upon whether or not it is argued that there 
was economic exploitation of India which furthered British industrial 
development ^^ . Major additions in the Asian and Indian Ocean Empire 
occurred with military conquests, generally from the French or the Dutch, 
of Ceylon (1796), Mauritius (1810), the Cape Colony (1814), Singapore 
"^ This was the hope of three early writers - Peckham, Hakluyt, and Carleill. See Rose 
(1960), p. 69. Apparently they were not yet aware of the small numbers and «primitive 
life» of these Amerindians. 
'^ For a bríef discussion of Caribbean warfare, and changes in ownership of different 
islands, see Richardson (1992), pp. 50-62. 
" It is estimated that the European population of India was less than 0.02 percent 
of India's population in 1805. Of the approximately 30,000 British, about 70 percent were 
in the army and six percent in govemmental roles. See Maddison (1971), p. 44. According 
to Martin (1967), the British share rose to about 0.05 percent in 1836. Overall Martin's 
estimates have only 2.1 percent of the British Empire white, although in the áreas of the 
Americas, including the West Indies, the share was 63 percent white. The Americas had 
only 2.3 percent of the Empire's total population, but over 70 percent of its white population. 
" TTiese could include freight charges, ínsurance, banking services, and the costs of 
govemment, as well as unilateral transfers of funds to England. 
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(1824), Burma (1824), and Hong Kong (1842). In África, Sierra Leone 
became a Crown Colony in 1808, as a result of the failure of the 
humanitarian Sierra Leone Company's attempts at settlement with ex-slaves 
after 1787. 
Colonies in the Americas also expanded, as a result of setdements on 
the maiíJand and Ln the Caribbean, but also by way of military conquests 
firom other European powers. The most important of these military 
acquisitions were: Jamaica (from Spain, 1655), New York (from the Dutch, 
1664), Canadá (from the French, 1763), Trinidad (from the Spanish, 1797), 
and British Guiana (from the Dutch, 1803). These American territories 
became colonies of settlement by the British and their African slaves and 
included few Native-Americans. 
Australia's settlement began in 1788, initially Avith convict labor that 
could no longer be sent to the mainland North American settlements. 
Australia had been previously left alone by other European powers so that 
its colonization did not require conquest from other recent settlers. Over 
time the share of free and subsidized immigration from Britain increased, 
and the population inflow from the United Kingdom provided the labor 
forcé for developing the colony. Prior to the European arrival in Australia, 
there had been a substantial (if still debated) number of aborigines, but 
the aboriginal population suffered from a substantial decline in numbers ^ ''. 
The other major área of white settlement in the Pacific Ocean carne with 
the movement into New Zealand in the 1840's. 
Although the Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
expanded by military conquest, the British held on to a number of conquests 
for only limited periods of time, before retuming them to their previous 
owners, for strategic and diplomatic reasons. Among the áreas owned for 
several years prior to retum were the French Caribbean islands of 
Martinique and Guadeloupe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, Spanish Cuba (1761-63) and the Philippines, Dutch Surinam 
(1799-1816), Curagao (1810-1814), and Java and other áreas in the Dutch 
East Indies in the early nineteenth century, as well as several African ports. 
The one major loss to the British Empire carne with the successful 
revolution of the thirteen North American colonies, an área that had been 
quite prosperous before achieving independence and was to continué to 
be so after the Revolution. They soon become one of the major trading 
partners for the British, becoming their principal source of raw cotton and 
For a recent statement of this debate, see Butlin (1993), Ch. 12-14. 
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also being a large market for British manufactured goods (despite the 
imposition of U.S. tariffs) ^'. 
Vn. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF COLONIES 
Colonies were not costless to acquire, setde, and defend. Frequent 
and ejctensive wars led to losses of men and ships, and the diversión of 
capital and other economic resources from altemative uses. As previously 
noted, Britain was at war more than one-half of the years in this period, 
and military activity occurred in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and África. 
The costs of these wars was reflected in the comparatively high rates of 
taxation paid by the British and in the unusual size of the British public 
debt, as well as the magnitude of the military and the losses suffered in 
wartime ^^ . 
Although the Navigation Acts limited the Dutch control of the New 
World carrying trade in favor of the British shipping and merchants, their 
enforcement was at the expense of colonial producers and the European 
consumers of colonial produce. The Acts may have formed part of the 
defense of the realm by supporting a mercantile school as a nursery for 
" This had been predicted by John Lord Sheffleld (1970) at the ending of the 
Revolutionary War. «The solid power of supplying the wants of America, of receiving her 
produce, and of waiting her convenience, belongs almost exclusively to our own merchants», 
and «the industry of Britain wiU encounter litde competition in the American market.» 
This, he argued, was based in part on the easier availability of British credit (p. 5). 
^' The British war casualties and/or deaths in military service were, however, lower 
than those in France, Austria, Spain, and (per 1,000 population) the Netherlands. See Wright 
(1965), pp. 656-665. For more on «excess» military deaths, see Dimias and Vedel-Petersen 
(1923), pp. 25-37, and Hodge (1856), and for a discussion of the costs of the movement 
of the military into tropical áreas, see Curtin (1989). The costs of the Caribbean Wars 
during the Napoleonic Era are described by Duffy (1987). For discussions of the impact 
of war financing, see Williamson (1985), Ch. 11 and 12, and Peacock and Wiseman (1961), 
pp. 35-40. The latter indicates that the ratio of govemment expenditures to GNP was at 
its nineteenth century peak in the years between 1800 and the 1830's, being approximately 
double the ratio for the remainder of the century. For a comparison of taxation in Britain 
and France in the eighteenth century, see Mathias and O'Brien (1976). 
For a general discussion of the economic effects of wars, see O'Brien (1996), while 
for an early (1691) attempt at measuring the human and property losses due to the «Late 
Rebellion» in Ireland, estimating «the destruction of people made by the Wars, viz. by 
the Sword, Plague, and Famine occasioned thereby», see Petty (1899), pp. 149-159 («The 
Politicai Anatomy of Ireland»). For a judicious analysis of the effects of wars on British 
eighteenth century growth, see Ashton (1959), Ch. 3. For a discussion of the wars at the 
start of that century, see Jones (1983, 1991). See also Deane (1975), and Crouzet (1990), 
pp. 262-317. 
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the Royal Navy, but they raised shipping costs and lowered retums in 
the colonies. Smith's comparison of defense and opulence, and his favoring 
die former despite the higher cost shipping, suggests an awareness that 
a price was paid for the substitution of British for Dutch shipping and 
other commercial services ^^ . 
Thus it is not obvious that the Navigation Acts provided large net 
gains to the metrópolis. There has been some examination of the effect 
that the code had had on the mainland colonies and the West Indies in 
the 1760's and early 1770's, which indicate that they imposed costs on 
the colonies, primarily through constraints on the direct shipping of colonial 
exports to Europe. Estimates of these costs tum out to be relatively small, 
and may have been more than offset by those benefits received by the 
colonies from membership in the Empire, particularly in the form of defense 
provided and paid for by the metrópolis *^. Losses to the colonies need 
not imply a transfer of benefits to the metrópolis. Relations between the 
colonies and the home country cannot be represented as a zero-sum 
situation, and some legislation meant that both could have ended worse 
off. For example, whñe the requirement for transshipment of colonial 
exports to Europe via Britain provided a boost to British merchants, this 
requirement also imposed an implicit tax on consumers and the British. 
The transshipment of goods required deployment of ships and manpower. 
Thus, the implicit tax paid by the colonists also entailed some real costs 
to the metrópolis in terms of reallocated resources. Whatever the gains 
to British consumers, in terms of lower prices on these goods, as well 
as to merchants and shippers resulting from the transshipment provisions 
of the code, these were not cosdess to achieve. 
Furthermore, the protection of sugar production in the British West 
Indies effectively precluded the import of French sugar, which was then 
generally believed to be of lower cost than the British sugar ^. Thus the 
protective provisión of the Acts led to some redistribution from British 
" See Smith (1976), pp. 464-465. On Smith's comment and the related aspeas of 
British naval power, see Bau^ (1994). The shipping cost differentials were noted in the 
niid-eighteenth century by Posdethwayt (1967), and were frequendy pointed to by colonial 
planters, arguing for some offsetting subsidy. See also Harper (1939), Ch. 19. 
*^ As Davis and Huttenback (1982) indicate, the tax burden of the colonies was small 
relative to that in the metrópolis. The overall tax burden of the colonists was also probably 
less than that of most parts of Europe. On British taxes in general, see O'Brien (1988). 
^' A key question is how much of a shift to sugar produced in the French West Indies 
would have occurred in the absence of British protection. Presumably the availability of 
sugar produced in the British West Indies would have placed a ceiling on French prices, 
ümiting the possibility of artificially raising the French price to take advantage of their 
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consumers to planters in the Britísh West Indies, whether the planters 
were Britísh or not. More specifícally, the gains went to those who owned 
land in the colonies or to the sellers of slaves in África, depending on 
the long-term expectations of those involved in the trade, and how these 
expectations influenced the pnces of both slaves and land. TTie increased 
benefíts to sugar growers in the Britísh colonies because of the tariff 
protection would be capitalized in the prices of the scarce resources used 
to produce sugar — l^and and slaves. Slave prices in África had risen, 
however, possibly in Une with the future New World prices, to the extent 
that these could be accurately forecast. 
Vm. LABOR FLOWS IN THE EMPIRE 
We can examine aspects of the impact of the Empire by looking at 
its influence on suppÜes of factors of productíon to the home economy. 
Arguments about the effects of the Empire on labor supply included two 
different variants. At an early stage of expansión, when there was a fear 
of overpopulatíon in Britain, the acquisitíon of new territory to which 
migrants could go was perceived to have solved two problems —mitígating 
populatíon pressure in Britain and providing labor for the settlement of 
overseas áreas. The support for outmigration waned with the apparent 
reductíon in the growth of Britísh populatíon and the reduced apprehension 
of overpopulatíon that emerged in the eighteenth century. New áreas of 
settlement did, however, serve a useful purpose as recipients of special 
types of labor that were sent from Britain, partícularly convicts and paupers, 
who were dispatched, first, to mainland North America and then, after 
independence was achieved, to Australia. The first migrants to the Americas 
carne as part of settíement companies, followed by a large stream of 
indentured servants, few of whom retumed, and these laborers formed 
the early white populatíon of the thirteen colonies and the Caribbean 
islands ^. Unlike the movement to the Americas, that to India was relatívely 
small in numbers and primarily for military purposes. Thus down to the 
enhanced nutrket share. Despite the comparative sizes of the two West Indian empires, 
the Ftench colonies were clearly produdng more output, and growing more rapidly, than 
were the Btitish through 1790. In 1770, San Domingue alone produced more plantatíon 
crops than did the Britísh islands, and if there was any significant link between sugar, slavery, 
and industrializatíon, more would have been expected of late eighteenth century France. 
'° The indentured servants and the free migrants from Britain represented a general 
cross-section of the populatíon, a pattem somewhat similar to that of Spanish America and 
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end of the eighteenth century the outflow of English population was 
primarily to North America and, within North America, increasingly to 
the mainland with a declining share (and absolute amount) goíng to the 
earüer settled Caribbean islands '^ 
The loss in population in establishing the overseas Empire was relatively 
small, both compared with the total British population of the time and, 
even more dramatically, compared to the labor forcé within the Empire. 
In India and elsewhere in Asia this was the case because the political and 
trading controls established by the British were dependent upon local rulers 
and resident labor, with no need for further inmigration from England 
or elsewhere. Within the Caribbean there occurred, within a half-century 
of setdement, a shift from dependence on white labor to the import of 
slave labor from África with the shift from the production of tobáceo to 
that of sugar. A similar shift to increased slave labor, over a somewhat 
longer time lag and not as complete, also took place in the southem 
mainland colonies. Unlike in the Spanish áreas, however, the Amerindian 
population formed only a small component of the labor forcé on the 
mainland and in the Caribbean. 
For both free >j(Hhites and black slaves, there were extremely rapid rates 
of natural increase in the mainland colonies, reducing the need for further 
inmigration from across the Atlantic. This pattem differed from that in 
the British West Indies where both wWte and black mortality was high, 
and both suffered from negative rates of natural increase. Given the 
unfavorable disease environment, the share of whites in the population 
declined, due to reduced migration from England, and the population of 
the West Indies became about 90 percent black slave. The slave populations 
of the British Caribbean (as well as those of the French and Dutch colonies) 
could be maintained only by continued imports of slaves from África, until 
such traffíc became illegal. The need to purchase more slaves fix>m África 
meant further expenditures were necessary to solve the labor supply 
problem, while the need for further inputs of whites from Britain meant 
a continued drain of British population from the metropole. The ability 
Portuguese Brazil. See Galenson (1981), Ch. 2; McAlister (1984), Ch. 6, 18. Among the 
settling European natíons, it was only England and France that drew extensively upon 
indentured labor. For more on European emigration pattems, see the essays in Canny (1994) 
and in Altman and Hom (1991). 
" See, for estimates on British migration, Wrigley and Schofield (1981), pp. 219-228, 
App. 3; and for migration to British North America, Gemery (1980, 1984), and Galenson 
(1981). For an overview of migration to the Americas, see Eltis (1983). For a summary 
of the effects in changing skill distributions, see Erickson (1959). 
209 
STANLEY L. ENGERMAN 
to purchase slaves from África was important for the continued prosperity 
of the West Indies, although it is probable that with some changes 
(amelioration, etc.) many of the islands continued to be economically viable 
through the ending of slavery. 
Australian econotnic development depended on migration from Britain, 
since there was only limited employment of the aborigines, whose numbers 
had declined sharply with British contact. This flow to Australia in the 
nineteenth century represented a part of the overall outmigration, which 
served to reduce the growth of the metropolitan labor supply. Early 
settlement was dependent on shipments of convict labor, most of which 
remained after serving their temas. The growing numbers of free and 
subsidized migrants from England, and the local objections to more convict 
labor, reversed the relative importance of these different sources of labor. 
It was only in the second-half of the nineteenth century, with immigrants 
from India, China, and, most importandy, several of the Pacific islands 
as contract laborers, that Australia used non-white labor, and even this 
ended within a short time with the shift to a «white Australia» policy. 
Another large British colony, the Cape of Good Hope, captured from the 
Dutch in 1814, had a somewhat more balanced population than did the 
other British áreas. Whites formed about one-third of the overall 
population, which also included slaves, free blacks, and Africans. More 
than half these whites were Afrikaners, who had setded there prior to 
the British take-over, while slaves were about one-quarter of the overall 
population in 1833, just prior to emancipation. 
The labor forcé within the British Empire carne from several different 
sources and their acquisitíon involved quite different circumstances. 
Drawing upon an existing resident population required no direct 
expenditures by the British, although the military costs of conquest and 
control formed part of the price paid to obtain this labor. Free migration, 
paid for by the immigrant, could be cosdess to most other members of 
the home population, while convict labor could represent a savings on 
imprisonment costs, offset by the costs of shipment and relocatíon. 
Indentured servants required a payment in the receiving área, to the shipper 
or whoever bore the transport cost, and those required expenditures by 
the users of such labor. Migration from Britain was effected by relatíve 
retums expected in the Empire and at home. And slaves were not free 
or inexpensive, but rather required expenditures to meet the cost of 
enslavement within África and the transport to the coast, with payments 
going to slave acquirers and traders within África, and the costs of the 
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Middle Passage. The cost of slave labor rose over time, and a distinct 
capital expenditure was required by the coionies to increase the labor forcé 
in this manner. 
K . CAPITAL FLOWS IN THE EMPIRE 
Marxists attribute the imperialism of the late nineteenth centiary to 
the British need for outlets for excess capital, caused by oversavings relative 
to domestic capital needs. However accurate (or inaccurate) this claim 
is for the period after 1850, after the extensive growth of British capital 
exports, it is not one generally used to explain the rise of the British 
Empire '^. Throughout the pre-1800 period the British were a net importer 
of capital, with most of the fiinds coming from the Dutch ^^ . After the 
early years of the nineteenth century, Britain became a large exporter of 
capital to other nations, though this was mainly to Europe and to the 
United States, as well as to the newly-independent nations of Latin 
America '^*. Only a relatively small share went to áreas within the Empire. 
While some capital, mainly short-term trade credit, was provided to the 
North American coionies, it was only after independence, particularly in 
the 1830's that long-term capital flows to the United States became 
important. Short-term trade credit provided primarily by Britain and 
Holland was of considerable importance for the successful operation of 
the Atlantic economy''. 
These investments did not all yield satisfactory retums, the Latin 
American nations defaulted on loans in the 1820's and some states of 
the United States defaulted in the late 1830's and 1840's. Caribbean 
plantations also received funds in the colonial period, though much of 
the capital formation there entailed the use of slave labor for land clearing 
and preparation. Richard Pares argued over fifty years ago, that even after 
the initial years of settlement, the West Indian coionies continued to require 
" See Knorr (1944), pp. 233-234. See, however, the arricie by Barbara Solow (1985), 
whose argument on the Eric Williams thesis is premised upen the West Indias as an outlet 
for excess British capital. Knorr (1944) claims that by the time of Wakefield and Torrens 
the possibility of redundant capital was thought possible, and that this could be resolved 
by colonizatíon (pp. 296-307). 
" See Feinstein (1988), Neal (1990), and Cárter (1975). 
'* See Jenks (1927), Edelstein (1982), Ch. 2, Davis and Culi (1994), Ch. 1,2, and 
Davis and Huttenback (1986). 
" On the provisión of trade credit to the thirteen coionies, and the problems this 
created, see the writings of Jacob M. Price, particularly (1980, 1991), and Hancock (1995). 
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capital from Britain, and it is doubtful if profíts from sugar planting 
provided a major source of capital inflow into Britain and made a substantial 
contribution to the capital formation of the Industrial Revolution ^^ . India 
did not absorb much capital from Britain in this period. Indeed the debate 
about the so-called «drain» suggests a flow from India to Britain, whether 
as payment for financial and banking services, freight and carrying trade, 
or insurance or, rather, a form of British expropriation, that probably 
remained relatively small ^^ . During the formation of the Empire the nature 
of capital outflows seems to have been quite different than it became 
between 1873 and 1914. *^ 
X. THE IMPACT OF EMPIRE 
Attempts to estimates the benefits and costs of the Empire to Britain 
pose many problems, theoretically and empirically. Much of the difficulty 
resolves around the specification of the appropriate state-of-the-world 
required to understand what could have happened in the absence of 
imperialism. While often discussed purely in theoretical terms, the 
specifícation of altematives was often made by contemporaries, and is 
important as a description of the nature of the economy at the time. 
A necessary question for historical analysis is whether the economy 
contained unemployed factors and unutilized resources or, rather, if the 
economy was in a condition that altemative employment of the resources 
would have been possible^^. The need to consider altematives uses for 
available resources indicates that the overall gains from, say, increased 
export demand may not have been large because to meet increased demand 
some other types of output and uses of factors of production wovild be 
^ See Pares (1937), and Pitman (1917), Ch. 6, who contrasts the French and the 
British West Indies, arguing for the greater needs of the British islands for capital from 
the metrópolis than was the case for the French islands. 
" See Maddison (1971), pp. 63-66. 
'* On this see, in particular, Hobson (1902), Edelstein (1982), and Cain and Hopkins 
(1993). Neither Hobson ñor Lenin in their writings on imperialism spend much time on 
the period prior to the 1850's. 
" The debates among contemporaries often made this distinctions, implicitly if not 
explicitly. The argued-for advantages or disadvantages of colonies to the home country were 
generally based upon comparisons with altemative circumstances. For a brief, but informative, 
listing of the arguments of the advantages, disadvantages, and utility of colonies «to the 
mother country,' see the subject Índex in Knorr (1944), pp. 425-426. See also Winch (1965). 
For a discussion of «The Commercial Valué of Imperialism», drawing the same distinctions, 
see Hobson (1902), pp. 28-30. 
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reduced. For example, diere were early arguments diat die increased 
volume of shipping flowing from overseas trade led to a greater utilization 
of labor and of natural resources (particularly timber) for die construction 
of ships. If this meant die need to attract labor from elsewhere where 
it was presently employed, then it might cause the British economy to 
suffer from shortages of labor in other sectors. Further, there might have 
been extra costs imposed on the iron industry because of the shortage 
of timber caused, in part, by the naval and maritime demands *°. 
These questions about the altemative use of resources are also central 
to debates about the effect of tariffs (explicit or implicit) on imports and 
import-competing industries, as well as of other govemmental policies 
designed to influence economic development. It is probable that tariffs 
on imports will increase output in the protected sector of the economy, 
but it is doubtful if the net effect wül be to raise national income or welfare, 
once allowance is made for the effects of the costs of the tariffs on domestic 
consumers, and upon other producers, including those producing 
commodities for export. 
XI. ECONOMIC MODELS TO EXAMINE EMPIRES 
The difficulty in formulating precise answers to questions about the 
impact of policy reflects both the uncertainly about the empirical 
magnitudes of their effects as well as of the knowledge about the 
state-of-the-world at the time. The choice of an appropriate model with 
which to examine these questions has also been a long-standing source 
of disagreement among economic historians. 
The most basic model used to approach questions such as the effects 
of Empire has been the static equilibrium model, which asks what difference 
it would have made if a particular demand source (or supply response) 
had not existed but which ignores dynamic or extemal effects. Such a 
*" Interpretatíon of this case is made more difficult, however, by the subsequent linking 
of irmovations in coal-based fiíels in the iron industry to the timber shortage. While it may 
be that shortages genérate induced innovations which then lead to economic betterment 
(as in Habakkuk's (1962) argument about the impact of labor scarcity m the U.S.), this 
is not an easy argument to generalize, since it is not ciear why one set of shortages would 
have such favorable effects while others would not, or why effects should be favorable 
in one área but not in another. It places rather heavy weight on the responses of the members 
of society to perceived difficulties. For a brief discussion of the effects of Britain's early 
timber shortage, see Nef (1937). 
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model has been used to analyze movements in labor supply (e.g., to study 
the effects of migratíon on the áreas of outflow and receipt), as weU as 
changes in savings (and the impact of savings upon investment at home 
or in the Empire). Its most frequent historiographic use has been in relation 
to arguments about the extemal demands for exports. It could be argued 
that this export demand from the Empire provided for the employment 
of labor and of other resources that would presumably not have otherwise 
been utiÜzed or, if utilized, only in uses that yielded lower retums. British 
income would therefore be higher as a result of export demand than it 
would have been in the absence of Empire, by an amount possibly as 
great as the source of demand if no altemative employment possibilities 
existed, or still positive, but lower if there were other uses, but these were 
not quite as rewarding. The impacts may be argued to have been even 
greater if multiplier effects (which also assumes the presence of resources 
with no or limited altemative uses) were positive, or, if some dynamic 
effects or extemalities were introduced into the assessment, irrespective 
of the level of unemployed resources. 
These questions of altemative possibilities, implicit in any cost 
accounting exercise for Empire, are obviously extremely difficult to answer, 
no matter what case one is trying to make in regard to the effects of 
changes in demand for exports. The same complexities arise in examining 
the nature of changes in supply and demand for factors of production. 
Central to any understanding of British economic growth is the explanation 
for induced, or for exogenous, variations in the labor supply. Were there 
increased annual amounts of labor input, and, if so, were they due to 
a shift out of seasonal industries, or to a reduced desire for leisure? If 
less leisure, was this the result of voluntary cholees, in the interests of 
obtaining more consumer goods, or was the reduction in leisure imposed 
by some coercive mechanism? The increased demand for consumption, 
and thus the increased willingness to work may have been, as Malthus 
claimed, due to the availability of exotic new goods from imperial and/or 
foreign sources ''^ 
Using these models and even with the assumption of unemployed 
resources, however, the magnitudes of intemational or of Empire trade 
'^ See Malthus (p. 403). Malthus argües that «one of the greatest benefits which foreign 
commerce confers, and the reason why it has always appeared an almost necessary ingredient 
in the progress of wealth, is, its tending to inspire new wants, to fonn new tastes, and 
to fumish &esh motives for industry». Presumably domestically produced luxuries covdd 
have had a similar effect in increasíng the willingness to work longer hours and/or with 
greater intensity. 
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remain relatively small compared to the expansión of domestic demand, 
though the share in the increment to industrial output may have been 
higher at various times ^^. Thus many of the arguments conceming the 
necessity of Empire for metropolitan growth prefer to focus on a range 
of dynamic spinoffs to allow for more significant effects. Yet to substantiate 
the point about the significance of Empire, it must be argued that the 
dynamic effects could only occur because of a particular and specified 
demand pattem, and not because of other economic circumstances. Thus, 
in some of the arguments heavier weight is given to the impact of less 
than ten percent of the economy (the share of exports in GNP for most 
of the eighteenth century), or less than five percent, the even smaller share 
of exports going to the Empire, since, it is contended that the dynamic 
influence of the other ninety percent of the economy's expenditure, coming 
from domestic demand, was Ümited '^^. The basis of those dynamic impacts 
from foreign and Empire demands could be: (1) internal to the firm, so 
that increased demand leads to a lowering of costs''''. (2) economies 
••^  For estimates of the share of exports in British national income, see Crafts (1985), 
p. 131; Crouzet (1990), pp. 213-261; and O'Brien and Engerman (1991). Leandro Prados 
de la Escosura (1993), p. 80-81, provides the foUowing rough estimates for shares of export 
trade in national income in the late eighteenth century: Great Britain, 9.4%; France, 4%; 
and Spain, between 3% and 7.4%. Peter Emmer (1991) estimates the share of overseas 
trade in Dutch income at about 10 percent, and its trade with Europe at about one-third 
of GNP. See also Emmer and Butel, beiow. The shares of the total exports of the Dutch 
and French with their colonies were generally below those of the British, Spanish, and 
Portuguese. For an analysis of Spain's early nineteenth-century empire, and the limited impact 
upon Spain of its loss, see Prados de la Escosura (1990). 
•" The growth of exports was most rapid after the colonial period, in the second and 
third quarters of the nineteenth century, the constant pnce share of exports in national 
income being almost twice as high in 1851 as in 1801, with a more than doubling between 
1841 and 1871. Crouzet (1990), p. 244. While the current pnce export share was relatively 
high in 1801, exports were considerably higher than in the preceding years, and it took 
several decades before the shares of 1801-1802 were consistendy exceeded. Crouzet (1990), 
pp. 243-245; Mitchell and Deane (1962), pp. 281-283. 
*^ This argument has frequendy been made for the cotton textile industry. But the 
tapid growth of cotton textile manufacture did not occur until the 1780's, and exports 
did not exceed domestic consumption imtil the start of the nineteenth century, both dates 
after the presumed start of the Industrial Revolution (Crouzet (1990), pp. 226, 251; Davis 
(1979), pp. 14-16, 65-66). And, in many years through the 1830's, Europe received more 
than one-half of the export of British cotton goods. Davis (1979), p. 15; Edwards (1967), 
p. 243; Famie (1979), Ch. 3. The West Indies were an early source of raw cotton, but 
after 1800 most carne from the United States, no longer a part of the Empire. Davis (1979), 
p. 41. Thus the contribution of the Empire to the growth of industry via the cotton textile 
industry was relatively small and as Clapham had indicated, the modem parts of the cotton 
textile industry generally accounted for only a small part of the economy. See Clapham 
(1967), pp. 54, 72, 74; Deane and Colé (1962), p. 202; Famie (1979), Ch. 3. Fanüe (1979), 
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extemal to the firm but intemal to the industry, such as the expansión 
of wholesale and retail distribution networks as industries expand, based 
on an increased number of fírms, each of limited size; or (3) economies 
externa! to the firm and the industry, but intemal to the economy, as 
illustrated by Adam's Smith discussion of the división of labor and George 
Stigler's analysis of vertical disintegration and increased specialization by 
fírms. These extemal effects include the creation of many specialized 
activities in transportation, financing, or industries otherwise reducing 
transaction costs between firms, and between producers and consumers. 
That such developments as external economies, with vertical 
disintegration and increased specialization, enhanced productivity in the 
economy, occurred during this period, and made the economy more 
productive, is not to be doubted. Orders of magnitude have, however, 
been diffícult to determine, and the specific linkages to foreign and to 
Empire demand compared to intemal demand remains problematic. For 
most industries, including cotton textiles, sales in the home maritet generally 
exceeded exports throughout the eighteenth century and, in most cases, 
afterwards. To focus narrowly on the Empire's contribution to British 
economic growth, without also detaíling the wide diffusion of growth in 
efficiency and in output throughout the economy, is to miss some essential 
aspects of the process of British economic growth"". ITie flexibility and 
adaptability of the domestic firms and entrepreneurs, and the labor forcé, 
might serve to distinguish British from other economies of Westem Europe, 
given the relatively smaller differences in shares of extemal trade and in 
the nature of the empires at this time than there were in the relative rates 
of growth of incomes ^. 
Xn. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF EMPIRE 
The evaluation of the benefíts of Empire are diffícult both to describe 
and to measure. Any attempt to provide a fvill benefit-cost calculation, 
which requires measures of the costs of acquiring and maintaining the 
p. 26, estimates that the hig^est contribution of increased cotton textile production to the 
increase of national income was about 13 percent, between 1781-83 and 1819-21. 
•" The relevance of balanced versus unbalanced growth modeb in expiaining British 
economic growth in this period has been studied by McCloskey, Crafts, and Berg. 
* See the estimates of trade shares in the 1770's for Britain, France, and Spain made 
by Prados, sununarized in footnote 42. 
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Empire, to see if it was an economically rewarding activity for the nation 
seems impossible to produce. A focus on the possible gains of Empire 
in the forms of increased income, power, or prestige can downplay the 
considerable costs that the Empire imposed on the nation ''^ . Furthermore, 
pointing to the gains of individuáis and defining them as gains to the nation 
wül overlook offsetting costs to other individuáis due to the policies 
pursued '*^. These points have been given attention in several implicit 
benefit-cost examinations of the British economy made at, and for, different 
time periods. For example, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, James Mili, 
Karl Marx, J. A. Hobson, and Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback, are 
only a few among the economists and others who have suggested both 
that empires were costly to the metrópolis, and that much of what some 
depict as social gains were primarily redistributions among the members 
of the population'". These were not arguments against trade with new 
áreas of setdement, but arguments that the benefits of trade could be 
obtained without the need to pay the costs of owning or ruling territory 
and resources overseas. 
The costs of Empire that are downplayed include: the costs of the 
army and navy, and of resources used in warfare, to acquire and defend 
the Empire; higher taxation than in many other nations, and also higher 
than in the colonies; the higher pnces paid to import protected commodities 
(e.g., eighteenth century British West Indian sugar rather than sugar 
produced by the French colonies, and, as was the intent of the original 
Navigation Acts, higher costs paid for British transadantic shipping 
compared to the Dutch). In some cases, moreover, depending upon the 
nature of market conditions, the benefits may not have gone to the 
metrópolis. While slavery no doubt reduced the cost of sugar to British 
consumers (relative to the hypothetical costs of sugar produced by free 
labor) it might have been even more benefícial for British consumers to 
•" For a detailing of some of the arguments relating colonialism and economic 
development in Europe, see Landes (1969), pp. 33-39. For a discussion of the evaluation 
of the benefits and costs of the Navigation Acts, see Harper (1939), pp. 376-378. At present 
there are no detailed calculations of the relative costs of different empires, and we do 
not know if, for some reasons, the British had a more expensive empire than did other 
nations. 
'" In regard to the redistribution aspects of policy regarding empire, it is also important 
to consider whether gains (and costs) accrue to the state and the treasury, or to prívate 
individuáis. Depending on where the benefits go and the costs come from, quite different 
political actions might be introduced. 
•" See, e.g., Knorr (1944), pp. 262-264: «The Interest of the Few versus that of the 
Many». 
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have purchased the lower-cost sugar produced by the French slaves. 
Furthermore, increased Britísh demand for sugar, and for slaves, may have 
yielded benefíts to West Indian owners of plantations, but they would have 
paid higher prices for imported slaves, and thus passed on some of die 
benefíts to the African suppliers of slaves. 
The costs and benefíts of Empire certainly varied over time. Thus it 
has been argued that the early Empire paid, but over time its costs increased 
and the Empire became less desirable on economic grounds. For example, 
a famous thesis presented by Eric Williams maintains that the West Indian 
sugar and slavery complex had been highly profítable, and that it made 
signifícant contributions to the British Industrial Revolution throughout 
most of the eighteenth century ^°. Then, when British economic 
development led to changes in economic and poütical structure, and when 
West Indian sugar production presumably declined due to both the 
American Revolution and the failure of plantation owners to adopt to new 
technologies, the British West Indies became either unprofítable or far 
less profítable, and thus an unnecessary part of the Empire. They became 
economically expendable, thereby creating conditions for the prohibition 
of, first, the slave trade and, later, slavery. These arguments remain 
contested, but they do suggest the retums from Empire varied over time. 
There have been several attempts by economic historians to measure 
the benefíts and costs of different parts of the Empire. Estimates for the 
thirteen colonies in the period just prior to the American Revolution have 
suggested that, for at least that part of the Empire, there were no signifícant, 
if any, positive benefíts to Britain. Similar conclusions have also been argued 
for the economies of the West Indies at about the same time '*. To some 
extent these numbers may understate the overall costs of Empire, since 
'" See Williams (1944), and for a flavor of the ensuing debate, see Drescher (1977), 
and Solow and Engerman (1987). 
" The debate on the profitability of the British West Indies between Richard Sheridan 
(1965) and Robert Paul Thomas (1968) includes some disagreement as to the possible 
altemative use of resources, some question as to the evaluation of war and military costs, 
and a disagreement on the relative costs of French West Indian and British West Indian 
sugar, among other Ítems. Some attribute the lower cost of producing sugar on the French 
islands to better soil, others to better care of slave labor, and others to a better French 
colonial policy. Thomas understates the benefíts of the West Indies to British colonists 
because of a failure to allocate the capital gains going to the original landowners on the 
islands. See also Coelho (1973). On the thirteen colonies, for the debate started by Harper 
(1939) see, most recently, Sawers (1992). This debate is summarized in Atack and Passell 
(1994), Ch. 3. Writing in 1803, Henry Brougham (p. 539) finds that earlier the French 
colonies had been superior to the British and (p. 590) «the French colonies were much 
more essential to the mother country than the English». 
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they are based on the contemporary expenditures on the military, and do 
not necessarily include the costs of warfare to initially acquire and later 
maintain these colonies. These estimates include the costs of defensa, the 
costs of indirect shipping to European markets, and the costs of diverting 
colonial resources into different productiva sectors due to the tariff-like 
effects of the Navigation Acts. It might, however, be argued that the defense 
costs were to provide for unmeasured benefits of national power, necessary 
for statebuilding at the time, and that potentially productive resources 
would not have been otherwise utilizad without the trade regulations, thus 
lowering their properly estimated costs. 
Xm. STATE-BUILDING AND EMPIRE-BUILDING 
In avaluating the overall benefits and costs of Empire to the 
metropolitan power, it is necessary to retum to the question of the 
motivation for acquiring new tarritory. Ware the colonies seen as an 
economic investment, with the costs necessary to achieve these gains, or 
were the costs paid for non-economic ends, such as power and domination. 
To numerous contemporaries as well as subsequant scholars, strong 
economic motivations were involved, but the goals of power, prestige, and 
other forms of conspicuous consumption also played a major role in 
justifying Empire-building. Less attention was often paid in these cases 
to the acquisition and maintenance costs involved. Here distinctions 
between trade with oversaas áreas and ownership of tha tarritory overseas 
becomes important, and the costs of the colonies can be related to higher 
goals and broadly defined national interests. For example, if it is argued 
that state-building was aided by the development of an overseas empire, 
and that without Empire a strong nation-state would not have been possible, 
then relatively narrow economic considerations might be sean as irralevant. 
The basic questions are whether these national objectives are related and 
if there was soma optimum extent of Empire, or time-path of expansión 
and contraction, that would have servad to best meet these objectives. 
A central question in linking Empire and state-building is concemed 
with the relation between the extemal Empire and the nature of the intemal 
aconomy. Tha first successful overseas empires were those of the Spanish 
and tha Portuguese. The Dutch had a rich and highly controlled Asian 
empire, while the French Caribbean colonies were highly productive, and 
France had a larga military establishmant. Thus the British were neither 
219 
STANLEY L. ENGERMAN 
the first, ñor the only, to have a large and apparently profítable set of 
overseas colonies. Yet Britain became both the fírst industrial nation and 
also the nation that had acquired the largest Empire. Perhaps its rather 
effective domestic economy allowed Britain to effectively acquire an empire. 
The apparently greater flexibility of the British economy and the nation's 
liberal political regime also allowed a more growth-oriented pattem of 
intemal and extemal change. Altematively, the British may have had 
somewhat different motives, and were more concemed with economic 
retums than with satisfying religious or other political aims. Although other 
colonial powers sought specie and plundered that may suggest a myopic 
economic strategy rather than the absence of acquisitive motivations. 
The analysis of the role of Empire in British economic growth is similar 
to relatad debates on the role of foreign trade, here with the relevant 
foreign trade Hmited to that within the Empire. This link is not inevitable. 
Smith and odiers pointed out that the benefíts of foreign trade could be 
obtained without the cosdy burdens of Empire. Arguments for the 
importance of foreign trade, with or without Empire, assume that Britain 
needed an extemal source of demand because of the limitations of the 
home market. Limited intemal demand was also part of the debate on 
the British standard of living, the foreign demands provided for increases 
in employment that otherwise could presumably not have been achieved 
in any other way '^. The source of increased imperial demands remain, 
however, to be determined, and Deane and Colé argued that the rapid 
growth in demand for the British goods by the West Indies and the thirteen 
colonies was not exogenous but could be attributed to the growth of 
incomes generated by increased demands for colonial products coming from 
within Britain. 
The basic argument for the importance of overseas markets, whether 
or not they formed part of the Empire, was the increasing ratio of exports 
to national income. Various refinements to this main measure have been 
advocated, such as shares of exports to manufacturing production, or, the 
shares of exports from those modem sectors which had key dynamic impacts 
for future growth. This makes it important to analyze not only the overall 
magnitude of the foreign demand, but also the particular áreas from which 
the demand emanated, and the nature of demand pattems in different 
markets. Nevertheless, the systematic increase in the ratio of exports to 
income came after the Napoleonic Wars, not in the earlier stages of British 
industrialization. 
" See Engerman (1995) for a discussion of these issues. 
220 
BRmSH IMPERIAUSM IN A MERCANTIUST AGE, 14921849 
The case for the importance of Empire tests on the share of the colonies 
in the total growth of trade, and the share of imperial trade relative to 
national income. The assumption is that the the role of the Empire would 
not have expanded if metropolitan controls over the empire had not 
influenced trade. Wars and imperial policies clearly influenced the evolution 
of trade over time, but the contention that Empire mattered also depends 
on the place of the United States, after it achieved independence, in the 
argument. It is probable that imperial trade increased its share over the 
fírst half of the eighteenth century. Thereafter, given the increased 
importance of early nineteenth century trade with the United States, the 
share stabilized. Nevertheless, the share of the Empire in British trade 
over the eighteenth century was generally less than one-third of total trade, 
less than 3 percent of total output (except for an unusual period just prior 
to the start of the American Revolution, when European demands were 
low). Adding in the so-called informal Empire (besides the United States), 
would not raise these figures by substantial amounts even in the nineteenth 
century, with the largest new sources of demand being within the Empire, 
India and Australia, and also, in the informal empire, South America. 
XIV. SLAVERY, THE «DRAIN», AND BRITISH 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
In addition to these arguments about the overall significance of the 
Empire, arguments are also made about the role of particular parts of 
the Empire, of particular producís, or of particular instítutions, labor and 
other. The most familiar of these is Eric Wüliams's argument about the 
importance of the slave trade and slave-produced sugar in the British West 
Indies. The incomes firom sugar production, which were based on the use 
of slave labor, allowed for increased purchases of goods manufactured in 
Britain, as well as increasing the pool of investible profíts. This argument, 
linking slavery and capitalism, provides a variant of Marx's primitive 
accumulatíon, as well as leading according to Walter Rodney and others, 
to the underdevelopment of África both via the loss in population with 
the export of labor in the slave trade and the deindustrialization resulting 
fi"om import of low-cost British manufactured goods in payment for slaves. 
This latter contention of lowered African incomes due to the slave trade 
was familiar firom the eighteenth century, it being claimed by Postlethwayt 
and others, that ending the transatlantic slave trade would have greatiy 
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increased European txade with África. While Williams's views on die 
contributíon of slavery to industrialization remain debated, as does his 
economic explanation for abolition and emancipatíon, he did provide an 
argument for the shifting economic fortunes of Empire over time that raises 
important questions for the examination of the full history of Empire. 
Similarly, as noted above the argument that the «drain» from India 
contributed both to British industrialization and Indian deindustrialization 
has played a similar role in the historiography of India as did the slave 
trade and slavery for the West Indies. The unbalanced trade between India 
and Britain was presumably the cause of a shift of funds to Britain to 
underwrite some of the investment going into industrialization. The 
magnitude of such an exploitative shift, however, remains uncertain, given 
the various cost items of shipping, trading, finance, etc., as well as local 
costs of defense and govemment within India. As with the Williams thesis, 
this issue remains debated both as to magnitude and signifícance. For the 
eighteenth centuty it is these two regions —the East Indies and the West 
Indies plus, prior to independence, the thirteen colonies, that have been 
considered the key Empire sources of contributions to British growth, at 
roughly the same time period, although with quite different mechanisms. 
XV. CHANCES IN TRADE AND FACTOR MOVEMENTS 
The analysis of the contribution of the role of the control of imperial 
áreas for purposes of directing trade and factor movements in order to 
promote metropolitan economic growth has presented a number of quite 
different scenarios. For the second half of the nineteenth century a key 
argument was the Empire as absorber of investable funds and thereby 
a needed offset to tendencies to oversavings within Britain, but this has 
not been claimed for the pre-1850 period. For that era the significant 
economic issues include the role of trade, both as a source of markets 
for exports of British manufactured goods and as a source of imports of 
raw materials, including sugar and other foodstuffs. 
The impact on manufacturing has been noted above; here the possible 
contribution of imports will be mentioned. Malthus claimed that exotic 
consumption goods would increase the willingness of workers to forego 
leisure and that this could help explain increases in labor supply. To the 
extent that increased labor supply was seen as desirable, it does not fit 
in well with the argument that overpopulation made colonies desirable 
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as an outlet for surplus labor. While the British did not benefit to the 
same extent as other colonial empires, particularly the Spanish and the 
Portuguese, from the mining of gold and silver they did benefit by bullion 
received from trade with these nations '^. The import of raw materials 
for production, as opposed to goods like sugar, tea, and tobáceo was a 
central argument for Empire. At that time it was often applied to naval 
stores, including timber, not all of which came, however, from Empire 
sources, Baltic timber being the first major source of this import during 
the eighteenth century. The West Indian colonies produced raw cotton, 
but the main supplier to Britain during the major years of cotton textile 
production after 1800 was a non-imperial source, namely the United States. 
In regard to capital flows, Britain probably shifted from being a net 
capital importer to a net capital exporter at the start of the nineteenth 
century. By 1800 several sectors of the Empire had been established, and 
it remains uncertain if the colonies required continued inflows of capital, 
or if, as a result of their profits, they were either able to meet local 
investment demands (which often required labor inputs from slaves for 
land clearing) or even repatriated capital back to the metrópolis. That 
capital was sent from the colonies to the home country need not mean 
that this represented a net gain from Empire. If the major basis of plantation 
profits was the restrictive regulations imposed by the British, rather than 
a net gain to the British Empire, these profits would have represented 
a redistribution from British consumers. The impact of colonial capital 
flows on British interest rates and investment, and the possible extemalities 
that these transactions had in making financial institutions more effective, 
all remain subjects of debate '"*. It appears that Britain did not suffer from 
a surplus of capital in the period covered, pointing to the need to explain 
the sharp changes in the level of foreign investment in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. 
There were also changes in the nature of the supply of labor, although 
Smith and others argued that those had taken place earlier, in the 
mid-eighteenth century". When overpopulation was seen as a major 
problem, colonies were considered useful as a source for its relocation, 
" For a descriptíon of bullion movements among the European countries, see Attman 
(1986). 
'•' The «export» of financial services by Britain raay also have played a significant role 
in British gains from the rest-of-the-world. Given mercantilist arguments, however, these 
were accorded less attention than were the exports of goods. 
" See, e.g.,Coats (1958). 
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a move which would also help Britain by providing a higher demand for 
British goods that presumably would not have odierwise existed. There 
were losses of populatíon by the British, due to free migration, indentured 
labor, and convicts, primarily to the Americas, with the share going to 
the mainland increasing over time. Overall these losses were a relatively 
small share of the British population, and the outflow declined with the 
eighteenth century recovery of the British economy '^. But, as noted above, 
the British Empire was able to get large labor supplies for its colonies 
either by using the resident population or, as in the West Indies, spending 
funds to acquire slave labor from África. The exceptional case was Australia, 
but here again the number of migrants before 1850, free or migrant, was 
only a small share of the British population. 
XVI. WAR AND EMPIRE 
The importance of warfare and military operations in promoting 
economic growth had been argued for by Werner Sombart, and 
subsequently criticized by John U. Nef and others ' ' . Warfare could provide 
for specific types of demands and innovations that might (or might not) 
also have had civilian uses. Warfare also absorbed numbers of what might 
otherwise have been regarded as a surplus population, thus easing potential 
social problems, but at some cost, morally if not economically. These 
arguments about the benefits of war depend upon the assumptions of 
unutilized labor and of other resources if they are to claim a large, benefícial 
economic impact. Running a large military establishments requires means 
of control and organization that could be carried forward to business fírms, 
particularly as they increase in size, although this extemality is seldom 
argued for, either at the time or now. These types of «benefits» of war 
could be argued to occur even without winning, and getting the advantages 
that come from territorial acquisition, confiscation, or access to laborers. 
But wars can be fought without requiring an Empire for justifícation, and 
it appears that their benefits were often costly in terms of Ufe and property. 
" See Wrigley and Schofield (1981). 
" See the discussionin Nef (1950). 
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XVn. CONCLUSIÓN 
The absence of any strong conclusión to the questions of the benefits 
and costs of the Empire should not be too surprising, given the large number 
of relationships that have been posited and the great difficulty of satisfactory 
theoretical analysis and empirical measurement. Even determining the most 
appropriate counterfactual to use remains uncertain. Much of the historical 
discussion takes the foim of treating the question as either-or in regard 
to Empire, while many contemporaries were concemed with issues involving 
relatively minor changes to make the system more effective —economically 
and/or politically. One major suggestion for future work related to this 
question is an increased attention to war and to the military and human 
costs of Empire-building, and whether many Europeans might have done 
better with less Empire and more peaceful activity. A second issue concems 
the full life-cycle of Empire, and the costs imposed during the dismantling, 
voluntary or involuntary, of Empire in the twentieth century. 
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